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This thesis is fundamentally about the size of verbs. The question I am asking is
whether verbs have information about their arguments that they project into the
syntax or not. I am going to pursue an approach where verbs do not have such
information and ask what the implications are for our theories of syntax and the
interface between syntax and semantics. I will argue that two seemingly unrelated
phenomena are actually intimately related: whether thematic arguments should be
severed from the verb and whether there is a syntactic difference between external
and internal arguments. The objects of study here are the mental representations
underlying these two phenomena.
It has long been known that hierarchical syntactic structures important for
semantic interpretation; in modern times, this goes back at least to Chomsky (1955,
1976) and May (1977). In particular May’s work lead to a range of interesting
constraints on LF, which is a syntactic level of representation that serves as input
to semantic interpretation (see also Huang (1982), May (1985), Heim and Kratzer
(1998), among others). However, for most semanticists, they have assumed what
they need to assume in order to get their semantic derivations to work, rather than
investigating the syntactic representations themselves. Syntacticians, on the other
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hand, tend to set aside concerns for how their syntactic structures eventually will
get interpreted. The goal of the present work is to bring syntax and semantics
together such that syntax transparently maps onto semantics, where transparency
really means transparency in the spirit of Montague (1974b). I will do this by
focusing on two domains of grammar: phrase structure and argument structure.
The core idea that I will explore is that eliminating the phrase structural differ-
ence between external and internal arguments makes it possible to give a transparent
account of how syntactic structure maps onto fully severed Neo-Davidsonian logi-
cal forms. That is, by eliminating the relational difference between specifiers and
complements, I am able to provide a syntax that maps transparently onto Neo-
Davidsonian logical forms. Simplifying for now, a sentence like (1) will have the
logical form in (2).
(1) Brutus stabbed Caesar.
(2) ∃e[stab(e) & Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar)]
Each piece of the syntactic structure that is spelled out will correspond to each of
these conjuncts. Chapter 4 will show in great detail how this works.
I will refer to Neo-Davidsonian representations of the sort in (2) as full the-
matic separation. My main proposal will consist of revising Spell-Out domains such
that each Spell-Out domain gives a conjunct at logical form. Each Spell-Out do-
main will be conjoined and existential closure will be added at the end. Together
with the mapping principles that maps syntactic structure into logical forms, I will
also assume translation principles that determine how elements manipulated by the
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syntax are translated into a logical notation for interpretation.
This introductory chapter will briefly outline some of my core assumptions,
which involves saying a bit about which particular version of the Minimalist Program
I will be working with. A roadmap of the chapter will also be provided. I will not
discuss more general and foundational questions concerning the nature of syntax
and semantics and how they relate to each other, and in particular how the theory
I will develop is (or is not) compositional. I will leave some of these questions for
chapter 6, where I discuss issues concerning how complex syntax and semantics are
and how we should think about compositionality from a mentalistic perspective.
1.2 A Minimalist Syntax and Semantics
The approach I will be pursuing here follows the Minimalist Program (also just
called Minimalism) initiated by Chomsky (1995c). Minimalism is an attempt at
deepening our understanding of Government and Binding Theory (GB). That is,
Minimalism builds on the successes of GB and asks why the Faculty of Language
should have these properties as opposed to other properties one can imagine, cf.
Boeckx (2006), Hornstein (2009) and Lasnik and Lohndal (In press). As such,
Minimalism does not constitute a paradigmatic change. Rather, it takes the results
from GB for granted and attempts at advancing our understanding of these results.
Thus, in essence, the approach is not extremely different from GB since it relies
on GB and develops the theory further by asking new and deeper questions, in
particular why the theory should look the way it does, and more recently, how the
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Faculty of Language developed evolutionarily. It is, however, important to stress
that Minimalism would not have been possible had there not been GB to rationalize.
The architecture of the grammar that is typically assumed is given in (3).
(3) lexicon
⇓
Narrow Syntax: External and Internal Merge
⇓
phon ⇐ Spell-Out ⇒ sem
⇓
phon ⇐ Spell-Out ⇒ sem
⇓
phon ⇐ Spell-Out ⇒ sem
⇓
. . .
I am not going to say much about the lexicon at this point as I will return to it below.
I will also stay neutral as to whether there is a Lexical Array/Numeration or not; this
will not affect any of what follows.1 The basic operation in narrow syntax is Merge.
Merge can create either an ordered or an unordered set. I will follow Chomsky (2004)
in assuming that Set Merge gives an unordered set {α, β} whereas Pair Merge gives
an ordered set < α, β >.2 Merge also comes in two ‘flavors’: External Merge and
1See Collins (1997), Putnam (2007), Stroik (2009a,b) for discussion of the importance of
numerations.
2See Zwart (2009, 2011) for a different view.
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Internal Merge. The former can be paraphrased as ‘first-Merge’ whereas the latter
corresponds to movement. Formally, these two operations amount to the same:
two elements are put together and the operation itself does not differ depending
on whether the element comes from the lexicon or whether it is an element that
already exists in the structure and that is being re-merged. See also Hunter (2010)
for more discussion. In chapter 5, we will see reasons for abandoning this view and
for returning partly to the view in Chomsky (1995c) where Move is a composite
operation consisting of Copy and Merge.
At certain points during the derivation, pieces of structure are sent off to
the interfaces. These pieces are sent to both interfaces at the same time (pace
Marušic (2005)). This is done by the operation Transfer. Chomsky (2004) calls
the phonological part of Transfer ‘Spell-Out’. Here I will not make this distinction
and use Spell-Out synonymously with Transfer. In the literature, these pieces of
structure are typically called phases, but since the size of the pieces will be different
than the standard pieces in the literature, I will avoid using that label.
(3) refers to the interfaces as SEM and PHON. The two interfaces are accessed
by the Sensori-Motor system (sometimes called the Articulatory-Perceptual system)
and the Conceptual-Intentional system. This follows Chomsky (2004: 106) who
argues that: ‘The last line of each derivation D is a pair <PHON, SEM>, where
PHON is accessed by SM and SEM by C-I. D converges if PHON and SEM each
satisfy [interface conditions]; otherwise it crashes at one or the other interface’. The
following quote elaborates on this (see also Hinzen (2006) for much discussion).
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(4) Assume further that L has three components: narrow syntax (NS) that maps
LA [lexical arrays] to a derivation D-NS; the phonological component Φ maps
D-NS to PHON; the semantic component Σ maps D-NS to SEM. Σ is as-
sumed to be uniform for all L; NS is as well, if parameters can be restricted
to LEX (as I will assume). Φ, in contrast, is highly variable among Ls. Opti-
mally, mappings will satisfy the inclusiveness condition, introducing no new
element but only rearranging those of the domain. Assume this strong con-
dition to be true of NS. [. . . ] In this conception there is no LF; rather, the
computation maps LA to <PHON, SEM> piece by piece, cyclically. There
are, therefore, no LF properties and no interpretation of LF, strictly speak-
ing, though Σ and Φ interpret units that are part of something like LF in a
noncyclic conception (Chomsky 2004: 107).
This is a quite different view of grammar if we compare it to GB: No Surface Struc-
ture or Deep Structure (though see Uriagereka (2008) for a critical discussion of
the latter claim), and also no LF conceived of as a syntactic level of representation.
If there is no LF, then the syntactic structure has to be mapped directly to SEM
(more on SEM shortly). Semantic interpretation is therefore still derived from syn-
tactic representations, and even more directly if there is no intermediate level of
representation.3
3This makes the contrast with other approaches, such as Generative Semantics, quite stark:
There, it was assumed that a given meaning (deep structure for generative semanticists) was the
input to the syntax (see, e.g., Lakoff (1971)). Thus the view here assumes that SEM is interpretive
rather than generative.
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Clearly, the question of whether LF is really required is an empirical question.
Jacobson (1998, 2008) argues that LF is not necessary in order to give an account of
antecedent-contained deletion, which has often been taken to be one of the strongest
arguments for LF. But non-movement accounts do not come for free, and they also
do not predict any constraints on movement. We know that such constraints exist,
which is prima facie a problem for non-movement accounts. Related to this issue is
the argument in Huang (1982), which shows that overt and covert movements are
subject to different island restrictions. As far as I know, no one has provided a new
analysis of these data within a single-cycle model, that is, a model that dispenses
with LF.4 However, the theory I will develop is not compatible with a distinct level
of representation such as LF. It would be impossible to create the full syntactic
representation that would be required, for say, covert wh-movement at LF. In the
future, for this model to be sustained, Huang’s arguments will have to be addressed,
as I discuss in chapter 6.
An important feature of Minimalism is the focus on the interfaces themselves.
Within Minimalism, a lot of work is currently being done researching various aspects
of the interfaces. This is particularly true for the PHON side where we by now have
several articulate proposals as to what the concrete architecture of this system looks
like, cf. Samuels (2009, 2011), Embick (2010), Idsardi and Raimy (In press), Lohndal
and Samuels (2010). On the SEM side, however, little work has been done. It is my
hope that part of the present work will help further our understanding of the nature
4Note that the problem does not go away if all islands effects are PF effects, in effect, it makes
the problem more acute since there is no way of capturing these differences on such a theory.
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of SEM, and I develop some concrete proposals in chapter 4 concerning SEM.
Continuing the focus on the semantic side of this architecture, an obvious
question emerges from the quote above: What exactly is the semantic component
Σ? I argue that Σ is just a Spell-Out rule. These rules determine the mapping
from narrow syntax to SEM. I will give several such rules in chapter 4, where for
example functional heads will help determine how arguments are interpreted. This
will enable us to account for semantic differences between external and internal
arguments, cf. Dowty (1991), Schein (1993), Kratzer (2000), Pietroski (2005a).
In line with the quote from Chomsky above, I assume that SEM is what you
get after the narrow syntactic representation has been handed over to the semantic
interface through Σ. I will show that the syntactic representations can be mapped
onto conjuncts. These conjuncts are then conjoined and existential closure is added.
The resulting logical forms are close to ‘earlier conceptions of logical form (or logical
syntax) [. . . ] found in the work of philosophers like Frege, Russell, Carnap, and
Strawson’ (Hornstein 2002: 345). The syntax will have a crucial role in providing
the input to the logical forms, and a major topic in chapters 4 and 6 will be how these
forms are generated. Below, I will argue that these logical forms furthermore can
serve as instructions to build concepts, in the sense of Chomsky (2000a), Pietroski
(2008b, 2010a, 2011).
I would now like to come back to the question of basic operations. I have
already stated that on the syntactic side, the basic operation is Merge. Similarly,
on the semantic side I will follow Neo-Davidsonians and particularly Schein (1993,
In press) and Pietroski (2005a, Forthcoming) in arguing that the main operation is
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Conjunction. That is, for a sentence like (6), Conjunction chains all the predicates
together.
(5) Peter bought a dog
(6) ∃e[buy(e) & Agent(e, Peter) & Theme(e, a dog]
There is no use of Functional Application. All there is is Conjunction chaining
together predicates, and then existential closure to bind the event variable. In
chapter 4 I will have more to say about how the arguments John and a dog are
integrated into the thematic predicates.
In the architecture I am working within, there will be mapping principles
between syntax and semantics that yield logical forms. These logical forms are not
‘complete’ logical forms in that they do not have access to conceptual content. To
see what I mean by this, consider the following example. (7) has a perfectly valid
syntax and a perfectly valid logical form (8), and despite this, the sentence is not
judged to be acceptable.
(7) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
(8) ∃e[Theme(e, colorless.green.ideas) & sleep(e) & furiously(e)]5
However, I argue that the weirdness associated with (7) is not a grammatical weird-
ness; it is a conceptual weirdness: Ideas do not have colors and they cannot sleep
in any possible way. The idea is that the logical form in (8) is perfectly valid as a
5In this thesis, I am going to use labels such as ‘Agent’ and ‘Theme/Patient’, though see Dowty
(1991) for a critical discussion. See also Schein (2002) for a defense of this terminology and chapter
3 for some more discussion.
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logical form because either the concepts have not been fetched or the wrong concepts
have been fetched. This is supported by the fact that (7) can have metaphorical
uses. A case that I would argue is similar is the following.6
(9) Humans levitate.
This sentence is fully acceptable, but it does not describe a situation that typically
happens in our world. This does not have anything to do with grammar - rather it
is an issue of how internalistic meanings relate to external properties. In that sense,
it is on a par with sentences involving unicorns.
(10) Unicorns are pretty.
Again, this sentence is perfectly fine and it has a coherent meaning only as long as
we do not operate within our world. The concepts that are fetched will have to be
given a metaphorical meaning in order to ‘make sense’.
More generally, I subscribe to the view that SEMS are instructions that get ex-
ecuted at the semantic interface (see, e.g., Pietroski (2010a) and Glanzberg (2011)).
Crucially, no semantic information is available in the syntax (cf. Marantz (1997),
Borer (2005a), Marantz (2005), Åfarli (2007), Platzack (2011), Larson (Forthcom-
ing); pace Ramchand (2008)) – what we tend to think of as ‘semantic information’
will on this view be conceptual information that is not available to syntax, cf Chom-
sky (2000b).
There are examples of sentences that are unacceptable and where it is very
hard if not impossible to make the sentence acceptable. A case in point is given in
6Thanks to Barry Schein (p.c.) for bringing up this case.
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(11).
(11) *John arrived Mary.
Everyone would agree that this example should receive a star, but that is basically
where the agreement ends. The question is what to make of the star. Most re-
searchers would say that this is a syntactic problem: arrive is an unaccusative verb
and unaccusative verbs cannot take two arguments (see e.g., Ramchand (2008) for
recent and very clear discussion). This is supposed to explain the star. However,
we should consider, following Borer (2005a) and Pietroski (2007), that the sentence
may be bad for non-syntactic reasons. What could be wrong is that the concept
arrive cannot combine with two nominal arguments to yield a legible interpretation.
A nominal and a non-nominal element do not create problems:
(12) John arrived at work.
Compared to (7), the difference is that (11) never acquires a legible interpretation,
whereas (7) does. In chapter 3, I will discuss issues concerning (11) in great detail
and present both a conceptual and a grammatical account.
The syntactic and the non-syntactic approaches may appear to be six of one,
half-dozen of the other but I want to emphasize that they are very different. On
Borer’s view, verbs do not have adicities that constrain the computation. This goes
against a very common assumption that verbs have thematic arguments. Another
way to put this is that the grammar operates on sentence frames: The verb comes
into the derivation with information that basically encodes how the sentence will
look like. The Borer view, on the other hand, does not make use of sentence frames at
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all.7 Again, on her view, verbs do not have adicities that constrain the computation.
This means that one needs a different explanation of cases like (11).
The view that most semantic information is not available to the syntax should
not be very controversial, as Adger and Svenonius (2011) point out: ‘The consensus
since the early 70’s has been that semantic selection is not part of syntax, but rather
part of some semantic module or of the conceptual-intentional domain of thought’.
This fits into the general view where category selection is replaced by semantic selec-
tion, cf. especially Grimshaw (1979). Borer (2005a) makes that very explicit when
she argues that complementation is determined by non-syntactic factors. Ramchand
(2008: 4) calls this the generative-constructivist view. However, it’s worth bearing
in mind, as Ramchand points out, that there are two ‘extremes’ within this camp:
(13) The naked roots view
The root contains no syntactically relevant information, not even category
features (cf. Marantz (1997, 2001, 2005), Borer (2005a)).
(14) The well-dressed roots view
The root may contain some syntactic information, ranging from category
information to syntactic selectional information and degrees of argument-
structure information, depending on the particular theory. This information
is mapped in a systematic way onto the syntactic representation which di-
7Borer (2005a: 14) makes use of ‘templates’ when she says that ‘[. . . ] the syntactic structure
gives rise to a template, or a series of templates, which in turn determine the interpretation’.
These templates are different from frames, as they are generated by syntactic principles and not
by properties of lexical items.
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rectly encodes it.8 (Ramchand 2008: 11).
Both views are different from Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995) since the lat-
ter assumes that constructions are listed and stored. The generative-constructivist
view is generative, which means that constructions are non-primitive and generated
based on minor building-blocks in a generative system. Ramchand (2008), among
others, develops a view that sits between the naked roots view and the well-dressed
roots view in that she allows roots to bear some syntactic information.
An alternative view is what Ramchand (2008: 4) calls the lexical-thematic
approach. This is an approach where the relevant information is projected from
the lexicon and the lexicon has its own generative operations (see in particular
Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995, 2005)). On this view, (category) selection can
be implemented in the syntax via features (e.g., Chomsky (1965), Emonds (2000),
Reinhart (2002)). Since selection is always local (Baltin 1989), there will have to be a
locality constraint on how these features are checked. Svenonius (1994) implements
this by connecting head-movement and c-selection, whereas Adger (2003) argues
that subcategorization features always require require local checking.9 Yet another
suggestion is to use mutual-command to define checking domains for selection, as in
8Ramchand points out that this view is virtually indistinguishable from what she calls ‘the
static lexicon view’, which is the view that the lexicon contains argument-structure information
that correlates in a systematic way with syntactic structure. See Baker (1988) for such a view.
9A quite different version of this is pursued by Larson (Forthcoming) who argues that there
are theta-features (in the sense of Hornstein (1999)) that encodes a purely syntactic notion of
selection. For Larson, the lexicon does not contain any statements of what kind of arguments e.g.,
verbs take. See his work for details.
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Hallman (2004).
In chapter 3, I will give good reasons for thinking that the generative-constructivist
solution is the better way to go, but the point here is just that there is technology
to implement selection in the syntax should one want to do that, cf. footnote 9.
This technology would also be compatible with the syntax that I will defend in this
thesis.
There is another reason why the generative-constructivist way (either as in
Borer, Larson or Marantz) may be feasible. It contributes to making syntax com-
pletely autonomous, but also to maintaining that the computational system of the
Faculty of Language is fully intensional in Chomsky (1986b)’s sense. Logical forms
do not say anything about what the conceptual content of the concepts idea or cat
is (cf. Pietroski (2007).10 Logical forms are therefore underspecified: They provide
a template for interpretation. This dovetails with, though does not force, the view
that semantics is not truth-theoretic (see in particular McGilvray (1998), Pietroski
(2005b, Forthcoming, 2010b), Lohndal (2011a) for a defense of this view). Logi-
cal forms contribute to truth conditions, but they underdetermine them as there is
no ‘content’ contribution by the items that make up syntactic terminals or logical
forms. This means that semantic identity effects that we see in e.g., ellipsis will have
to apply when the concepts have been fetched. Exactly how this works will have to
be developed in detail in future work.
Since the early days of generative grammar it has been common to assume a
10This does not mean that one does not have to connect concepts to the world somehow; see
Fodor (2008) and especially Kjøll (2011) for ideas on how one might do this.
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specific form of isomorphism between syntax and logical form. Subcategorization
frames encode, for example, that the verb kill takes two arguments: a subject and
an object. In the semantic derivation, it is assumed that kill is dyadic. With
Davidson (1967), logical forms acquired an event variable, and this marks the fall
of the isomorphism since it was not argued within generative syntax that this event
variable finds a place in the hierarchical syntax. Kratzer (1996) argues that Themes
are part of the lexical specification of the verb, both in the syntax and at logical form,
but also she does not put the event variable in the syntax. Scholars who assume
full thematic separation (tacitly) assume that the verb or the root is entirely bare in
the syntax, and that it only has an event variable in the semantics. How to encode
relations between events is usually not discussed. I will return to the spirit of the
older view and argue that if the logical form has one or more event variables, syntax
could encode those event relations. This will yield a certain version of transparency.
I will return to this in chapters 4 and 6, including what I take transparency to mean,
but I want to offer a few general remarks here.
As Bach (1976) points out, every theory needs to make explicit the relationship
between expressions in the language that is being described and the expressions in
an interpreted language that specifies the meaning. Bach distinguishes between
what he calls the ‘configurational hypothesis’ and the ’rule-to-rule’ hypothesis. We
can formulate them as follows.
(15) Given a structure of a given form, translate the structure into an expression
in the interpreted language of a given form.
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(16) For each syntactic rule, there is a unique translation rule.
The rule-to-rule hypothesis gives a more transparent mapping, in that there are no
additional levels, as Bach makes clear. However, he does not say anything about
how the metalanguage is related to our competence regarding the object language.
Bach observes that the configurational hypothesis has no inherent limitations on the
nature of the mapping relation. Bach (1976: 186) states this clearly when he says
‘[. . . ] there is no inherent limitation in the hypothesis to prevent stating rules of
the configurational sort for structures of arbitrary complexity. On the other hand,
a rule-to-rule hypothesis must fix the translation of the constituents as they are put
together’. A lot of work in the generative tradition has argued that a rule-to-rule
hypothesis is not tenable because of phenomena such as antecedent-contained dele-
tion, and covert wh-movement in Chinese. But it is also not the case that ‘anything
goes’, and this is what I take to be the main point in Bach’s paper. Restrictions are
necessary, both for a child learning a language, and for the theorist in making pre-
dictions about what a possible rule/mapping is. A major point in this dissertation
is that we can create a constrained theory exactly by adopting the two reductionist
hypothesis that I mentioned at the outset: No relational difference between specifier
and complements, and that verbs do not have thematic arguments. Taken together,
this gives us a theory where each application of Spell-Out corresponds to a conjunct
in a logical form.
There is also another related issue which has to do with reversability. To
what extent are the mapping principles we postulate reversible? That is, given
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a logical form that exhibits full thematic separation, can we reverse the mapping
principles and generate a hierarchical syntactic structure on the basis of a logical
form? The more transparent the mapping is, the easier it will be to reverse the
mapping principles. We know that relative clauses present a clear case where the
principles are not reversible. Consider the relative clause in (17) and its syntactic
structure in (18).






A standard derivation for the relative clause runs as follows, based on Heim and
Kratzer (1998). The JKA brackets signify the interpretation and the superscript A
is the assignment function.
(19) J[knew Mary]KA = λyλx. x know y(Mary) = λx. x knew Mary
(20) J[t1 [knew Mary]KA = λx. x knew Mary(A[1]) = A[1] knew Mary
(21) J[who1 [t1 [knew Mary]]]KA = λx. x knew Mary
(22) J[students [who1 [t1 [knew Mary]]]]KA =λz. z are students & z knew Mary
Merging who corresponds to lambda-abstraction, and merging students invokes pred-
icate modification, which essentially conjoins students and x knew Mary. I have
skipped several intermediate steps here but urge the reader to trust me that I pro-
vide the most important details. For present purposes, the important question is:
How can we go from the last step of the derivation back to the syntactic structure in
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(18)? Due to conjunction and lambda abstraction, it is impossible to go back. What
would lambda abstraction correspond to? In a relative clause, it can be lexicalized
by either who or that. Furthermore, how would the system know how to interpret
the conjoined structure, a structure that also resembles the way in which adjectives
are analyzed, e.g., big elephant. So relative clauses are not reversible in the sense
that the thematic part of the clause is.
This issue may seem somewhat insignificant. However, once we ask what
the relationship is between the formalism and how this formalism is implemented
in terms of I-language computations, the question becomes very important. We
both produce and understand speech, and how do we go from the speech signal
to understanding a given structure? Do we employ principles that are similar to
the ones that are used to build up structures when we produce speech? From this
perspective, we can think of the reversability issue as parallel to the generation and
parsing of syntactic structures. The more transparent the mapping is, the more
likely it is that we employ similar principles in production and parsing. I will come
back to the issue of transparency in chapters 4 and 6.
Throughout the thesis, the existence of event variables will be taken for granted.
See Davidson (1967), Taylor (1985), Parsons (1990), Lasersohn (1995), Bayer (1996),
Rothstein (1998), Landman (2000) and Tenny and Pustejovsky (2000) for summary
of the traditional arguments in favor of events. Lexical items or roots can either be
born with an event variable in the encyclopedia, or roots get an event variable from
their categorizer. The latter view entails that the categorizer contributes the event






How event variables are introduced depends on the particular framework within
which one is working, and since the choice does not matter for what follows, I will
for reasons of simplicity follow the former view.
Summarizing, I am arguing for a theory where there is no phrase-structural
difference between specifier and complements. This, I will argue, go together with
logical forms that exhibit full thematic separation. In this section I have discussed
some more general architectural issues. At this point I am not attempting to con-
vince the reader that the perspective I have just outlined is the correct perspective.
Obviously that requires much more motivation and I encourage the reader to con-
sult some of the references I have provided. However, it is important to make the
assumptions clear and that is what I have tried to do. For a more thorough introduc-
tion to how one can think about semantics explicitly from an I-language perspective,
see Larson and Segal (1995), McGilvray (1998), Chomsky (2000b), Pietroski (2005a)
and Elbourne (2011), among others.
1.3 A Roadmap
In this section, I will provide a short summary of each of the chapters.
Chapter 2 reviews the history of how X-bar theory developed and how X-bar
theory later developed into Bare Phrase Structure. I will mostly focus on specifiers,
and the goal will be to show that specifiers are stipulated and this will eventually
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lead to the conclusion in chapter 4 that they should not be distinguished from
complements. I start out by discussing Chomsky (1970) and Jackendoff (1977).
I will not focus too much on the details of the empirical analyses but rather try
to distill the core theoretical aspects. The reason for this is that the theory has
changed a lot since that time, which means that the particular analyses won’t be
that relevant for what will follow in this thesis. After this review of the Extended
Standard Theory’s view of phrase structure, I move onto Government and Binding
Theory and discuss Chomsky (1986a) and Fukui and Speas (1986). In particular,
Barriers represents the culmination of X-bar theory since it crystalizes the standard
X-bar theory. Fukui and Speas’s work is important because it differentiates lexical
and functional projections (see Abney (1987) for more discussion of this) and puts
certain constraints on phrase structure that we will see reoccurring in various ways.
Then I turn briefly to Kayne (1994), which is the last theory of phrase structure
before Minimalism. The next section is then devoted to Bare Phrase Structure, and
I discuss this theory in a more detailed way than the other theories since it is the
theory I will be working with and modifying in this thesis. I spend quite some time
discussing limitations of Bare Phrase Structure when it comes to specifiers, which
naturally leads me to consider Starke (2004)’s claim that specifiers should not be
part of phrase structure. I will discuss his view and some limitations it has, and
also briefly Narita (2009, 2011), who puts forward a theory of Spell-Out that will
turn out to be relevant for my own proposal in chapter 4.
Chapter 3 has a much more semantic focus. I go through numerous argu-
ments from the literature claiming that arguments need to be severed from the verb,
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or, to put it differently, that full thematic separation is required. The arguments
will mainly be drawn from Schein (1993), Herburger (2000), Pietroski (2007) and
Williams (2008). I will also discuss Kratzer (1996)’s argument that Themes should
not be separated from the verb and argue that this does not provide evidence against
separation.
In chapter 4, I present a syntactic proposal that can derive full thematic sep-
aration in the sense that the syntax together with Spell-Out principles give a trans-
parent mapping from the syntax to logical forms. I develop an idea of Spell-Out
which draws inspiration from Moro (2000)’s work and more recently Narita (2011).
The idea is that whenever two phrases want to Merge, Spell-Out has to happen
so that the phrase that is on the ‘spine’ will be reduced to a head, following Bare
Phrase Structure. After I present the core proposal, I address various implications
on both the semantic and syntactic side concerning composition operations, and I
provide more details of how Spell-Out works.
In chapter 5, I discuss various consequences of the present theory. I particularly
focus on the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) and how my proposal supports a
specific way of understanding the nature of the EPP. My conclusion will be that the
EPP is less of a deep phenomenon than many others have been led to conclude. I also
discuss how movement works, and show how the present theory bans multidominance
representations. Next, I discuss locality and what the present proposal can say
about how one can derive certain freezing and island facts. Serial verbs are then
addressed and shown to offer additional support in favor of my theory. Lastly I talk
about how my view can account for the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis
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(Baker 1988) and how this relates to how arguments are integrated into their event
predicates.
The present work raises some questions concerning how syntax and semantics
are structured and how they interface with each other. In chapter 6, I will address
some of these questions and consider what it means for either syntax or semantics
or both to be simple or complex from the point of view of transparency. This will
lead to preliminary discussion of ‘semantic compositionality’ as well.
Chapter 7 briefly summarizes the main claims.
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Chapter 2
Specifiers and Phrase Structure
2.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to discuss how the notion of a specifier has developed
within Chomskyan generative grammar. In particular, the most recent conception
of phrase structure, known as Bare Phrase Structure, will receive a lot of attention.
This is the framework of phrase structure within which contemporary minimalist
research is conducted, and this is also the version of phrase structure that I will
build on in the present thesis. The goal is not to scrutinize all aspects of phrase
structure. For the most time, I will focus on specifiers and how they fit into the
overall view of phrase structure. But this will lead to discussions of many aspects
surrounding phrase structure in some way or other. The main goal of the chapter is
to motivate the conclusion that there is no relational difference between specifiers
and complements.
Since specifiers originated with the invention of X-bar theory in Chomsky
(1970), I will provide a short tour of how the notion of a specifier has developed
since Chomsky’s seminal paper. I will look at that paper in some detail, and then
at the revision by Jackendoff (1977). We will then look at the view of phrase
structure that emerged in Chomsky (1986a), which is the traditional X-bar theory.
After that, the minimalist view of phrase structure (Chomsky 1995c) will occupy
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the remainder of the chapter. It is necessary to discuss Bare Phrase Structure and
specifiers in great detail because it turns out that there are reasons to eliminate the
relational distinction between specifiers and complements. By way of motivating
this, I will discuss a lot of the issues surrounding specifiers, and argue that as far as
the grammar is concerned, the core relation is that between a head and a non-head.
I will not discuss theories of phrase structure prior to 1970 (see Stowell (1981:
66-71), Lasnik (2000) and Lasnik and Lohndal (In press) for discussion). The reason
for this is that specifiers as such did not exist in those phrase structure grammars.
Of course, notions like ‘subject’ did exist, and one could have stipulated a specifier
if one wanted too (see the discussion of Chomsky (1970) below), but that was not
done. Therefore it seems less relevant to look at those theories and rather focus on
the theories where specifiers have been explicitly defined.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the Extended Stan-
dard Theory. In section 3, I look at Government and Binding, which also includes
Kayne (1994) as that is the last pre-minimalist theory of phrase structure. Section
4 discusses the Minimalist Program and its view on phrase structure. Bare Phrase
Structure will be discussed in detail, and in particular the problems that Bare Phrase
Structure faces in dealing with specifiers in a satisfactory way. I will also discuss
some more recent work that suggests that specifiers should not be part of the theory
of phrase structure. Lastly, section 5 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 The Extended Standard Theory
In this section, I will discuss the two most prominent views on phrase structure
within the Extended Standard Theory (EST), namely that of Chomsky (1970) and
Jackendoff (1977).
2.2.1 Chomsky (1970) and the introduction of X-bar theory
One problem in Chomsky (1955) and Chomsky (1957) is that the theory developed
there allows phrase structure rules like (1) alongside ones like (2) (Lyons 1968).
(1) NP → . . . N . . .
(2) VP → . . . N . . .
But there do not seem to be rules like (2). Why is this? The formalism allows
both rules, and the evaluation metric (Chomsky 1965) judges them equally costly.
Chomsky (1970) is the first attempt to come to grips with this problem. There it is
proposed that there are no individual phrase structure rules of the sort that did so
much work in Chomsky (1957) and even in Chomsky (1965). Rather, there is what
is now known as the X-bar schema. X is a variable, ranging over category names
such as V, N, and so on.
Here is the version of X-bar theory that Chomsky (1970) presented (see also
Emonds (1976) and Jackendoff (1977) for much relevant discussion).
(3) X’ → . . . X . . .
X” → . . . X’ . . .
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X’ and X” are placeholders for true complex symbols. Keep in mind that in Syntactic
Structures NP looked like it had something to do with N, but in that system it really
did not. NP was just a symbol that was written for mnemonic purposes with two
letters. In X-bar theory, a category label is a letter plus a number of bars. (originally
written as overbars - e.g., X - but later written as primes - e.g., X’ - for typographical
convenience). It can be thought of as an ordered pair. X is <X, 0>, X’ is <X, 1>,
and X” is <X,2>. X-bar theory immediately explains why there are no rules like
(2). This is because phrases have heads, i.e., they are endocentric, which is to say
that phrases are projections of heads.
Chomsky also introduced the relational notions complement and specifier. A
complement is a sister to a head. He argues that complements do not play any
role in transformations (Chomsky 1970: 210), that is, complements cannot be the
target qua complements of any transformational operations. At this point, there
were general rules like (7) that subsumed rules like the ones in (4)-(6).
(4) NP → N Comp
(5) VP → V Comp
(6) AP → A Comp
(7) Comp → NP, S, NP S, NP Prep-P, Prep-P Prep-P, etc.
The rules in (7) should instead be replaced with the rule in (8).
(8) X → X . . .
The dots in (8) indicate that there are no restrictions on what can be a complement
and where the complement is placed vis-á-vis the head.
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Chomsky then proposes that in order to ‘introduce further terminological uni-
formity, let us refer to the phrase associated with N, A, V in the base structure as
the “specifier” of these elements’ (Chomsky 1970: 210).
(9) X → [Spec,X] X
On this view, a specifier encompasses a heterogeneous set as it contains a variety
of ‘pre-head’ elements like auxiliaries in SpecV, determiners in SpecN, adverbials
in SpecV and degree modifiers like very as SpecA. As Jackendoff (1977: 14) points
out, it is not clear whether Chomsky considers the specifier to be a constituent or an
abbreviation for a sequence of constituents, like Comp. The diagrams in Chomsky
(1970) show specifiers like a constituent. As we will see below, Jackendoff (1977)
argues against specifiers being constituents whereas Hornstein (1977) defends the
claim that they are. However, beyond being a constituent and bearing a geometrical
relation to a head, it is not clear what the defining characteristics of a specifier are
taken to be (see also George (1980: 17)).1 Chomsky (1970) does not say anything
about possible selectional restrictions that may obtain between a specifier and the
rest of the phrase. Only later did that become a topic of discussion; see in particular
Grimshaw (1979) on selection more generally. I will return to this issue in chapter 3;
see also chapter 1. For now, it suffices to establish that complements and specifiers
did seem to behave in different ways in Chomsky (1970).
1Of course, an implicit assumption here is that there are defining characteristics of specifiers, and
that they are not just descriptive terms. Specifiers have to be generated, and the question is how
the grammar does that. Put differently, how does the grammar differentiate between generating a
specifier and generating a complement, and how can we explain that difference?
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Later a biconditional version of X-bar theory was developed, namely that
phrases have heads, and heads project. Whenever a structure has an XP, it has an
X (this is what Chomsky (1970) suggested), and whenever a structure has an X, it
has an XP.
In Chomsky (1970), the initial rule of the base grammar is as in (10).
(10) S → N V .
This means that X-bar theory is not fully general: S and S’ (the latter the larger
clause including a sentence introducing complementizer like that) do not fit into the
theory in any neat way.2 These labels are not projections of heads, unlike the other
labels in the system. There is another way in which S does not fit into the theory.
Semantically it is of adicity zero, unlike a VP when we assume event variables (see
chapter 3 for further details). Expressions with adicity zero have always represented
an anomaly in the theory, which raises the question whether adicity one, two or
three expressions are well founded too. I will return to this important question in
chapter 3.
It is worth bearing in mind that Bresnan (1972) suggests that complementizers
are essentially specifiers of sentences through the rule in (11) (Bresnan 1972: 13).
(11) S → COMP S
This is in line with the general approach to specifiers during the 1970s, as comple-
mentizers are here analyzed on a par with auxiliaries, which were also specifiers.
2Though see Jackendoff (1977) for a way to solve this problem by identifying S with V” in his
system. See also Hornstein (1977) who argues that S is not a projection of V.
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It may be worth pausing to reflect on what pushed Chomsky to create X-bar
theory.
(12) The development of X’ theory in the late 1960s was an early stage in the effort
to resolve the tension between explanatory and descriptive adequacy. A first
step was to separate the lexicon from the computations, thus eliminating
a serious redundancy between lexical properties and phrase structure rules
and allowing the latter to be reduced to the simplest (context-free) form.
X’ theory sought to eliminate such rules altogether, leaving only the general
X’-theoretic format of UG. The problem addressed in subsequent work was
to determine that format, but it was assumed that phrase structure rules
themselves should be eliminable. (Chomsky 1995a: 61).
The attempt was to do away with redundancies. Another way to say this
is that when we impose strict constraints, the PS rules themselves vanish (see in
particular Lasnik and Kupin (1977)). It is possible to view the change from phrase
structure rules to X-bar theory in the same way as Chomsky (1973)’s generalizations
of some of Ross (1967)’s locality “island” constraints on movement. In both cases,
instead of more or less idiosyncratic properties, we get general properties that hold
across categories. Baltin (1982: 2) puts the general development this way:
(13) The history of transformational generative grammar can be divided into
two periods, which can be called expansion and retrenchment. During the
early ‘expansion’ period, a primary concern was the description of grammat-
ical phenomena . . . The theory was correspondingly loose, and consequently
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failed to provide an adequate solution to the projection problem . . . During
the retrenchment period . . . the focus of attention shifted from the construc-
tion of relative complex . . . statements to the construction of a general theory
of grammar, restricted as to the devices it employed, which could be ascribed
to universal grammar.
Chomsky (1970) only discusses NPs, VPs and APs, not PPs. One goal of
Jackendoff (1977) is to bring PPs under the X-bar theoretic fold. So at the end of
the 1970s, a quite general picture of phrase structure had started to emerge. The
next section discusses Jackendoff’s work.
2.2.2 Jackendoff (1977)’s extension of X-bar theory
The goal of Jackendoff (1977) is to provide an in depth study of phrase structure in
the spirit of Chomsky (1970) and Emonds (1976). Jackendoff develops a theory that
covers all lexical categories, including prepositions. Among others, Jackendoff ex-
tended Chomsky’s insight concerning specifiers by emphasizing the parallels between
e.g., possessives in nominals and subjects in clauses. Technically, though, there are
many differences between the two theories. Whereas the basic X-bar structure in
Chomsky (1970) is a two-level representation (X”, X’ and X), Jackendoff suggests
that a three-level representation is necessary for both nouns and verbs (X” ’, X”,
X’ and X). I am not going to survey the details of Jackendoff’s proposal since our
understanding of the data have changed a lot since then, and elements that were
specifiers at that time are no longer specifiers. See Jackendoff’s own work and es-
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pecially Stuurman (1985) for a critical review of his work. Rather, I would like to
focus on certain core aspects of Jackendoff’s theory, and here I will be drawing on
the discussion in Stuurman (1985).
Jackendoff (1977: 103) makes a couple of interesting remarks concerning the
study of specifiers that are worth reiterating here:
(14) ‘There are problems in studying specifier systems that do not arise in study-
ing complements. First, specifier systems involve very small numbers of lexi-
cal items and are riddled with idiosyncracies. Thus general phrase structure
rules must be supported on the basis of impoverished and skewed surface
distributions. [. . . ] A second problem with specifier systems, at least in En-
glish, is that it appears much less possible to correlate semantic regularities
with syntactic positions, as we did in complements. This may of course be a
function of our ignorance about the semantics of deixis, quantification, and
measuring; but it may also be a brute fact about English or about speci-
fiers in general. In the absence of a coherent semantic theory of specifiers, I
will make the latter assumption, hoping that a better understanding of the
syntax may make possible a more disciplined approach to the semantics’.
Jackendoff (1977: 37) emphasizes that for him, there is no distinction be-
tween specifiers and complements: ‘. . . there is to my knowledge no evidence that
either complements or specifiers function as constituents - they do not move or
delete as units, and unlike normal constituents, no part can be designated as a
head. Consequently, I will use the terms specifier and complement for expository
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convenience only, with no theoretical significance implied’. This is different from
Chomsky (1970), where there is a distinction between these positions. Stuurman
(1985: 74) argues that this distinction acts as a constraint that prevents the child
from inducing ‘free constituent order’ from pairs like the one in (15).3
(15) a. (she left) after - two days
b. (she left) two days - after
X-bar structure determines that two days should be a complement in (15a) and
a specifier in (15b), Stuurman argues. If this were not the case, X-bar theory
would not prevent the child from drawing the conclusion that (16b) should also be
grammatical, given (16a) (Stuurman 1985: 75).
(16) a. (she cried) for - two days
b. *(she cried) two days - for
An unspoken premise in Stuurman’s argument seems to be that only certain prepo-
sitions can take specifiers and that the X-bar schemas encode linear order. If such
statements can be made, then one can derive the difference between these data sets.
However, viewing this argument from a more modern perspective, it is not obvious
why one cannot phrase the distinction in terms of movement: certain prepositions
like after allow their complements to move, whereas other prepositions like for do
3This point is similar to Lightfoot (1979: 54) who argues that on Jackendoff’s view, ‘it is not
clear that the X-bar Convention offers any means of restricting possible phrase structure rules
from which a particular grammar may draw’. See also Hornstein (1977) for arguments against
Jackendoff’s view.
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not. If this can be done, it weakens Stuurman’s criticism of Jackendoff. We will
see in the next chapter that the phrase structure that I will develop actually shares
with Jackendoff the view that specifiers and complements are not distinct.
2.2.3 A problem with the EST view
Before we move onto the early Principles and Parameters view on phrase structure,
it may be worth considering a general problem that both Chomsky (1970) and Jack-
endoff (1977) face. The problem has been brought up most clearly by Stuurman
(1985). Stuurman’s goal is to defend what he calls ‘the single projection-type hy-
pothesis’. Multiple projection types, as assumed in Chomsky (1970) and Jackendoff
(1977), are banned. Stuurman’s thesis is that only one distinction is made internal
to projections: the distinction between X0 and X1, or put differently, between a head
and everything else. Stuurman argues that this provides a more restrictive phrase
structure theory and a theory that is more easily learnable. Here is an example that
he uses to make this claim.
In English, only the first hierarchical level projected from X0 can dominate an
NP. Stuurman takes the following contrast to show this, where (17b) is claimed to
be bad.
(17) a. he [[met his wife] in Italy]
b. *he [[met in Italy] his wife]
Stuurman (1985: 8) points out that if we assume multiple projection-types, the facts
in (17) can easily be captured directly at the level of PS as follows:
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(18) a. Vi → . . . Vj . . . , where . . . 6= NP, i > j > 1
b. V1 → . . . V0 . . . , where . . . = NP, . . .
These restrictions are descriptively adequate, but as Stuurman stresses, they do not
explain how a child can learn the distribution of NPs. Put differently, UG does
not provide a rationale for why the constraints are the way they are: Why should
UG not allow NP under Vi and exclude NP under V1? Unless the rules in (18) are
universal, children need access to negative data, which they by assumption do not
have access to.4
Stuurman presents a different analysis where there is only one projection type.
His theory, which we will not flesh out here, allows for both the structure in (19)




















Here an independent principle that filters out the structure in (20) is required. This
structure has an NP that is not dominated by the first X1 up from X0. Stuurman
argues that this filtering condition can be associated with an adjacency condition
on Case theory, following Stowell (1981). That is, being a Case assigner is a lexical
property, thus a property of X0, not of X1. (20) is therefore ruled out independently
of phrase structure rules, as in Stowell’s work.5 Stuurman presents additional argu-
ments for why the single projection hypothesis is better than the more classic X-bar
theory. The point is that the view emerging in the late 1970s had important flaws,
as it was too flexible and not principled enough. As I will show in the next section,
in the early 1980s, many of these flaws were addressed.
5In fact, Stowell (1981) argued for the general elimination of phrase structure rules, thus pro-
viding empirical motivation for the formalization of Lasnik and Kupin (1977).
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2.3 Government and Binding Theory
As research developed during the 1970s and 1980s, more and more of the elements
that Chomsky and Jackendoff had analyzed as specifiers came to be analyzed as
heads of particular functional projections (see also Abney (1987)). As Chametzky
(2000) points out, a notion of a specifier emerged with the following characteristics:
(i) typically an NP, (ii) it bears a certain relationship with the head. Stowell (1981:
70) summarizes the general characteristics of X-bar theory in the following way:
(21) Every phrase is endocentric.
(22) Specifiers appear at the XP-level; subcategorized complements appear within
X’.
(23) The head always appears adjacent to one boundary of X’.
(24) The head term is one bar-level lower than the immediately dominating
phrasal node.
(25) Only maximal projections may appear as non-head terms within a phrase.
These were then further developed during the Government and Binding era in the
1980s. Here I will focus on Chomsky (1986a), since that work presents the canon-
ical version of X-bar theory.6 However, I will also briefly discuss Fukui and Speas
(1986) since that work has been quite influential and prepared the ground for future
theories. Kayne (1994) will also be discussed as the representative of the last pre-
minimalist theory of phrase structure. I will not discuss Speas (1990) in this section
6For a critique of X-bar theory, see Pullum (1985) and Kornai and Pullum (1990).
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since that work is closely related to Bare Phrase Structure, which will be discussed
in the next main section.
2.3.1 Chomsky (1986a) and generalized X-bar theory
Chomsky (1986a) provides a generalization of X-bar structure (see also Chomsky
(1989) for a clear summary), though attempts had already been made in Chomsky
(1981), Stowell (1981), den Besten (1983), to mention the most important works.
As we have seen, prior to Barriers, the maximal projections were VP, NP, AP and
PP. In addition, there was S and S̄, which got rewritten as shown in (26)-(27).
(26) S → NP INFL VP
(27) S̄ → COMP S
COMP includes at least C and wh-expressions. The problem is that S does not
conform to X-bar theory. It is not endocentric since it has no head, which means
that there is no projection line from a head to a maximal projection. S’ is also not
uniformly endocentric since when Comp is filled by phrasal material, it is not the
head of S’. Because of these problems, Stowell (1981: chapter 6) suggests that the
head of S is Infl, as illustrated in (28). This is very similar to Williams (1981b: 251)




Once IP replaces S, a natural next step is to reconsider S’. Stowell (1981: chapter
6) proposes that C is the head of S. The optional specifier then becomes the target
of wh-movement. We have the structure in (29) (see also Barriers).
(29) CP
... C IP
With this in place, it is possible to formulate restrictions on movement based on
what can appear in a head position and what can appear in a specifier position, cf.
Travis (1984), Rizzi (1990).
The reanalysis of S and S̄ paves the way for a generalization of X-bar theory.
Chomsky (1986a: 3) proposes that X-bar theory has the general structure in (30),
where X* stands for zero or more occurrences of some maximal projection and X =
X0.7
(30) a. X’ = X X”*
b. X” = X”* X’
(Koizumi 1995: 137) argues that the traditional X-bar schema can then be
seen as expressing three claims:
(31) a. Asymmetry: A node is projected from only one of its daughters.
b. Binarity: A node may have (at most) two daughters.
c. Maximality: A head may project (at most) two non-minimal projections.
7This is what Chomsky said, but it is obviously not exactly what he meant. (30a) should read
read X’ = X Y”* because otherwise a verb, for example, can only take a VP complement, and
similarly for (30b) and specifiers.
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Asymmetry and Binarity give at most one complement. Maximality is required to
ensure that there is only one specifier.
Chomsky (1986a: 4) points out that specifiers are optional whereas the choice
of complements is determined by the Projection Principle. The latter is a principle
that says that representations at each syntactic level are projected from the lexicon,
cf. Chomsky (1981). That is, theta-relations have to be observed. Presumably the
lexicon only contains rather general information of the sort that a verb requires an
external and/or an internal theta-role; it does not say that a specifier or a com-
plement is needed. That is something that the grammar determines based on the
external/internal distinction. Furthermore, Chomsky stresses that just as notions
like subject and object, specifiers and complements are relational and not categorial
notions (Chomsky (1986a: 3); see already Chomsky (1965: 68) and also George
(1980: 17), Muysken (1982)).
This discrepancy between specifiers and complements is important to the gen-
eral issue that I am concerned with in this dissertation. If specifiers are optional,
that has implications for how we conceive of external arguments. Chomsky explic-
itly says that only the choice of complements is determined by theta roles. If so,
then that essentially removes the external argument from the theta grid on the verb,
since specifiers are optional. This is very important for the discussion in chapter 3,
where I will take issue with the claim that theta roles constraint even the choice of
what Chomsky refers to as complements.
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2.3.2 Fukui and Speas (1986) and differences between lexical and func-
tional heads
Following up on the theory in Chomsky (1986a), many researchers developed some-
what different versions of X-bar theory. Fukui and Speas (1986) claim that there are
significant differences between lexical and functional projections, e.g., between VP
and IP. They argue that lexical categories may iterate specifiers as long as all these
positions are fully licensed and can be interpreted at LF.8 Functional categories, on
the other hand, only have one unique specifier position (see also Stuurman (1985:
182) for a similar claim, though Stuurman claims that this also holds for lexical
categories). Fukui and Speas also argue that specifiers of functional categories close
off projections, so that the node dominating the maximal projection should be XP.
For lexical projections, the node should be X’, since iteration has no limit in this
case.
The following seven observations motivate their proposal.
(32) Functional heads have one and only one (i.e., non-iterable) specifier, while
the specifiers of lexical heads may be iterable ones.
(33) The specifiers of functional heads are often (in [their] model, always [. . . ])
moved from within their complement.
(34) All functional heads have specifier positions; it is not at all clear that all
lexical heads have Spec positions.
8Fukui and Speas do not elaborate on what all the relevant licensing principles are.
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(35) Languages which lack functional heads also lack specifier positions.
(36) Functional heads are special in that they are closed-class items.
(37) Functional heads lack the sort of semantic value associated with lexical cat-
egories.
(38) Functional heads always select a unique complement.
I will not go through these in detail, but rather focus on certain cross-linguistic
differences that such an analysis can capture.
Fukui and Speas point out that data such as (39-(43) are ruled out if there’s
only one specifier position. It may seem a bit strange that this is true of (39) too,
but this must be on the view where determiners are specifiers of N’.
(39) *the the old man
(40) *yesterday’s Chomsky’s book
(41) *It Mary ate a bagel
(42) *the John’s cat
(43) *What who did buy?
However, as they go on to point out, X-bar theory as developed in Chomsky (1986a)
does not provide such a restriction as any number of specifiers is allowed for every
category. They argue that X-bar theory itself should provide this restriction, and
they also use their theory to account for differences between languages like English
and languages like Japanese (see also Farmer (1980), Hale (1980) for earlier attempts
to analyze differences between these language in terms of the phrase structure com-
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ponent). Fukui and Speas and also Fukui (1986) argue that Japanese lacks certain
functional categories, namely Det, Infl and Comp. This means that Japanese is
predicted to allow structures similar to the ones in (39)-(43) that English disallows.














lit. ‘John’s that car.’ (Fukui 1986: 202)
Both Fukui and Speas (1986) and Fukui (1986) provide a lot of empirical evidence
in favor of their proposal. Put differently, for Fukui and Speas, by revising and
parametrizing the phrase structure component, one can give comparative analyses
of such apparently different languages as English and Japanese.
Fukui and Speas (1986)’s theory is one of the most articulate theories that
assume that a split between lexical and functional categories is encoded in the
phrase structure component, e.g., by way of allowing different numbers of specifiers.
Certain parts of Fukui and Speas’ theory recurs in more modern theories as well.
In the next sub-section, we will look briefly at Kayne (1994) before we turn to the
minimalist conception of phrase structure: Bare Phrase Structure.
9Fukui and Speas do not say anything about why English does not allow iteration of specifiers
to lexical categories. Presumably such iteration is ruled out because the specifiers won’t be fully
licensed, but again, they do not spell out what fully licensed means, as pointed out in the previous
footnote.
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2.3.3 Hoekstra (1991) and the elimination of specifiers
Hoekstra (1991) argues that specifiers are not defined in X-bar theory. As he puts
it, ‘Standard X-bar theory stipulates a cross-categorial distinction between speci-
fiers and complements’ Hoekstra (1991: 9). Since specifiers are stipulated, Hoekstra
claims that they should not be defined. He contextualizes his proposal by referring
to Stowell (1981) and Stuurman (1985). Stowell’s minimalization of X-bar theory
only affects the horizontal dimension and he specifically excludes the vertical dimen-
sion (Stowell 1981: 92). Stuurman, as we have seen above, argues that the vertical
dimension also can be reduced and that a two-level X-bar theory can be replaced
with a one-level X-bar theory. Hoekstra follows both Stuurman and Stowell in re-
ducing the vertical and horizontal dimension, and consequently ends up eliminating
specifiers.
Rather, Hoekstra argues, specifiers should be defined through agreement: a
specifier always agrees with its head. He presents a conceptual redundancy argument
for this (Hoekstra 1991: 23). He claims that a two-level X-bar theory can define
specifiers in two ways. One way is by saying that a specifier is the maximal projection
that is sister to a one-bar projection. The other way is to say that a specifier
takes part in Spec-Head agreement. The conceptual redundancy here is rather
obvious, so Hoekstra claims that agreement, and the concomitant view of specifiers,
is indispensable. Thus the X-bar theoretic characterization of specifiers should be
dropped.
A one-level X-bar theory looks as follows (Hoekstra 1991: 24):
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(46) XP → YP XP
(47) XP → ZP X
Within such a one-level theory, it may seem impossible to distinguish specifiers from
adjuncts. Hoekstra argues that this is not the case because specifiers are defined by
virtue of entering into Spec-head agreement. (Hoekstra 1991: 24) defines specifiers
as in (48).
(48) A specifier is an adjunct which agrees with a head.10
As Hoekstra (1991: 28) argues, categorial restrictions on specifiers follow from the
nature of the type of agreement that is involved. This differentiates the specifier of
IP and the specifier of CP.
This way of defining specifiers entails that the definition does not hinge on
the difference between minimal and maximal projections: ‘Thus it is possible for
a specifier to be a head’ Hoekstra (1994: 163). I will not discuss this further here
since we will return to the issue when discussing Starke (2004) below.
2.3.4 Kayne (1994) and the assimilation of specifiers and adjuncts
Kayne (1994) puts forward a novel theory of phrase structure. He suggests there is
one universal order and that this order is as in (49), where > means precedes.
(49) specifier > head > complement
10On this view, adjectives are specifiers since they agree with the nominal head in many
languages.
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Throughout the history of Chomskyan generative grammar, it had generally been
an assumption that languages vary in their base structure. Phrase structure rules
encode this directly as in (50) for an English VP and (51) for a Japanese VP.
(50) VP → V NP
(51) VP → NP V
When Principles and Parameters Theory emerged, phrase structure rules were elimi-
nated (Stowell 1981, Travis 1984) and instead a head parameter was suggested where
there is basically a binary choice between a head-final and a head-initial structure
(Chomsky 1986b). But everyone assumed that this parameter is part of the syntax
(until Chomsky (1995c) who explicitly argues against this), so again, the syntactic
base structure might be different from one I-language to another I-language. Kayne
(1994) argues that this is the wrong picture and that linear and hierarchical order
are much more tightly connected. The quote in (52) summarizes Kayne’s position
very well:
(52) ‘From this perspective, linear order turns out to be more fundamental to
syntax than is normally thought. As a result of the Linear Correspondence
Axiom (LCA), the property of antisymmetry that a linear ordering has is
inherited by the hierarchical structure. I have argued that this is behind
X-bar theory, or rather, that X-bar theory, although largely accurate in its
standard form, should not be considered to be a primitive part of syntactic
theory (i.e., of UG). What is primitive in UG is the LCA, from which follow
familiar X-bar-theoretic properties such as (1) the need for a phrase to have
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a head, (2) the impossibility for a phrase to have more than one head, (3)
the limitation to one specifier per phrase, (4) the limitation to one sister
complement per head, and (5) the requirement that a complement not be a
bare head’ (Kayne 1994:131).
As the quote explains, the LCA is the basic property of phrase structure. The axiom
is stated in (53).
(53) Linear Correspondence Axiom
d(A) is a linear ordering of T (Kayne 1994: 6).
The nonterminal-to-terminal dominance relation is represented by d. This relation
d is a many-to-many mapping from nonterminals to terminals. For a given nonter-
minal X, d(X) is the set of terminals that X dominates. A is the set of ordered pairs
<Xj, Yj> such that for each j, Xj asymmetrically c-commands Yj . A contains all
pairs of nonterminals such that the first asymmetrically c-commands the second,
thus it is a maximal set. T stands for the set of terminals.
One aspect of Kayne’s theory that doesn’t come through in the above quote
is that adjunction is always to the left. Kayne also argues that specifiers are an
instance of adjunction. Thus specifiers will also always be to the left.
The theory of phrase structure in Kayne (1994) is the last one that emerged
before a new theory was suggested within the Minimalist Program. Although Chom-
sky’s theory of Bare Phrase Structure does make some use of Kayne’s linearization
algorithm, we will see that many of the other specifics will not be retained. In chap-
ter 3, I will return to Kayne’s proposal concerning specifiers and adjuncts and argue
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that we can put this to good use within an even barer theory of phrase structure.
2.4 The Minimalist Program
With the development of the Minimalist Program, Chomsky also developed a new
theory of phrase structure. This theory was argued to be a reduction of X-bar
theory in that the theory does not rely on bar levels at all. In this section, I will
discuss the details of Bare Phrase Structure and also discuss certain limitations
concerning specifiers. These limitations will lead me to consider a couple of theories
that explicitly or implicitly suggest we eliminate the relational distinction between
specifiers and complements.
2.4.1 Bare Phrase Structure
Chomsky summarizes the gist of Bare Phrase Structure in the following quote:
‘Minimal and maximal projections must be determined from the structure in which
they appear without any specific marking; as proposed by Muysken (1982) they
are relational properties of categories, not inherent to them’ (Chomsky 1995a: 61).
Chomsky (1995c: 242) also relates this to the Inclusiveness Condition, which bans
any marking of maximal and minimal projections. This way of looking at things
is closely related to Speas (1990: 35): ‘What I will propose is that bar level is not
a primitive of the grammar at all; rather ‘maximal projection’ and ‘minimal pro-
jection’ are defined terms, and intermediate projections are simply the elsewhere
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case’.11 Another way to put this is to say that there is really nothing categorically
special about being a specifier or a complement in the grammar - these are just
different relational properties that a phrase can have in relation to other elements.12
In this sense, specifier and complement are more like the notions ‘subject’ and ‘ob-
ject’. However, there are still reasons to distinguish specifiers and complements, as
specifiers are landing sites for movement, they introduce external arguments, they
are subject to EPP properties, and so on and so forth. As we will see below, tradi-
tional Bare Phrase Structure maintains an important distinction between specifiers
and complements.
Travis (1984) already suggested that intermediate projections are not targeted
in the syntax. Speas follows Travis in making this claim and below I will consider
some data that bear on this issue.
Another way to put this is to say that phrase structure is built solely of lexical
items. No ‘extrinsic’ marking is necessary: Bar levels are not properties of phrases
but mark relations between lexical items. This means that instead of a phrase like
(54), we have a phrase like (55). Here I’m setting aside how verbs are inflected
and where the arguments really belong in the structure - the important point is the
difference between the two structures.
11It is not exactly clear what makes intermediate projections ‘invisible’. More on this below.
12There may still be differences at the interfaces, e.g., concerning how something in a specifier













The lexical items John, kicked and balls are accessed at the LF interface. No units
apart from the lexical items can be part of the computation. Thus bar-levels are
‘invisible’ both during the computation and by assumption at the interface. In
short; bar-levels have no existence within Bare Phrase Structure. It should be
pointed out, though, that it is not exactly clear what makes the highest and lowest
instances of kicked visible while excluding the middle one. The topmost one has
to be there to mark that something is a phrase and possible provide the label for
further computation (as argued in Hornstein (2009)), and the lowest one is the head.
The middle instance does not serve a purpose, but the theory is less clear on how
this is formally ensured.
Travis (1984) considers one-substitution in detail since one-substitution has
been one of the main arguments in favor of bar-levels. The traditional contrast is
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given in (56)-(57).
(56) I saw the student from Stuttgart and the one from Berlin.
(57) *I met the student of physics and the one of literature.
However, some of-complements do allow being left behind in pronominalization, as
Travis (1984: 80) points out (pace Jackendoff (1977)).
(58) I saw a picture of Debbie in the living room and one of Konrad in the dining
room.
The contrast between (57) and (58) is not expected. Travis points out that there
appears to be two types of of-phrases corresponding to this contrast. She argues that
complements that are thematically dependent (referring to Higginbotham (1983)
and Rappaport (1983)) on a head noun cannot be left behind whereas complements
that are thematically independent can. She mentions that Hornstein and Lightfoot
(1981) differentiate (59) and (60) by arguing that the former denotes two properties
(being a student and having long hair) while the second denotes one property (being
a student of physics).13
(59) a student with long hair
13It is not clear what a property is. Furthermore, there is an empirical problem, as Barry Schein
(p.c.) points out since (i) is not well-formed.
(i) *the picture of Julia’s and the one of John’s.
I set this problem aside since it does not matter for the main point I am trying to make, which is
that there is a contrast here, as reported in the main text, that challenges the traditional account
of one-substitution.
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(60) a student of physics
Travis (1984: 83) then notes that the type of PPs that can occur with one are of
the first type. The facts for of NP phrases pattern the same way:14
(61) the picture of Julia and the one of Suzanne
(62) This picture is of Julia.
(63) *the student of physics and the one of chemistry
(64) *This student is of physics.
Speas (1990: 42) argues, based on Travis’ arguments, that one should be treated as
a pronominal projection (and that this also holds for do so in the verbal domain).
One can then say that thematically independent complements may be sisters of
one. Whatever the ultimate explanation turns out to be, the important point is
that these arguments militate against letting one-substitution play a crucial role in
defining phrase structure (see also Kayne (2009), who implicitly makes the same
claim). Once we assume the DP hypothesis (see e.g., Abney (1987)), the need for
N bars also disappear.
Going back to Chomsky’s discussion of Bare Phrase Structure, he also provides
definitions of specifiers and complements. The following quote provides essentially
14There are complicating empirical issues here. For (59), the data go in different directions:
(i) the student with long hair and the one with short hair
(ii) *This student is with long hair.
Travis does not discuss these data. She only says that two properties go together with one, so even
if the copula case is bad, that could be due to something else.
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what he has to say about this issue:
(65) The terms “complement” and “specifier” can be defined in the usual way
[. . . ]. The head-complement relation is the ‘most local’ relation of an XP to
a terminal head Y, all others within YP being head-specifier (apart from ad-
junction [. . . ]); in principle there might be a series of specifiers, a possibility
that seems to be realized [. . . ]. The principles of UG, we assume, crucially
involve these local relations. (Chomsky (1995a: 63), Chomsky (1995c: 245))
Let us first focus on the last part of this quote, namely that multiple specifiers come
for free in Bare Phrase Structure, unless you explicitly restrict the theory so that
they cannot occur. I will now show why multiple specifiers exist without further
ado once we make explicit what we think about Merge and labeling (see also Speas
(1990)). The following proof is based on Adger et al. (1999).
Chomsky (1995c: 243) argues that Merge applies to two objects α and β
and then forms the new object K. K includes both the formed set {α, β} and its
label γ: {γ, {α, β}}. Given this definition of Merge, a term with its own internal
structure can freely merge with another term with internal structure. One of these
will determine the label, and we get a specifier. (66) shows this.
(66) Merge ({x, {x, y}}, {m, {m, n}}) = {m, {{x, {x, y}}, {m, {m, n}}}}
Now, crucially nothing bans the reapplication of this operation.
(67) Merge ({a, {a, b}}, {m, {{x, {x, y}}, {m, {m, n}}}})
= {m, {{a, {a, b}}, {m, {{x, {x, y}}, {m, {m, n}}}}}}
Now we have two specifiers: x and a, and m is the head/label. This set-theoretic
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This is a solid argument and it means that when specifiers are relational, there
can be no ban as such on multiple specifiers, unless one stipulates such a ban. It
furthermore raises the question why languages appear to be different in whether or
not they allow multiple phrases to merge with the same head. The definition of
Merge we have adopted allows this computation, as we have just seen, and then it
appears that some languages have restrictions on how many they allow. There is
an important question of how to encode this parametrization. Is it a property of
the relevant head that it allows one, two or three specifiers? How does a child learn
how many specifiers each head allows? These are non-trivial questions, but I am not
going to discuss them in detail here. The theory that I will pursue in the present
thesis will not make it possible to generate an object where multiple phrases have
been merged with the same head.
In addition to this argument, there is also a lot of empirical evidence in favor
of multiple specifiers. I will now give some of the evidence that has been put forward
in the literature.
Kuno (1973) presents data from Japanese that shows multiple subject con-
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‘It is in civilized countries that men - their average life-span is short.’
(’It is the average life-span of civilized countries that is long.’)






















‘Good green tea, Japanese people drink [it] with pleasure.’
(Doron and Heycock 1999: 70)
Japanese is not the only language that has multiple subject constructions. Doron
and Heycock (1999) argue that both Modern Standard Arabic and Modern Hebrew








‘The students are meeting Hind.’







‘The house has bright colors.’ (Lit.: ’The house, its colors are bright.’)

















‘Ruti will end up winning.’ (Doron and Heycock 1999: 71)
Doron and Heycock present several arguments that the initial noun phrase in these
sentences should not be analyzed either as a dislocated phrase or in a designated
focus position, which are the standard analyses of these sentences in Semitic and
Japanese, respectively. They argue instead that the noun phrase is a subject that
combines with what they call a ‘sentential predicate’, which is a phrase that seman-
tically denotes a property even if syntactically, it is a full clause that already has
a subject. I am not going to review their arguments here; see their paper for all
the details. Suffice it to say that multiple subject constructions do not seem to be
specific to Japanese, though even if they were, they still provide empirical evidence
for the existence of such constructions.
There is a complicating factor that it is worth highlighting, especially since
it involves an issue that the literature seldom engages with. How can we be sure
that multiple subjects are equivalent to multiple specifiers? An alternative would be
that these subjects are specifiers of each of their functional heads, and that these
functional heads are silent so that we wouldn’t be able to tell that these heads
were present. Extensionally we would get the same result, but intensionally the
computation would be different.15
15Koizumi (1995) attempts to present a possible argument in favor of the existence of multiple
specifiers and against silent heads. However, upon further scrutiny it turns out that the crucial
contrast he relies on does not exist in English. Therefore I am not going to present the discussion
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Before I go into problems with specifiers and how they affect our understanding
of phrase structure, I would like to step back and reflect briefly on the results of
Bare Phrase Structure. Consider the following quote.
(74) If the reasoning sketched so far is correct, phrase structure theory is essen-
tially “given” on grounds of virtual conceptual necessity in the sense indi-
cated earlier. The structures stipulated in earlier versions are either miss-
ing or reformulated in elementary terms satisfying minimalist conditions,
with no objects beyond lexical features. Stipulated conventions are derived.
Substitution and adjunction are straightforward. At least one goal of the
Minimalist Program seems to be within reach: phrase structure theory can
be eliminated entirely, it seems, on the basis of the most elementary as-
sumptions. If so, at least this aspect of human language is “perfect” [. . . ]’
(Chomsky 1995c: 249).
Bare Phrase Structure provides a reduction of X-bar structure and paves the way
towards the elimination of the phrase structure component. This is a very important
result from the perspective of this dissertation: If phrase structure theory can be
eliminated entirely, we want to understand exactly how that can happen. I will argue
that eliminating the relational difference between complement and specifiers is one
further step towards this goal, with the added benefit of providing a transparent
mapping onto logical forms that exhibit full thematic separation. If specifiers qua
specifiers do not play an important role for argument structure, then we have to
here.
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consider whether there are other empirical arguments in favor of them. The rest of
the dissertation will argue that there are no such arguments.
In many ways, Bare Phrase Structure represents the natural continuation of
the path that was initiated by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures. Here he had to
formulate a number of phrase structure rules and order them. Later he developed
X-bar theory as a way of generalizing over phrase structure rules. X-bar theory was
further streamlined in Barriers and then The Minimalist Program provides a further
reduction while preserving empirical coverage. I think there are reasons to say that
Bare Phrase Structure constitutes one of the genuine success stories of Minimalism.
It does exactly what Minimalism was supposed to do, namely take a theoretically
and empirically well-understood construct and show us that we can understand it
even better by reducing the ontology. I would submit that there are not many such
success stories within Minimalism, but Bare Phrase Structure seems like a solid
candidate.16 However, even Bare Phrase Structure is not free of problems, and in
what follows, I will probe Bare Phrase Structure further to illustrate where there is
still room for improvement. I will then in chapter 4 show how we can move further
towards reducing Bare Phrase Structure even further, by removing the relational
difference between specifiers and complements.
16For example, we do not seem to have increased our theoretical understanding of islands during
the past 20 years. Islands appear to be just as much of a problem now as they have always been.
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2.4.2 Remaining problems with specifiers
There are two types of issues that we need to separate here, namely (i) how easy
or hard it is to provide an adequate definition of a specifier, and (ii) whether the
grammar actually distinguishes between specifiers and complements. I will show that
a specifier can be defined, but it comes at the cost of admitting X-bar levels into
the theory again. In chapter 4, I will argue that the grammar does not distinguish
between specifiers and complements, and that this has the virtue of providing a
transparent mapping from syntactic structure onto Neo-Davidsonian logical forms.17
Let us for now concentrate on how specifiers can be defined.18 As we saw
above, Chomsky (1995c) basically defines specifiers as maximal projections that are
not complements or adjuncts. For ease of exposition, here is what he says about
these relations again:
(75) The terms “complement” and “specifier” can be defined in the usual way
17See Adger (In press) for a different critique of specifiers and different solutions.
18This was already discussed by van Riemsdijk (1998: 3) when he says:
(i) With further multiplication of functional heads, the number of specifiers is multiplied as
well. In many cases it is not clear what role these specifiers play, if any. Another way of
putting this is to say that the definition of ’specifier’ was never entirely clear in that, for
example, it subsumed such categorially and otherwise diverse elements as articles, quan-
tifiers, modifiers, subjects, etc., and while in more recent work heads have been more or
less successfully separated from XPs, the confusion remains with respect to the status of
negation, adverbs and the like [. . . ].
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[. . . ]. The head-complement relation is the ‘most local’ relation of an XP to
a terminal head Y, all others within YP being head-specifier (apart from ad-
junction [. . . ]); in principle there might be a series of specifiers, a possibility
that seems to be realized [. . . ]. The principles of UG, we assume, crucially
involve these local relations. (Chomsky (1995a: 63), Chomsky (1995c: 245))
We also saw that this allows for multiple specifiers. However, as I have already
mentioned, there are properties that suggest that the grammar makes use of a ‘true’
or distinct specifier position. The EPP is one such property, namely that there
seems to be a unique ‘subject’ position that has to be filled Chomsky (1982). We
have already seen an example motivating this, repeated in (76):
(76) (*It) is raining.
Note that the element in the EPP position cannot be an adjunct:
(77) *Yesterday was raining.
In these cases, an expletive is required:
(78) Yesterday, there was rain.
Semantically, there has also been the intuition that the EPP is related to ‘subject-
hood’ and predication, an approach that in particular was developed in Rothstein
(1983).
Let us return to the issue of defining specifiers. Chomsky (1995c)’s definition
is problematic because it is tricky to define specifiers as the ’elsewhere’ case since he
also assumes that labels exist. Labels are copies of lexical items, and if so, they will
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also be included in the ‘elsewhere’ case. Thus ‘elsewhere’ will include both specifiers
and labels (aka. lexical items), and then we are left with the question of how to
distinguish these. There is also the possibility that adjuncts and specifiers are very
similar if not identical in certain ways (Kayne 1994). One could maybe get around
this problem by denying the existence of labels (Collins 2002, Seely 2006), but there
are also good reasons for assuming that labels exist (Hornstein 2009).
Chomsky (2010) asks the following question: In (79), why do we not say that




Typically we say that D2 is the specifier of T, but Chomsky’s way of defining spec-
ifiers within Bare Phrase Structure does not rule out the latter option. D2 is a
specifier of T, and T is a specifier of D2 since it is only the complement relation
between T and D1 that is explicitly defined in the definition above. Every other re-
lation is a head-specifier relation, and assuming that labels exist, they can function
as specifiers as well.
A definition based on c-command may at first glance seem to provide an answer
to Chomsky’s question. That presupposes that the c-command algorithm correctly
identifies what the head is. We need a definition of c-command, and a definition of
complements and specifiers in terms of c-command is given in (80).
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(80) ‘The complement position is that which uniquely stands in a mutual C-
command relation with the verb. The Specifier position is that which stands
in a unique asymmetrical C-command relation to the verb (viz. it asym-
metrically C-commands the verb). These, then, are the positions which are
closest to the verb in ways that are straightforwardly definable in terms of
C-command relations’ (Chametzky 2000: 136).





The T head asymmetrically c-commands the verb, but we don’t want to say that T
is a specifier (pace George (1980: 27)). One could probably get around this problem
by saying that c-command only holds internally to every phrase.19. However, it is
not clear how you determine what is a phrase without reference to the head that
merges with the phrase. More importantly, binding conditions on variables show
that c-command holds across phrases.
A definition where complements are first-merged and specifiers are later-merged
does not suffice, since later-merged does not single out designated specifiers that ap-
19This would be similar to saying that every phrase constitutes its own Spell-Out domain (see
e.g., Epstein and Seely (2002), Müller (2010)).
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pear to be necessary for the EPP in English. It also makes it hard to distinguish be-
tween specifiers that are externally merged and specifiers that are internally merged.
Collins and Stabler (2011) provide the following definitions of complements
and specifiers:
(82) Y is the complement of X in C iff C = Merge(X,Y) and X is a lexical item
token.
(83) Y is the specifier of X in C iff C = Merge(X,Y) where X is not a lexical item
token. When LI = Label(X), we also say Y is the specifier of LI in C.
Two other definitions that are needed are the following ones:
(84) For all C, C is a minimal projection iff C is a lexical item token.
(85) A lexical item token is a pair <LI,k> where LI is a lexical item and k an
integer.
Put in more conventional terms, a lexical item is an item taken out of the lexicon.
These definitions show that specifiers can easily be defined, but however, note that
X in (83) is defined as ‘not a lexical item token’. That is, it is something else than
a lexical item. What is it? We are only told that it is not a lexical item token. This
seems reminiscent of the elsewhere case that Chomsky made use of, and Collins and
Stabler also provide a definition of an intermediate projection:
(86) For all C, D syntactic objects in workspace W, LI is a lexical item token,
C is an intermediate projection of LI iff Label(C) = LI, and C is neither a
minimal projection nor a maximal projection in W.
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It is hard to see how this is not just recoding X-bars, though as long as these
are intended as ‘informal notions’ (Chomsky 1995a: 61), the definition as such is
unproblematic. Collins and Stabler show that we can certainly provide definitions
that distinguish specifiers and complements. The remaining question is whether
there is evidence that the computation of syntax requires these definitions. The
remainder of this chapter and the beginning of chapter 4 will discuss that question.
There are various proposals in the literature where it is argued that speci-
fiers should be eliminated, cf. Cormack (1999), Starke (2004), Jayaseelan (2008b),
Chomsky (2010); see also Chomsky (2004: 111-112). In the next section I will in par-
ticular discuss Starke’s approach and also a recent approach by Narita (2011). The
latter does not try to eliminate specifiers as such, but his proposals are interestingly
relevant for what I will be suggesting in chapter 4.
2.4.3 No specifiers
There have been attempts at eliminating specifiers, as we already saw when dis-
cussing Hoekstra (1991). The most explicit attempt is the one in Starke (2004).
Cormack (1999) makes a similar suggestion within Categorial Grammar, but I am
not going to discuss that here. I will also not discuss Jayaseelan (2008b) since he
bases his approach on Starke’s, and furthermore because he assumes that Merge is
asymmetric and that dominance/precedence is the main syntactic relationship. As
I have made clear in chapter 1, I assume that Merge is symmetric. And Jayasee-
lan’s specific proposal hinges very much on these assumptions together with Starke’s
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work, which is to say that the technical details of Jayaseelan’s account won’t play a
major role in what follows. After discussing Starke, I will go on to discuss a proposal
by Narita (2011) that in part ends up getting rid of specifiers.
2.4.3.1 Starke (2004)
Starke (2004) argues that specifiers should be eliminated. He specifically focuses
on questions and argues that there is no need to have an empty C head. That is,
he argues that the structure in (88) should be replaced with the structure in (89)
(Starke 2004: 252).












these boys ate t
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Starke notes that specifiers are a way of “adding space”. However, as cartography
emerged (Pollock 1989, Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999), there’s as much space as you can
ask for (cf. already Stuurman (1985: 183)). Specifiers agree with heads, so they
contain the same features as heads do, which is shown in the structure. Concerning
the wh-phrase DP, (Starke 2004: 253) says that ‘The “specifier” has now taken
over the role of the head [in (89)], it has become a complex, non-terminal head’.
Unfortunately, it is not clear what a ‘complex, non-terminal head’ is. When you
remove the C head, you do not seem to have a specifier. Heads, however, are usually
not complex in this way either. This issue is related to another issue, namely how the
CP emerges in Starke’s structure. Starke does not elaborate on that, but presumably
this is due to the wh-feature that he puts on both the DP and the CP. One has to
think that this feature fulfills endocentricity, but exactly how Starke imagines that
this works remains unclear. In order to achieve that the feature somehow captures
endocentricity, quite a bit of feature percolation seems to be required. It is also
not clear how it works in those cases where the moving element does not bear a wh-
feature, as in topicalizations. It is hard to see what will project in such constructions,
and Starke does not address the question in the paper.
Yet a further problem is that the structure in (89) is incompatible with the
proposals in Moro (2000), Chomsky (2008) and Kayne (2010) that [XP YP] struc-
tures are not allowed for purposes of linearization. I will return to Moro’s suggestion
in detail in chapter 4, but insofar as this is correct, Starke’s approach is problematic.
Setting these issues aside for now, Starke makes a point that the present thesis
is concerned with, namely why one would want to eliminate specifiers. A relevant
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quote is given in (90).
(90) ‘Eliminating the notion “specifier” carries us one step further toward the
reductionist program initiated by minimalism: minimalism eliminated the
looser notion of government in favor of the more restricted notions of specifier-
head relations. This chapter amounts to eliminating specifier-head rela-
tions also and restricting all syntactic relations to the most basic: head-
complement relations’ (Starke 2004: 253).
I think this is a valid and important point. Jayaseelan (2008b: 104) further argues
that if we get rid of specifiers, Merge will be maximally simple. I won’t give his
argument here since it is rather complex. Rather, I will give Starke’s reasons for
dispensing with specifiers. I am just going to list them here and I refer the reader
to Starke’s paper for further arguments.
(91) Doubly Filled Nothing: no projection can have both its head-terminal and
its specifier present at the same time.
(92) Starke asks why merger of an XP specifier has to be preceded by insertion
of a corresponding head. He says that currently there are no answers to this
question, though he does not consider possibilities such as the Extension
Condition or Greed.
(93) The specifier relation is similar to an ’expletive’ relation: it maps onto a
semantically vacuous identity relationship and plays no role in labeling.
(94) Locality of specifier-head is very different from the locality of e.g., wh-
movement, but this should not be the case since both types of locality involve
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featural identity.
(95) Features are duplicated since they are present on both the head and the
specifier. (See also Hoekstra (1991).)
(96) Phrase structure is split into two hierarchies: first nodes are assembled into
X-bar structures and then these are assembled into a rigid sequence of pro-
jections.
Starke argues that a way to remedy these problems is to make explicit an assumption
that ‘all modern theories of syntax assume’, namely that projections are ordered.
He describes this as in (97) (Starke 2004: 256).
(97) There exists an ‘fseq’ - a sequence of functional projections - such that the
output of merge must respect fseq.
Insertion of structure is triggered directly by fseq, which means that an fseq cannot
be <C, V> but has to be <C, T, V>. Starke argues that ‘the beauty of this result
is that fseq is independently needed in every theory’ (Starke 2004: 257). Although
fseq is a stipulation, it is one that is needed in most theories, as far as I can see.
There is another serious problem with Starke’s approach: It is not clear what
exactly bans specifiers. He needs to impose a constraint that does this job, but he
never gives us the constraint. Put differently, were you to insert a specifier, what
exactly would go wrong? As far as I can see, nothing would go wrong, although
all the undesirable consequences that Starke discusses ((91)-(96)) would of course
loom large. Still, from a computational perspective, without a constraint there is
nothing that would ban the merger of what we think of as a specifier. In addition
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to this problem, I also mentioned some unclear issues concerning Starke’s specific
proposal above, and particularly the problem that arises if Moro (2000) is right. So
although Starke tries to eliminate specifiers, I do not think he succeeds. But I share
his goal of getting rid of specifiers, as will become evident in chapter 4. Now, let
me discuss a recent proposal by Narita that has some interesting consequences for
phrase structure and Spell-Out.
2.4.3.2 Narita (2011)
Narita (2009, 2011) develops a new take on Spell-Out which turns out to be relevant
to the issue of whether specifiers exist. Although Narita does not try to get rid of
specifiers, his proposals will turn out to be very relevant for what I’m going to
suggest in chapter 4.20
Since my goal here is not to give a comprehensive discussion of Narita’s the-
ory, I will rather focus on the aspects that are relevant for specifiers. His system
implements Moro (2000)’s and Chomsky (2008)’s claim that two phrases cannot
be merged. If Spell-Out applies to the specifier, then the specifier is reduced to a
head/lexical item that can be merged with the clausal spine (a phrase). And if the
specifier does not undergo this kind of ‘reduction’, then the clausal spine has to.
This way, all syntactic relations are always head-phrase, which is to say that these
relations look more like head-complement relations. A picture illustrating this is
provided in (98).
20See also Epstein (2009) for a similar reasoning, though discussed in the context of theta




This figure shows a core syntactic relation that consists of a head and a non-head
in either order.
This is something that I will argue in favor of in chapter 4, though I will argue
that there should not be any optionality the way Narita has it when it comes to
Spell-Out.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has provided an in depth discussion of several issues concerning phrase
structure, and in particular focused on specifiers. I have gone through how phrase
structure developed in generative grammar and in particular focused on the general
aspects of the various theories. In particular, I have discussed the view of phrase
structure within the Minimalist Program in great detail. A number of problems
concerning specifiers have been brought forward and that discussion led me to dis-
cuss in particular Starke (2004)’s proposal of how to eliminate specifiers. This is
something that I will develop in a new way in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Motivating Full Thematic Separation
3.1 Introduction
Whereas the previous chapter provided a thorough discussion of how specifiers fit
into various theories of phrase structure, the present chapter will focus much more
on semantics and how logical forms for the argument domain of the clause look like.
Most linguists learn at some point that verbs have arguments. There are
transitive and intransitive verbs and the difference is roughly speaking whether
verbs have two arguments or just one argument. This property has been taken
to be theoretically significant and has played a rather important role in generative
grammar as well as in other grammatical frameworks. In essence, the idea is that
the verb encodes a propositional shell in the sense that the verb is a full sentence in
disguise - following a tradition going back at least to Frege. In generative grammar,
theoretical principles such as the Theta Criterion posits the adicities that verbs have
by requiring that the verb’s arguments be present in the syntactic structure. The
view is that the adicities of a verb are part of the verb’s meaning and that the latter
in part determines the realization of arguments.
It is important to emphasize that verbs having adicities is not a virtual con-
ceptual necessity for formal semantics. Tarski gave a semantics for the first-order
predicate calculus without any adicities. The predicates Sxy and Fa are alike in
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having only sequences as satisfiers. Put different, the necessity of adicity require-
ments must come from further empirical assumptions about human languages. It is
those assumptions that I would like to question in this chapter.
Levin and Rappaport Hovav, in their comprehensive overview of argument
realization, say that: ‘We have emphasized that not only is the structural facet of
meaning relevant to argument realization generalizations, but so is the root [. . . ]’
(Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005: 238), where the root is the idiosyncratic prop-
erties of a verb. The current chapter aims to show that this may not be true as far
as the grammar is concerned.
The traditional view where all the verb’s arguments are part of the lexical
specification of the verb has been challenged in recent years. In particular, Schein
(1993) and Kratzer (1996, 2000) argue that external arguments or Agents should be
severed from the verb, that is, not be specified in terms of a variable that corresponds
to a grammatical argument of the verb.1 Schein and Kratzer, however, disagree on
whether internal arguments or Themes should be severed as well. The goal of the
present chapter is to take steps towards resolving the debate. I will argue that there
are cases where verbs do not have thematic arguments. If that is the case, it raises
specific questions about the syntax-semantics interface, questions that I will address
in chapters 4 and 6.
In this chapter, I will present a series of arguments that supports the view
that verbs do not take thematic arguments. The arguments will take the following
1Similar claims have been advanced in non-generative frameworks such as Construction Gram-
mar (Goldberg 1995, 2006). Here I will not discuss this literature.
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form: They will show that Neo-Davidsonian logical forms, what I will refer to as
full thematic separation, are the correct logical forms for certain data. These logical
forms presuppose that verbs only take an event variable and that they do not take
other arguments.2
In the postscript to their book, Levin and Rappaport Hovav state the following,
which is worth quoting at length (the italics are mine):
In chapter 1 we stressed the importance of isolating the
“grammatically relevant” facets of verb meaning. Most lin-
guists take this type of meaning to be what we characterized
as the “structural” components of verb meaning. How does
this convergence fit in with our repeated assertion that the
semantics of the root is important to many facets of argument
realization? We suggest that the basic mapping from event
structure to syntax is indeed governed by a relatively small
set of semantic notions: the grammatically relevant facets of
meaning expressed in an event structure. However, the se-
mantics of the root determines the range of event structure a
particular verb is associated with, the distribution of semantic
cases, and the compatibility of a verb with particular modes
of information-packaging.
2See Davidson (1967), Parsons (1990), Lasersohn (1995), Bayer (1996), Rothstein (1998), Land-
man (2000), and Tenny and Pustejovsky (2000) for a summary of the traditional arguments in favor
of event variables.
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It is perhaps fitting to conclude this book with the observa-
tion that the lexical semantics of the root determines in many
complex ways different facets of argument realization. This
observation is worthy of note in light a recent trend towards
shifting the burden of explanation to extralexical factors. Al-
though such factors are clearly present, the recognition that
lexical semantic factors are still very relevant affirms research
programs that pay close attention to the lexical semantics of
verbs, despite the notoriously elusive nature of word meaning.
(Levin and Rappaport Hovav 2005: 241)
Many researchers have argued that properties of the verb influence or even
determine how the verb’s arguments are realized. However, in the present chapter
I present arguments against this view.3 There have been a number of such argu-
ments in the literature, as Levin and Rappaport Hovav mention; see Krifka (1989,
1992), Parsons (1990: 96-99), Schein (1993), Gomeshi and Massam (1994), Ritter
and Rosen (1996), Herburger (2000), Baker (2003), Borer (2005a,b), Marantz (2005),
Åfarli (2007), Williams (2005, 2008), Pietroski (2007), Boeckx (2010), Cuervo (2010)
and Platzack (2011) for the verbal domain and Barker (1998) for the nominal do-
3An initial reason for thinking that this is the case is provided by the three verbs eat, dine
and devour. These verbs all have roughly the same meaning, but quite different subcategorization
requirements: eat is optionally transitive, dine is intransitive and devour is obligatorily transitive.
Thanks to Lucas Champollion (p.c.) for reminding me of this.
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main. Here I focus on a few of these arguments, namely the ones presented by
Schein, Herburger and Borer. These arguments have never been gathered together
in one place before so I think it will be useful to do that. Special attention will be
devoted to the issue of whether Themes should be severed from the verb’s argument
structure or not.4
It is worth emphasizing that the present approach does not suggest to dispense
with the event argument.5 I will return to some more discussion of this below.
The chapter is organized as follows. I start out by discussing Schein (1993)’s
development of the proposal in Parsons (1990), where I will in particular focus on
Schein’s argument for severing the Agent. I will also present a couple of other
arguments, based on Herburger (2000), Schein (2003), Borer (2005a) and Williams
(2008) in favor of also severing the Theme. Then I will discuss Kratzer (1996) and
her argument that the Theme should not be severed from the verb. Here I will in
particular focus on Kratzer’s explicit formal semantics for her logical forms and I
will also show how that semantics could easily be applied if the Theme also should
be severed. The entire chapter, together with the previous one, set the stage for
chapter 4, where I present a way of cashing out full thematic separation through
eliminating the categorical distinction between specifiers and complements.
4Bayer (1996) presents a very long discussion of whether Neo-Davidsonian representations are
better than Davidsonian logical forms. He concludes that they are not. Most of the issues I discuss
below are not discussed by Bayer or discussed inadequately (like his discussion of Schein (1993)),
so I will not engage in a detailed rebuttal of Bayer’s claims in this chapter.
5It may even be possible to argue that having an event argument is what makes a lexical item
a verb, though I won’t pursue this possibility here.
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3.2 Motivating Full Thematic Separation
Davidson (1967) suggests that an event variable is crucial to the representation of
verbal meaning. Concretely, he suggests the representation in (1) for (2).
(1) Jones buttered the toast.
(2) ∃e[buttering(e, Jones, the toast)]
Davidson argues that these event representations are well-suited to capture impor-
tant entailment relations. Consider the examples in (3)-(7).
(3) Jones buttered the toast.
(4) Jones buttered the toast slowly.
(5) Jones buttered the toast slowly in the bathroom.
(6) Jones buttered the toast slowly in the bathroom with a knife.
(7) Jones buttered the toast slowly in the bathroom with a knife at midnight.
In these examples, (7) entails (3), (4), (5), and (6); (6) entails (3), (4), and (5);
(5) entails (3) and (4); (4) entails (3). This follows straightforwardly if there is an
event modifier common to all the modifiers. The modifiers can then be linked by
conjunction, in which case the entailments would follow as a natural consequence of
conjunction reduction.
(8) ∃e[buttering(e, Jones, the toast) & Slow(e) & In(e, the bathroom) & With(e,
a knife) & At(e, midnight)]
Immediately after Davidson presented the proposal in (2), Castañeda (1967) argued
that the thematic arguments could be severed from the verb. That is, (2) could
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rather be represented as in (9), where thematic relations are independent two-place
predicates.
(9) ∃e[buttering(e) & Agent(e, Jones) & Theme(e, the toast)]
Logical forms with this structure are called Neo-Davidsonian. Dowty (1989) calls
(2) the ‘ordered-argument’ method and (9) the ‘neo-Davidsonian’ method.6
Note that the original Davidsonian proposal lumped the event argument and
the thematic arguments together at logical form. As I will argue, it is a virtue of the
Neo-Davidsonian proposal that this distinction is restored. On a Neo-Davidsonian
approach, verbs are monadic in the sense that they only have a single argument,
namely the event argument. As mentioned above, this offers a way to classify verbs
in the sense that one can say that the event argument is what makes a lexical item
a verb. This requires that one insists that verbs and their corresponding gerunds
are not synonyms (pace e.g., Parsons (1990)).7 I will not take on that task in this
paper, as the goal is not to discuss the question of what makes a verb a verb.
It is important to note that Parsons would be happy if all decomposition is
assigned to the lexicon. That is, we could stipulate the meaning postulate in (10)
and this would suffice.
6Since Gruber (1965) and Jackendoff (1972), there has been a lot of discussion of what the ap-
propriate thematic roles are. See Dowty (1991) for arguments that we can only define prototypical
roles, though Schein (2002) argues against this.
7Verbs and gerunds will have different meanings. One way to put it is that the verb run is a
predicate of events but running is a referring expression that designates plurally just those events
that satisfy run.
76
(10) ‘V(e, F, G)’ is true ↔ ∀x(Agent(e, x) ↔ Fx) ∧ V*e ∧ ∀x(Theme(e, x) ↔
Gx) (Schein 1993: 9)
Thus, it is crucial to distinguish decomposition from separation, where the latter as-
sumes that all thematic arguments are never part of the verb, either in logical forms
or in the lexicon. Parsons mostly assumed decomposition rather than separation,
which is why I do not include Parsons among Neo-Davidsonians.
Parsons (1990: 96-99) presents an argument for why decomposition is required
(see also already Bartsch (1976), Carlson (1984), Higginbotham (1985, 1986), Taylor
(1985), Krifka (1989, 1992)). It concerns examples such as (12) and the polyadic
analysis in (14).
(11) Brutus stabbed Caesar.
(12) Caesar was stabbed.
(13) ∃e[stabbing(e, b, c)]
(14) ∃e∃x[stabbing(e, x, c)]
Parsons instead defends the analysis in (16).
(15) ∃e[stabbing(e) ∧ Agent(e, b) ∧ Theme(e, c)]
(16) ∃e[stabbing(e) ∧ Theme(e, c)]
The problem with the non-decomposed logical form is that it is not possible for
the logical form to predicate a stabbing event in such a way that it does not entail
the existence of a corresponding agent. One can construct sentences where no such
agent exists. Parsons gives the example of reporting a dream in (17).
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(17) In a dream last night, I was stabbed, although in fact nobody had stabbed
me, and I wasn’t stabbed with anything.
Parsons (1990: 98) presents this as ‘a report of an incoherent dream, one in which,
say, I am bewildered by the fact that I have been stabbed but not by anyone or
anything’. It is difficult to achieve this without decomposition as (14) incorrectly
asserts the existence of an agent and (18) yields a contradiction.
(18) ∃e[∃x[stabbing(e, x, i) ∧ ¬∃x[stabbing(e, x , i)]]
However, decomposition gives us the desired logical form, as shown in (19).
(19) ∃e[stabbing(e) ∧ Theme(e, i) ∧ ¬∃x[Stabber(e, x)]]
See Schein (1993: 94) for further support of this argument, though from the point
of view of separation, and Bayer (1996: 206) for counterarguments.
It is important to point out that what both Davidson and Parsons call ‘logical
form’ is not the same as the notion as Logical Form (LF), which is a syntactic
level of representation (cf. May (1977, 1985)). As Hornstein (2002: 345) points
out, the ‘conception of LF is analogous (not identical) to earlier conceptions of
logical form (or logical syntax) [. . . ] found in the work of philosophers like Frege,
Russell, Carnap, and Strawson’. Kratzer (1996: 110) cites Parsons (1993) saying
that the theory in Parsons (1990) is a ‘proposal for the logical forms of sentences,
unsupplemented by an account of how those forms originate by combining sentence
parts’. On such a theory, one can for example argue that there is ordered argument
association in the syntax and in conceptual structure, or one can argue that there is
ordered argument association in the syntax but separation in conceptual structure.
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Yet another option is to argue that there is separation both in the syntax and
conceptual structure. The latter is Schein’s project (Schein 1993: 11), as I will
illustrate in detail below. One can also take intermediate positions, as Kratzer
(1996) does, where only the Agent is severed in the syntax (Kratzer is explicitly
agnostic about conceptual structure). This issue will play an important role in the
present chapter, and I will return to a more comprehensive discussion below.
In the next subsection, I will discuss arguments for full thematic separation.8
I will focus mostly on semantic arguments and not so much on syntactic arguments
(see Borer (2005a,b), Marantz (2005), Boeckx (2010) and Bowers (2010) on the
latter). Then I will go on to discuss Kratzer’s approach in the following section.
3.2.1 Schein (1993) on Severing the Agent from the Verb
Schein (1993) puts forward arguments that show that we need the representation in
(9), a representation that he refers to as full thematic separation. Schein makes the
strong claim that the Agent relation, the Theme relation and the verb relation are
independent of each other.
Schein’s project is to argue that lexical decomposition, as seen above, is not
8I will not discuss the proposal in Krifka (1989, 1992) for reasons of space as it is quite complex.
Essentially, Krifka suggests a theory of how the reference of nominals that bear thematic roles
affects the aspectual understanding of the events they participate in. Various patient relations are
analyzed in terms of how they map the mereological structure of the object to the mereological
structure of the event. To do this, Krifka needs to separate the thematic relations from the verb.
See Larson (Forthcoming) for more discussion.
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sufficient. Schein (1993: 10) says that ‘The argument for a radical decomposition is
an argument that decomposition enters into the logical syntax’. The project is then
to argue that (10) is not sufficient. The way Schein makes this argument is to put
a Theme in between the Agent and the verb. as illustrated in (20). If the Agent is
not lexically represented on the verb, but rather introduced by structure separate




Schein introduces such a case involving a distributive quantifier as the Theme. Such
a Theme may induce a mereological partition relation between the event of Agent
and the event of the verb. Importantly, though, in this case no substantive verbal
meaning is added. There is not a substantial semantic relation to the event of the
verb, as e.g„ a causative would contribute, but simply the mereological relation. In
order to make this clearer, let us see how a mereology of events is motivated.
Consider the data in (21), from Schein (1993: 7).9
(21) a. Unharmoniously, every organ student sustained a note on the Wurlitzer
for sixteen measures.
b. In slow progression, every organ student struck a note on the Wurlitzer.
Schein argues that the reading for (21a) where each student is related to a note
on the Wurlitzer, that is, for each to have an event of his own, the quantifier must
include a quantifier of events within its scope. Note that it is not the individual note
9See Ferreira (2005) for more discussion of this issue.
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that is unharmonious but the ensemble. Each of the students only play a part in
the larger action. There is no other way to get this reading, and the sentence would
be false if, for example, one of the students keeps it going for eight measures and
then another student does the other eight, as Schein observes. The same argument
can be made for (21b). The solitary events performed by the students can only
be related to the larger one as parts of the whole. Summarizing, the merological
relation is encoded through a quantifier which includes the condition that e’ is part
of e (e’ ≤ e).
Now that we have seen why mereological relations are required, let us turn to
the central data points. Schein’s discussion centers around cases like (22)-(25). I
will in what follows concentrate on (22).
(22) Three video games taught every quarterback two new plays.
Intended reading: ‘Between the three of them, the video games are respon-
sible for the fact that each quarterback learned two new plays.’
(23) Three agents sold (the) two buildings (each) to exactly two investors.
(24) Three letters of recommendation from influential features earned the two
new graduates (each) two offers.
(25) Three automatic tellers gave (the) two new members (each) exactly two
passwords.
One may wonder why Schein adds the third NP two new plays in (22). The reason
is that this eliminates the possibility that the crucial universal every quarterback
denotes a group, e.g., the quarterbacks. If we were dealing with a group denotation,
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one could possibly analyze (22) as akin to The games taught the quarterbacks. That
is, the group of games taught the group of quarterbacks. If that is the case, the
particular reading that Schein has identified does not obtain. Therefore, in the
example at hand, the universal has to denote a genuine quantifier since it has an
indefinite that depends on it. That is, two new plays depends on every quarterback:
for every quarterback there are two new plays that he learned. The claim is that the
mereological/part-whole relation among events (e’ ≤ e) connects quantification over
quarterbacks and their solitary events to the larger event where three video games
are the teachers (Schein 1993: 8). So every quarterback and three video games are
cumulatively related, but every quarterback also seems to behave like an ordinary
distributive quantifier phrase in its relation to two new plays, as Kratzer (2000)
makes clear. This is the fact that Schein tries to describe and explain.
Note that in the logical form above, the Agent and the Theme are independent
of each other and also of the verb (Schein 1993: 57). (Schein 1993: 8, 57) suggests a
corresponding logical form for (22), namely (26) (Schein 1993: 8, 57), where INFL
means the Agent event.10
(26) ∃e(teach(e)
∧ ∃e([∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)]∀x(INFL(e, x) ↔ Xx)
10A brief note about Schein’s take on plurals, which is important for understanding his logical
forms: A plural like the As is a second-order description of a predicate: a predicate such that if it
holds of x, x is an A. This means that the cats comes out as a definite second-order description:
(i) ιY(∃yYy ∧ ∀y(Yy ↔ cat(y))
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∧ [every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e](∀z(TO(e’, z) ↔ z = y)
∧ [∃Z: 2 (Z) ∧ ∀z(Wz → Pz)]∀z(OF(e’, z) ↔ Wz)))11
We can spell this out in plain(er) English as in (27).Note that the lower case e
and the use of singularity are just for simplicity. In real life these are second-order
quantifiers.12
(27) There is an event e, and e is a teaching,
and a three-membered plurality X comprising only video games, such that
for every x, x is an agent of e just if it is among those three in X,
and for every quarterback y, there is a part e’ of e, such that the targets of
the teaching are all and only the quarterbacks,
and there is a two-membered plurality Z, comprising only plays, such that
the content of the teaching e’ was all and only the plays of Z.
We see that the part-whole relation among events (e’ ≤ e) connects quantification
over quarterbacks and their solitary events to the larger event where three video
games are the teachers (Schein 1993: 8). Notice that in the logical form above, the
11Brasoveanu (2010) and Champollion (2010a) argue that event variables are not required in
this logical form, a view that comes with difficulties when faced with generalized quantifiers such
as most. Furthermore, although both Brasoveanu and Champollion code the mereology differently,
it is not clear to me that this is an argument against having events in the logical forms, given the
existence of many independent arguments for event variables (see e.g., footnote 2 of this chapter).
So even if one were to grant that Schein’s argument did not go through, there are still other
arguments for events that to my knowledge have not been explained away.
12Schein (1993) observes that this formulation is actually not strong enough. See his book for
more discussion.
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Agent and the Theme are scopally independent of each other and also of the verb.
Here is what Schein says about the interpretation of (26).
(28) It is ]. . . ] essential to the meaning of [(22)] that the θ-role bound into by
the subject not occur within the scope of other quantifiers, as in [(26)], and
that the action of the three video games be related mereologically to what
happened to the individual quarterbacks (Schein 1993: 57).
Schein devotes a lot of time to showing that if teach is a polyadic predicate,
we do not get the correct logical forms. That is, in (29), either the universal will
be inside the scope of the plural, or the reverse, and all thematic relations will be
within the scope of any quantifiers.13
(29) [∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)] [every y: Qy] [∃Z: 2(Z) ∧ ∀z(Zz → Pz)]
∃e teach(X, y, Z, e) (Schein 1993: 57)
As Schein points out, the problem for such polyadic logical forms is to find a meaning
that relate individual objects to plural objects. From the point of view of entries
such as (29), the difference between (22) and (30) is only a matter of scope. The
logical form is given in (31).
(30) Every quarterback was taught two new plays by three video games.
(31) [every y: Qy] [∃Z: 2(Z) ∧ ∀z(Zz → Pz)] [∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)]
∃e teach(X, y, Z, e) (Schein 1993: 58)
13Though see McKay (2006) for a different view. However, McKay’s theory does not generalize
to adding adverbials. He is also not attempting to provide a theory of how humans understand
natural language locutions.
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But the meaning of (22) is crucially different in ways that scope does not reflect.
In (30), all the NPs related to plural objects occur in the scope of the quantifier
over individual objects. This is different in (22) since one of these NPs has escaped,
as Schein puts it. I will not go through all the other illustrations Schein provides
of why polyadic predicates fail to give the correct meanings and instead I refer the
reader to chapter 4 of his book for comprehensive discussion.
Kratzer (2000) furthermore shows that it is technically possible to get around
Schein (1993)’s argument for severing the Agent. Here I will outline her argument
and emphasize, as she does, what one has to buy in order to escape Schein’s ar-
guments. Kratzer uses the sentence in (32) and the goal is to derive the logical
representation in (33). This logical form is simplified compared to the logical form
Schein has, but the simplification does not matter for present purposes.
(32) Three copy editors caught every mistake (in the manuscript)
(33) ∃e∃x[3 copy editors(x) ∧ agent(x)(e) ∧ ∀y[mistake(y) →∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧ catch(y)(e’)]]]
Kratzer makes the following assumptions:
(34) a. Denotations are assigned to bracketed strings of lexical items in a type-
driven fashion (Klein and Sag 1985)
b. For any string α, T(α) is the denotation of α
c. Types: e (individuals), s (events or states; eventualities as in Bach
(1981)), and t (truth-values)
d. Composition Principles: Functional Application and Existential Closure
(for this example)
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With these assumptions in hand, she provides the following derivation:
(35) a. T(every mistake) = λR<e<st>>λe∀y [mistake(y) →∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧ R(y)(e’)]]
b. T(catch) = λQ<<e<st>><st>>λxλe [agent(x)(e) ∧ Q(catch<e<st>>(e))
c. T(catch (every mistake)) =
λxλe [agent(x)(e) ∧ T(every mistake) (catch)(e)] =
λxλe [agent(x)(e) ∧ ∀y [mistake(y) → ∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧ catch(y)(e’)]]]
From (a), (b), by Functional Application.
d. T(3 copy editors) = λR<e<st>>λe∃x[3 copy editors(x) ∧ R(x)(e)]
e. T(3 copy editors (catch (every mistake))) =
T(3 copy editors)(λxλe [agent(x)(e) ∧ ∀y [mistake(y) → ∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧
catch(y)(e’)]]]) =
λe∃x[3 copy editors(x) ∧ agent(x)(e) ∧ ∀y [mistake(y) → ∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧
catch(y)(e’)]]]
From (c), (d), by Functional Application.
f. ∃e∃x[3 copy editors(x) ∧ agent(x)(e) ∧ ∀y[mistake(y) → ∃e’[e’ ≤ e ∧
catch(y)(e’)]]]
From (e), by Existential Closure.
This derivation gets us the intended reading, without severing the Agent. Step (b)
shows that all the arguments of catch are part of the lexical entry. Note, however,
the price we have to pay to be able to do this is clear: 1) A complicated semantic
type for the direct object position of catch is needed, and 2) it’s necessary to posit
different argument structure for catch and ‘catch’, that is, the object language word
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and the meta language word would have different denotations. Many semanticists,
including Kratzer, argue that this is not a price we should be willing to pay, and
she goes on to show that severing the Agent makes it possible to do without these
two assumptions. Furthermore, a derivation of the sort that we have just seen does
not preserve the intuition (e.g., in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995)) that there
is an ‘underlying’ matching of semantic structure to argument structure.
Notice that so far we have only seen a claim that Agents have to be fully
severed from the verb. This is similar to the claims in Kratzer (1996) and Marantz
(1997). In fact, Schein (1993) leaves open the possibility that ‘V(e) & Theme(e,
x)’ could be abbreviated ‘V(e, x)’. Although the latter collapses verb and thematic
role, the Theme argument x is still separated from any other nominal argument. In
later work, (Schein 2003) argues against this based on cases like (36).
(36) The cockroaches suffocated each other.
The sentence in (36) could be true ‘even where only the entire group sits at the cusp
of catastrophe’ (Schein 2003: 349). Put differently, had there been only one less
cockroach, all cockroaches would have survived. Schein (2003: 350) observes that
none of the following paraphrases are accurate to capture this reading.
(37) The cockroaches each suffocated the others.
(38) The cockroaches each suffocated some of the others.
(39) The cockroaches suffocated, each suffocating the others.
(40) The cockroaches suffocated, each suffocating some of the others.
The problem is that all the paraphrases assign each a scope that includes the verb.
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The main point here is that each cockroach is in a thematic relation to some event
E that contributed to the mass suffocation. But E is not itself a suffocation of one
cockroach by another. Schein concludes that the scope of each includes the thematic
relation, but not the event predicate suffocate. He gives the logical form in (41),
which has the paraphrase in (42) (Schein 2003: 350). The logical form itself is not
that important since Schein has other fish to fry as well in this paper; the paraphrase
should be the focus of attention.
(41) ∃e[the X : cockroaches[X]](Agent[e, X] & suffocate[e] & Theme[e, X] &
[ιX : Agent[e, X]][Each x : Xx] [ιe’ : Overlaps[e’, e] & Agent[e’, x]]
[∃e” : t(e”) ≤ t(e’)] [ιY : Others[x, Y] & Agent[e”, Y]] Theme[e’, Y])
(42) ‘The cockroaches suffocate themselves,
(with) them each acting
against the others that acted.’
Had there been only one less cockroach, they would all have made it. So each does
something to some of the others that contributed to their mass suffocation, but it
is not a suffocation, as all the paraphrases in (37)-(40) would suggest.
Some readers may object that there are many independent issues that need
to be dealt with concerning reciprocity before the above argument can be accepted.
Here I will not discuss reciprocity in detail, but refer the reader to Dotlačil (2010)
and LaTerza (2011) for further arguments that reciprocity requires full thematic
separation.
In what follows, I will go on to discuss other arguments in favor of full thematic
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separation, before I return to the issue of the Theme.
3.2.2 Herburger (2000) on focus and thematic separation
Herburger (2000), developing ideas of Partee (1992, 1999) presents an argument in
favor of full thematic separation which she claims is necessary in order to give an
adequate account of focus (see also Kawamura (2007)). Her arguments presuppose
that we want the semantics to be of a Davidsonian character. That is, the argument
below is not an argument that this is the only adequate analysis of focus.
Consider the focus-neutral sentence in (43) and its logical form in (44).
(43) Milan bought cider.
(44) ∃e[buying(e) & Agent(e, Milan) & Theme(e, cider)]
If we then put focus on cider, we get the following logical form, Herburger argues.
(45) Milan bought CIDER.
(46) ∃e[buying(e) & Agent(e, Milan)] Theme(e, cider)
In (46), the non-focused part is the restrictor of the existential quantifier whereas
the focus element falls within the scope of the quantificational structure. That is,
the restrictor is what is presupposed and the scope is what is asserted. If we instead
focus either Milan or bought, we get the logical forms in (48) and (50).
(47) MILAN bought cider.
(48) ∃e[buying(e) & Theme(e, cider)] Agent(e, Milan)
(49) Milan BOUGHT cider.
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(50) ∃e[Agent(e, Milan) & Theme(e, cider)] buying(e)
These logical forms show that in order to give a Neo-Davidsonian analysis of focus,
full thematic separation is required. Note that the thematic relation itself has to be
outside the presupposed part - it is not sufficient to just place the content of the
focused element outside the presupposed part. That is, a logical form like (51) is
not sufficent.
(51) ∃e[buying(e) & Agent(e, Milan) &Theme(e, x)] x = cider
Were (51) to suffice, a Davidsonian version should suffice as well:
(52) ∃e[buying(e, Milan x)] x = cider
However, since verbs can be focused as well, as shown in (50), we need the thematic
arguments to be severed from the verb. Otherwise a more complicated story needs
to be told for cases involving verb focus, and we do not get a symmetric account
where both verbal focus and thematic focus are captured in the same way.
The next argument concerns the variable adicity that many verbs display.
3.2.3 Variable adicities
There is a different argument in favor of full thematic separation that comes from
Borer (2005a). Borer’s concern is varying degrees of adicity that predicates appear
to exhibit. Let us first start with a case from Clark and Clark (1979), which involves
the verb to siren.
(53) The factory horns sirened throughout the raid.
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(54) The factory horns sirened midday and everyone broke for lunch.
(55) The police car sirened the Porsche to a stop.
(56) The police car sirened up to the accident site.
(57) The police car sirened the daylight out of me.
Even if native speakers of English have never heard siren used as a verb, they
can easily interpret these sentences. The examples show that the new verb can
appear with several subcategorization frames where the core meaning seems to be
maintained (to produce a siren sound), though the specific meanings are augmented
according to the syntactic environment. This strongly suggests that the meaning
of siren cannot just come from the verb itself, but it depends on the syntactic
construction. Such a view fits nicely with a Neo-Davidsonian theory where the verb
only has an event argument.
There are many similar examples. Consider the following ones, taken from
Pietroski (2007). I include PPs in some cases to display more of the variability that
many verbs display.
(58) White sold the knife to Plum for ten dollars.
(59) Plum bought the knife from White for ten dollars.
(60) Plum bought the knife for ten dollars.
(61) Plum bought the knife.
(62) Plum bought the knife for Scarlet.
(63) Plum bought Scarlet the knife for ten dollars.
91
(64) White sold Plum on the idea of buying a knife.
(65) Scarlet’s broker recommended buying long and selling short.
These examples show that verbs like buy and sell can appear in different contexts
and with varying adicities. This is not an idiosyncracy related to these verbs. The
verb kick seems paradigmatically transitive (66), but there are also examples that
undermine that conclusion, as in (67)-(69).
(66) White kicked the knife.
(67) White kicked the knife to Plum.
(68) White kicked Plum the knife.
(69) The baby kicked (at nothing in particular).
Similarly, cook and sing are typically not assumed to be ditransitive. However,
Pietroski points to the following examples in (70)-(72).
(70) Mrs. White cooked an egg, while Colonel Mustard sang.
(71) White cooked an egg for Mustard, while he sang a lullaby.
(72) White cooked Mustard an egg, while he sang the baby a lullaby.
It is of course a theoretical possibility that sang, cook and kick are ternary predicates
and that there are covert arguments in cases like (66) and (70). A further case of
this concerns the verb jimmy (Williams 2005). This appears to be a transitive verb.
(73) Alexander jimmied the lock with a screwdriver.
(74) Alexander jimmied the lock.
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Here, the reference to an implement cannot appear as a third argument, it has to be
in a modifying phrase. Still, the verb jimmy presumably indicates a triadic concept
that in some way or other has a slot for an implement ‘with which the jimmier
jimmies the thing jimmied’ Pietroski (2007: 358). As Pietroski puts it, apparent
transitivity does not seem to tell us much about conceptual adicity.
In some cases, it is quite plausible to assume covert arguments, as in (75)-(76).
(75) John ate.
(76) Mary played.
Other verbs do not appear to allow direct objects, like dine. Still, there are examples
such as (77)-(78) that suggest that the concepts eat and dine are equally relational
(Chomsky 1986b).
(77) Mustard dined on shrimp.
(78) Mustard ate shrimp in high style.
A last example involves the concept of marriage. The following examples show
that there is no fixed adicity for this lexical entity either.
(79) Scarlet married Plum, but their marriage was doomed.
(80) Scarlet got married to Plum, with the Reverend Green officiating.
(81) With reservations, Green married Plum and Scarlet.
(82) It was Scarlet’s first marriage, though Plum married for the third time.
Common to this example and the others I have discussed is that on standard as-
sumptions, one can accommodate such facts by stipulating a number of ambiguities
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in addition to covert arguments. But ambiguities do not explain anything, and is
only something one should resort to if there are no other options.
Relevantly, these facts follow if thematic arguments are not arguments of the
verb. That is, full thematic separation means that verbs do not have adicities. Of
course, as Pietroski points out, it may be that many verbs have ‘canonical’ numbers
of arguments, something that probably reflects the adicities of the given concepts.
However, this is very different from saying that verbs have arguments. On this
view, the idiosyncracies that we observe are due to complex interactions between
grammatical principles and conceptual knowledge, in addition to language use; cf.
Borer (2005a,b). Below I will consider a case study of this, where I compare the
conceptual account to a grammatical account. But first, let us look more closely at
themes.
The main target for rebuttal is that the obligatoriness of a theme indicates
‘V(e,x)’ rather than ‘V(e) & Theme(e,x)’ and that the obligatory presence of an
argument indicates that there is an argument position and that the host verb encodes
this argument position. Now, consider the following data.14
(83) *Barry stepped.
(84) *Barry stepped the path into the garden.
(85) Barry stepped into the garden.
A Neo-Davidsonian cannot hold the view that I just described. The verb step has
an obligatory PP, though if that is indicative of the adicity of this verb, into the
14Thanks to Barry Schein (p.c.) for useful discussion about these cases.
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garden does not have a consistent Davidsonian semantics despite being a poster
child for such a semantics. If we want to maintain the Davidsonian semantics for
into the garden, the above examples do not indicate that the Theme predicate is
obligatory. Something else needs to account for this apparent obligatoriness of the
PP associated with the verb step.
There are also cases of disjunctive obligatoriness.
(86) *Mary passed.
(87) *Mary crossed.
(88) Mary passed the garden.
(89) Mary crossed the garden.
(90) Mary passed into the garden.
(91) Mary crossed into the garden.
The same argument that I just made applies to these sentences as well. We cannot
conclude anything about obligatoriness based on such data.
However, there are other data that have been taken to suggest that we need
a syntactic encoding of argument structure. Those are cases such as the following,
which have been discussed at length in the literature.
(92) *Plum arrived Scarlet.
(93) *Plum sent.
We have seen a number of arguments that lexical items do not have fixed adicities,
so if we are convinced by those arguments, we cannot say that these examples are
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out because these adicities are not fulfilled in the grammar (pace Ramchand (2008:
21-22)). The examples also do not suggest that predicates can acquire adicities.
The question is then how we analyze examples such as (92)-(93).
There are prominent syntactic replies, sometimes combined with semantic fac-
tors as well; cf. e.g., Perlmutter (1978), Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995), Hale
and Keyser (2002). The syntactic reply holds that the overt subject is actually
covertly merged in the object position and then moves to its surface position. How-
ever, that is one way to analyze data such as (92), though it does not extend to
(93). It may be that there is a unified syntactic explanation for these cases, as I will
discuss shortly, or it may be that the syntax does not encode these limitations in a
unified way. At any rate it seems to be an open question how to exactly rule out
examples such as (92)-(93), which clearly are data that we need to account for.
One way to deal with these examples is to follow Borer (2005a), who argues
that examples like (92)-(93) are not excluded for grammatical reasons.15 That is,
it is not possible to combine the concepts plum, arrived and scarlet or plum
15Borer (2005a) seems to argue that there are not really any unacceptable examples of the sort
in (92)-(93) because speakers can coerce plausible interpretations out of most structures. Still, she
concedes that some examples are more acceptable than others. In the case of Plum arrived Sarlet
there seems to be an interpretation where ‘Plum helped Scarlet arrive’, but it’s nevertheless the
case that one cannot use (92) to utter that thought. So it seems like we need to account for the
perceived unacceptability of these data. These cases are however different from, say, extraction
out of relative clauses (i), where one just cannot construe a relevant interpretation.
(i) What did John read an article that is about?
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and sent. The reasons for this are not explicated in Borer (2005a,b), presumably
because they require a better understanding of concepts than we have at present.
Borer is mostly concerned with arguing that these are not facts that the grammar
should account for. Rather, they are facts about language use and about concepts
that do not belong to the grammar proper. Unfortunately we do not know a whole lot
about how concepts are structured and organized. They could be Fregean in nature,
as Fodor (1975, 1987, 2008) argues is the case for the Language of Thought. It could
also be that lexical conceptual structures in the sense of Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(1995) are part of the Conceptual-Intentional interface. If that is the case, the
accounts they offer of data such as (92)-(93) can be carried over in a framework
where the status of examples like (92)-(93) are not taken to be grammatical facts.
I am not going to choose one particular way of doing it here, as it is not
exactly clear to me what the relevant evidence would look like. Future research will
hopefully tell us more about how exactly to analyze the facts on such a view.16
16There might be some examples that do not fit the account I have just offered (thanks to Chris
Barker (p.c.) for alerting me to this). Consider the following contrast.
(i) The doctor amputated John’s leg.
(ii) *The doctor amputated the leg from John.
For (ii), it does not seem plausible to argue that this is bad because we cannot construe a relevant
interpretation. The interpretation is readily accessible, and can be paraphrased as in (i). The
sentence does also not seem to be bad for syntactic reasons since Romance inalienable constructions
exhibit a syntax comparable to that of (ii).Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992) give an analysis of the
differences between English and French inalienable constructions that could be implemented here,
but since their story is fairly complex and rests on a number of theoretical assumptions within GB
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Another way to deal with the examples in (92)-(93) is to maintain that there
is a grammatical reason why they are bad. Even though I claim that this cannot be
because the relevant verbs take a limited number of thematic arguments, there are
other grammatical reasons why they are bad. This path might be better because of
data such as (94)-(95) (see, among many, Levin (1993), Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(2005)).
(94) I loaded the truck with hay.
(95) I loaded hay onto the truck.
(96) I loaded the truck.
(97) I loaded the hay.
(98) *I loaded onto the truck.
(99) *I loaded with hay.
The last two cases are presumably taken to be attempts at expressing the thoughts
‘there was loading onto the truck’ and ‘there was loading with hay’. Verbs like load
have been argued to have a grammatical requirement that there be a direct internal
argument, i.e., a Theme.17 I am going to suggest that one plausible grammati-
cal component is abstract Case. Following the by now standard assumption that
Theory, I will not repeat their account here for reasons of space.
17Though even this is not clear, when one considers cases like the following:
(i) Peter loaded, while Jim gathered.
There may be a covert argument in these cases, though even if there is, why can it go unexpressed
in (i) and not in (98)-(99)?
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functional heads assign Case (see, among others, Déprez (1989), Mahajan (1989),
Chomsky (1991), Johnson (1991)), one can argue that the absence or presence of
the relevant Case feature on a functional head determines whether a sentence is licit
or not.18 That is, for a case like (92), the verb arrive does not occur together with
the functional head that assigns accusative Case.19 This means that when we have
a case like (92), the second argument Scarlet will not receive Case. Similarly, load
needs to occur with a functional head that assigns accusative Case and that Case
needs to be discharged when present (cf. the Inverse Case Filter of Bošković (1997)).
As for (98) and (99), these can be captured in the same way, where the necessity
of a Theme is related to a functional head that assigns accusative Case. However,
there is a lot of work on the locative alternation in English (see Arad (2006) for a
review), and Borer (2005a) provides a different story that incorporates the semantic
facts (not discussed here) as well. Both the Case story and the story given by Borer
would work within the present framework. It is worth noting that the Case story
does not seem very different from positing lexical stipulations that require certain
conjuncts for certain verbs. So I am skeptical that this story can be the correct one.
For verbs that have variable adicities, the verb will have to be able to occur
with different functional heads. Assuming that indirect objects are licensed by an
18This is reminiscent of Pesetsky (1982)’s reply to Grimshaw (1979).
19An unanswered question on this story is how we ensure that the functional heads occur together
with the relevant lexical items or roots. This is a general problem. Suppose Case were assigned
by verbs. Then the question is what determines what and how many Cases the verb has to assign.
Though bear in mind that the need for stipulations on a no argument structure view is not evidence
of argument structure.
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Applicative head (Marantz 1993, McGinnis 2001, Pylkkänen 2008), this head can
optionally be present for verbs like buy. To give a concrete example, for the sentence
in (100), we get the traditional tree in (101).









In this tree, T assigns Case to the subject John, Appl assigns Case to the indirect
object Mary and v assigns Case to the object the book. If the Appl head is not
merged, we get a transitive sentence like John bought a book. Based on these simple
illustrations, it seems like a Case-based story is a way to maintain that the data I
have discussed here have a grammatical side even though verbs do not take thematic
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arguments.
One should ask the question whether concepts with variable adicities are any
less problematic than linguistic predicates with variable adicities. Arguably concepts
are prior to linguistic predicates, since many animals appear to have concepts. So
if we need concepts and linguistic predicates, concepts need to be acquired in some
way or other (see Fodor (2008) for discussion of this, among others). It is not
clear that we should expect concepts to be universal, and if they are not, then they
have to be acquired by a child. A child will arguably acquire concepts that have
various adicities, which is to say that the child has to be sensitive to what kind
of adicities concepts have. And then linguists have to ask what the relationship
between concepts and linguistic predicates is. They could be isomorphic, or, as
the arguments I’ve reviewed so far indicate, they are not isomorphic and linguistic
predicates have a different structure than concepts (see Marantz (1984), Zubizarreta
(1987), Pietroski (2008a) for some discussion). However, that does not mean that
they do not have some grammatical structure. The Neo-Davidsonian view says that
verbs do not have thematic arguments. We need better tests to determine whether
the facts above are of a grammatical or a conceptual nature. In order to show that
cases like *John arrived Mary are bad for grammatical reasons, we ought to show
that their badness correlate with other grammatical phenomena (say movement,
extraction, binding etc.). As far as I know, it is very hard to come up with such
tests, but future work will hopefully help us address these issues.
I have presented two views here as I think they represent the current state of
the field when it comes to these issues. The field is in flux and some researchers think
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that the facts reviewed above suggest that we need to hold on to a view where the
arguments of a verb are represented on the verb. Others push the Neo-Davidsonian
approach and need to appeal to conceptual knowledge. My personal opinion is that
the Neo-Davidsonian conceptual story is the more plausible one, but I hope future
work will make progress in deciding between the different accounts.
In the next section, I am going to look at some specific counterarguments
against full thematic separation.20
3.2.4 Williams (2008)
Another way of looking at the issue of verbal adicities is presented in Williams
(2008). Williams focuses on patients in Mandarin Chinese and Igbo, and specifically
on how patients behave in resultative constructions. Before we can look at the data,
I will introduce some terminology.
Resultatives are single clauses that have two predicates, a means predicate (M)
and a result predicate (R). A typical example from English is given in (102).
(102) Al pounded the cutlet flat.
Here, M is pound and R is flat. Examples of resultative constructions in Mandarin
and Igbo are provided in (103) and (104), respectively (Williams 2008: 6).
20A potential issue arises from manner of motion constructions of the sort shown in (i).
(i) John walked Mary home.
This sentence displays what is called ‘double agentivity’ where both John and Mary are walking,
even though Mary is a Theme. I am not going to consider these cases here; see Folli and Harley























‘He made that gourd split by striking.’
In (103), M is ti ‘kick’ and R is duàn ‘snap’. The meaning of the sentence is that
kicking caused snapping and that the plank was snapped. M is ku. and R is wa in
(104), and the meaning is that striking caused splitting and that the gourd ended
up split.
Williams says that resultative constructions are sometimes analyzed as com-
plex predicates (cf. Dowty (1979) and Larson (1991)) where M does not have any
argument positions. Rather, the means verb combines directly with R while it ex-
cludes the object. The structure is shown in (105), where linear order is irrelevant.
(105) [ Object [Vmeans R ] ]
Williams assumes that this is the correct structure and points out that we here have
a diagnostic to figure out whether arguments are arguments of the verb or not. Let
us say we have the two possible denotations in (106)-(107).
(106) JpoundK = λyλe.pound(e) ∧ Patient(e) = y
(107) JpoundK = λ.pound(e)
If we look at (106), when the verb occurs in M it will have an argument that is not
immediately saturated. The sister of the verb will be R, which is an expression that
does not provide a patient. Thus we expect the complex predicate to inherit the
unsaturated argument from M, as shown in (108).
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(108) JpoundK = λy . . . pound(e) ∧ Patient(e) = y . . .
This means that the verb should be subject to the same requirement in resultative
constructions as in simple clauses. Such an expectation is not created for (107). The
patient is not an argument of the verb, which is to say that there is no argument
that can be passed on to the complex predicate.
We here have a way to test whether verbs have thematic arguments. If a certain
thematic relation obtains regardless of wherever the verb occurs, be it resultatives
or simple clauses, then it is likely that the verb introduces this thematic relation.
On the other hand, if it does matter where the verb occurs, then it seems likely that
the context introduces the thematic relation and not the verb (Williams 2008: 8).
Let us now consider Williams’ discussion of Mandarin (Williams 2008: 12-13).










‘Lao Wei cut bamboo shots.’
This means that the following two sentences in (110)-(111) have to be analyzed as
including a silent object pronoun that refers to a salient individual in the discourse.
Aa Williams (2008: 11) points out, ‘They cannot mean simply that there was an

















Intended: ‘Lao Wei is cutting.’ (Can mean: ‘Lao Wei is cutting it.’)
Williams then points out that when this verb is part of a resultative construction,
then there are no such requirements. In (112), the sentence can mean just that the
subject made the knife dull by cutting something. There is no noun phrase that













‘He also made your cleaver dull by cutting.’

















‘Intended: He also made your cleaver dull by cutting bamboo.’
















‘Cutting bamboo shots, Wei made the cleaver dull by cutting.’
Lastly, Williams says that the direct object càidāo in (112) is not itself an argument
of the means verb. It is the instrument of the means event, but in simple clauses,









Intended: ‘He cut with your cleaver.’
All these data show that Mandarin behaves exactly as one would predict if the verb
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does not have thematic arguments, but the context is the deciding factor. Anyone
who wants to maintain that verbs have thematic arguments in Mandarin will be
hard pressed to come up with an alternative analysis of these data, as far as I can
see.
Williams also argues that patients are arguments of the verb in English, based
on the same test that he uses for Mandarin and Igbo. Verbs like yell do not differ
in terms of the necessity of expressing that which is yelled, as seen in (116)-(117).
(116) Al yelled.
(117) Al yelled his throat hoarse.
Verbs like carry are different in that their patients cannot be dropped. This is
illustrated in (118)-(119).
(118) Al carried *(the luggage).
(119) *Al carried his neck sore.
Again we see that a verb behaves similarly in simple clauses and in resultative
constructions.
However, as far as I can tell, there is a problem here. If we consider the two
transitive verbs pound and cut, it turns out that they show a difference in behavior.
One can say (120) and (121), but not (122).
(120) Al pounded the cutlet flat.
(121) Al pounded the cutlet.
(122) *Al pounded.
106
Whereas (123) is good, (124) is not.
(123) Al cut the frozen meat.
(124) *Al cut the frozen meat soft.
(125) *Al cut.
In (124), there is a patient, but the resultative construction is still not allowed. Why
is that? We can see similar cases in (126) and (127).
(126) Al carried the luggage.
(127) *Al carried his luggage/neck sore.
So even if there is a patient, the resultative construction is not allowed. This makes
it hard to say that (119) and (11) are bad because the patient has been dropped,
since even with a patient, the sentence is no good. Something else must be going
on here, though it remains to be worked out what the solution to this issue is.
Williams (2008: 21) argues that his analysis nicely captures the difference be-
tween Mandarin Chinese and Igbo on the one hand and English on the other hand.
The difference, he argues, is just a matter of lexical valence of verbs. However, if
Williams is right, there is a more substantial difference at stake: In English, the
patient is always an argument of the verb, whereas in Chinese it does not seem to
be an argument of the verb. That would entail that logical forms differ in a sub-
stantive way across languages (say, Davidsonian versus Neo-Davidsonian argument
association), which has generally assumed not to be the case. Furthermore, the con-
siderations we have seen earlier in this chapter mitigate against such cross-linguistic
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differences since I have argued that even in English, there is thematic separation of
the patient/theme.
This concludes this section. In the next section, I will look at Kratzer (1996)
and her claim that Themes are not severed from the verb. This will be similar to
Williams (2008)’s conclusion for English Themes in this section, but I will argue
that Kratzer’s argument does not go through, even if it has been widely cited and
applied in the literature.
3.3 Kratzer (1996) on not severing the Theme
In the previous section, we saw arguments in favor of severing all thematic arguments
from the verb. One argument in favor of not severing the Theme has not been
discussed so far, namely that of idioms. In this section I will discuss idioms and
argue that they do not constitute a strong argument for not severing the Theme.21
21Another potential argument for not severing the Theme comes from Tenny (1994)’s observation
that only the Theme can be measured out, where ‘measuring out’ entails that the direct argument
plays a particular role in delimiting the event. However, as Borer (2005a) shows, Tenny’s obser-
vation can be recast in syntactic terms by letting a particular syntactic head encode the property
of measuring out. This head combines with certain verbs and arguments to yield the relevant
interpretation. Therefore I do not see that Tenny’s observation constitutes an argument for not
severing the Theme. As Tenny also points out, there are constraints on all arguments: ‘Constraints
on the aspectual properties associated with direct internal arguments, indirect internal arguments,
and external arguments in syntactic structure constrains the kinds of event participants that can
occupy these positions.’ (Tenny 1994: 2).
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Kratzer (1996) starts out by rephrasing the argument in Marantz (1984) which
says that external arguments are not arguments of verbs. Marantz observes that
there are many cases where the interpretation of the verb depends on the internal
argument. Marantz (1984: 25) gives the following examples.
(128) a. throw a baseball
b. throw support behind a candidate
c. throw a boxing match (i.e., take a dive)
d. throw a fit
(129) a. take a book from the shelf
b. take a bus to New York
c. take a nap
d. take an aspirin for a cold
e. take a letter in shorthand
(130) a. kill a cockroach
b. kill a conversation
c. kill an evening watching T.V.
d. kill a bottle (i.e., empty it)
e. kill an audience (i.e., wow them)
One could of course argue that these verbs are homophonous, but that seems like a
cop-out and it also seems to miss a generalization that one can make, namely that
the verb and its internal argument together determine the relevant interpretation (cf.
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Marantz (1984: 25)). Furthermore, Marantz (1984: 26): notes that ‘. . . the choice
of subject for the verbs does not determine the semantic role of their objects’. This
is supported by the data in (131)-(132), where the subjects are different but the
object could be the same.
(131) a. The policeman threw NP.
b. The boxer threw NP.
c. The social director threw NP.
d. Throw NP!
(132) a. Everyone is always killing NP.
b. The drunk refused to kill NP.
c. Silence can certainly kill NP.
d. Cars kill NP.
These facts would all follow if external arguments are not true argument of their
verbs, Marantz argues. That is, by excluding the subject from the unit consisting
of the verb and the object, we can capture this asymmetry between subjects and
objects.
Bresnan (1982) and Grimshaw (1990) take issue with this claim. Their coun-
terarguments are given in (133) and (134).
(133) In short, one could capture the subject/non-subject generalization without
affecting the lexical representation of predicate argument structure, simply
by giving the subject a distinguished role as final argument in the semantic
composition of the sentence (Bresnan 1982: 350).
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(134) In any theta-marking calculation, the external argument is the last to enter
in. Thus, in effect, calculations performed over the internal arguments are
done without reference to the external arguments, but any a-structure calcu-
lation involving the external argument will of necessity involve the internal
ones. The special properties of externals follow from their occupying the
position of maximal prominence (Grimshaw 1990: 35).
The problem with this reasoning is that it does not ensure that the external argu-
ment does not trigger a special interpretation of the verb. There is no technical
obstacle to formulating such a rule, as Kratzer (1996: 115) notes. She gives the ex-
amples in (135) (Kratzer 1996: 115), where the highest argument triggers a specific
interpretation of the verb.
(135) a. If b is a time interval, then f(a)(b) = truth iff a exists during b.
b. If b is a place, then f(a)(b) = truth iff a is located at b
c. If b is a person, then f(a)(b) = truth iff b is the legal owner of a.
Kratzer takes issue with the position stated by Bresnan and Grimshaw. Although
Bresnan and Grimshaw are probably right that you do not need severed external
arguments to get an asymmetry between external and internal arguments, Kratzer’s
point is that we get a more adequate theory if we sever the subject. She uses the
Marantz data to develop a specific syntactic and semantic theory where the Agent,
but not the Theme, is severed from the verb.
Note, however, that Kratzer’s argument only goes through if the specification
of the verb’s meaning only refers to the internal argument, and furthermore, if
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idiomatic dependencies like these can be captured by defining the meaning of the
verb. Kratzer discusses the first premise but not the second. She seems to assume
that idiomatic dependencies must be specified over objects in the lexicon, that is,
over the verb and its Theme. However, we will see below that Marantz (1997) has
a different view (see also Harley (2009)), namely that idiomatic dependencies can
be defined over outputs of syntax, in which case Kratzer’s argument would not go
through.
Recall that for Kratzer, idiomatic dependencies are stated over function-argument
relations in a single lexical item, i.e., the verb. Marantz (1997: 208) has a very dif-
ferent view as he argues that ‘The syntactic head that projects agents defines a
locality domain for special meanings. Nothing above [vAG] can serve as the context
for the special meaning of any root below this head, and nice versa’.22 The quote




22See also Harley (2009) and Bowers (2010) for a somewhat similar view of idiomatic
dependencies.
23There has recently been a lot of discussion on how to capture ‘special meanings’ within Dis-
tributed Morphology. I will not review the debate here, but see Arad (2003), Marantz (2001),
Harley (2009), Borer (2009), Embick (2010) for different perspectives.
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Marantz (1997: 208-209) points out that this view makes three predictions. They
are listed in (137)-(139).
(137) No idioms with fixed agents (root in agent position, context for special mean-
ing within VP).
(138) No eventive-passive idioms, but possible non-eventive stative idioms.
(139) No idioms with causative morpheme and lower agentive verb, but possible
idioms with causative and lower non-agentive verb.
The first prediction is a slightly more refined version of Marantz (1984), which I have
discussed above. The prediction is borne out, Marantz argues, and points towards
examples such as (140), where the idiom is non-agentive.24
(140) The shit hit the fan.
This is the only point where Kratzer and Marantz agree. The two other predictions
are predictions that Kratzer cannot make in her system, so to the extent that these
predictions are borne out, Kratzer cannot capture them.
The second prediction is borne out, which we can see by considering the differ-
ences between ‘adjectival (stative) passives’ and ‘syntactic (eventive) passives’. The
former are created with a functional head merging below the v head that projects
the agent, while the latter are formed with a functional head merging above or
24Similar examples are provided by O’Grady (1998: 298) and Bruening (2010: 535), putting
forward data such as fortune smiled on X, the ceiling caved in on X, the bottom fell out on X,
time’s up for X. As Bruening points out, some of these might be unaccusative, but smile on is
probably not, he claims.
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as the head that projects Agents. Marantz points towards data from French and
Chichewa that show this. Here I will look at the Chichewa data, which Marantz
(1997: 210) cites from Dubinsky and Simango (1996). Note that this language has


































‘Last year corn was beautiful.’
Only statives can have idioms; passives cannot. Kratzer’s approach cannot capture
this because on her approach, it should not matter whether the arguments that
verbs take are active or stative.
Let us now look at the last prediction, (139). Building on Ruwet (1991),
Marantz notes that a causative construction in English may not be idiomatic unless
the lower predicate is non-agentive. This is illustrated in (145)-(148).
(145) Make oneself scarce.
(146) Make X over.
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(147) Make ends meet.
(148) *Make X swim/fly a kite
The examples in (145)-(147) are all non-agentive whereas the example in (148) is
agentive and consequently does not have an idiomatic reading.
Lastly, there are verbs that can take part in multiple idiom patterns. Bruening
(2010: 536) gives the following examples for give.
(149) give X the creeps
(150) give rise to X
If the idiomatic interpretation is specified on verbs, two lexical specifications for give
seem to be necessary; one for each idiom structure. If one is in for polysemy, that
is a possible analysis, but as I have argued above, we should resist this, cf. Borer
(2005a,b), Boeckx (2010). Bruening also argues that we need a theory of idiom
formation that explains the lack of logically possible idioms such as (151), where
the asterisk means that an idiomatic interpretation is missing.
(151) *give the wolves X
I will not attempt to develop such a theory here; the goal is simply to show that
Kratzer’s theory is inadequate to account for the complexities of idiomatic depen-
dencies. See Bruening (2010) for one attempt at developing a comprehensive theory
of idioms.
All these arguments suggest that Kratzer’s argument from idioms does not
carry much force. It should be clear that idioms present difficult theoretical chal-
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lenges, but to the extent that they tell us something, they do not seem to provide
an argument for not severing the Theme.
If these arguments are on the right track, they raise important questions about
the syntactic representations and more generally about the interface between syntax
and semantics. In particular, they question our assumptions about how Agents, or
External Arguments more generally, are represented syntactically such that their in-
terpretation is derived in a transparent fashion. Based on Marantz (1984), this issue
has become important in recent years, e.g., in the work of Hale and Keyser (1993,
2002) Harley (1995), Kratzer (1996), Marantz (1997), Borer (2005a,b), Alexiadou
et al. (2006, In Progress), Folli and Harley (2007), Pylkkänen (2008) and Ramchand
(2008). In the next chapter, I will discuss how the syntax should look like for logical
forms that respect full thematic separation.
3.4 Conclusions
The goal of this chapter was to present a host of arguments against the widespread
assumption that verbs have thematic arguments. The arguments have been drawn
from, among others, facts about distributive readings, focus, and variable verbal
adicity. A number of counter-arguments have also been addressed, in particular
involving idioms, and I have argued that these arguments do not undermine the
arguments in favor of severing thematic arguments from the verb.
The next chapter will develop a syntax and a theory of the syntax-semantics





A Syntax for Full Thematic Separation
In the previous chapter, I argued in favor of full thematic separation. The goal of
this chapter is to tie chapters 2 and 3 together and provide a syntax that maps
transparently onto logical forms where all thematic arguments are severed from the
verb. Specifically I will argue that an argument is semantically tied to a head iff it
is a sister of that head.
After I have outlined the syntax in the first part of the chapter, I will discuss the
nature of the mapping principle I assume. I will argue, following Neo-Davidsonians,
that conjunction is the main principle that works together with what I will call
‘thematic integration’ and existential closure. Finally, I conclude the chapter and
set the stage for chapter 5.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I discussed a number of arguments for full thematic sep-
aration in English and in other languages. Hopefully it is clear that there are
phenomena that exhibit full separation, though as we have seen, not every semantic
fact will show separation. They raise a number of interesting questions, and in this
chapter, I will try to answer one of these, namely what kind of syntax full thematic
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separation requires.1
4.2 The main idea
The core idea that I will be pursuing is that each application of Spell-Out corre-
sponds to a conjunct in a logical form. Correspondingly, if we want full thematic
separation in the logical forms, we need each argument and the predicate to be
spelled out separately. I will put forward a view of syntax that achieves this. Im-
portantly, the syntax that I will suggest is independently motivated by the discussion
in chapter 2 as the syntax does not make a categorical distinction between speci-
fiers and complements. My proposal will build on insights in Starke (2004), Narita
(2009, 2011), and Chomsky (2010), but it differs quite substantially in technical
implementation and conceptual motivation.
I will start by going through an example of my proposal and then develop it in
more detail. Let us therefore look at the argument domain of a transitive sentence.
I am here following Borer (2005a,b) in having the verb phrase merged below all
arguments (see also Uriagereka (2008) for related discussion). This is not crucial,
but what is crucial is that all the arguments are introduced in different projections
from the verb. So if one e.g., would want the VP to be merged above the direct
1Larson (Forthcoming) argues that a Neo-Davidsonian analysis implies that the Theta Criterion,
if it is correct, must be a purely syntactic condition that governs a purely syntactic notion of
selection. I take the discussion in this chapter to confirm this, though I go further and suggest
that the Theta Criterion is not needed as a syntactic constraint. Larson’s view faces Borer (2005a)’s
redundancy argument, which I consider to be very powerful, cf. chapters 1 and 3.
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object, there is nothing that prohibits that. I will return to this issue in a slightly
different form in chapter 5 when I discuss serial verbs.
I make the following assumptions.
The syntax does not make a categorical distinction between specifiers and
complements, cf. Hoekstra (1991), Starke (2004), Jayaseelan (2008a), Chomsky
(2010). The main syntactic relation, modulo adjuncts, is that of a merged head and
a non-head, and whether we call this a head-complement relation or a specifier-head
relation does not really matter. To make this very clear, one can define specifiers
and complements as follows:
(1) A complement is the sister of a head.
(2) A specifier is the sister of a head.
However, at this point, there is really no point in providing such definitions. Since
there is no difference between specifiers and complements, we can just define the
core syntactic relation as a merged head and non-head. How exactly we choose to
label that relation should not be important.
In order for these definitions to apply, it is necessary to rethink the units
of Spell-Out. I am going to do this by proposing a constraint on the kinds of
representations that can be generated. The constraint looks as follows.
(3) *[XP YP].
(3) is a derivational constraint that bans two elements that can only be phrases from
being merged. Here I understand a phrase as a maximal projection, and I adopt
Chomsky (1995c: 242)’s definition of the latter:
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(4) A maximal projection is a projection that does not project further
I take no position on the specific nature of the constraint in (3) other than
that it has to be derivational (pace Moro (2000)); see Speas (1990: 48), Uriagereka
(1999), Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (2001, 2007), Richards (2010b) and Chom-
sky (2008, 2010) for much discussion. Whenever the grammar would be confronted
with a configuration like (3), the grammar will resolve the conflict by making sure
that instead of two phrases merging, a head and a phrase are merged. Spell-Out
enables this reduction in a specific way that I will discuss below. Note that a similar
logic has been used by Epstein (2009) and Epstein et al. (In press), where Spell-Out
fixes an otherwise illicit representation. However there is a difference: For them,
you can generate the representations and then Spell-Out can fix it. For me, you
cannot generate the relevant representation at all.
For now, let me continue to show how we can create a mapping from the syntax
and onto logical forms that exhibit full thematic separation if we assume (3).
I assume that all arguments are introduced by functional projections, as in Lin
(2001), Borer (2005a,b), Bowers (2010).2 A problem for these kind of approaches,
one may think, is that it is typically claimed that the object and the verb have a
relationship that does not hold of the subject and the verb. That is, the object
and the verb constitute a unit to the exclusion of the subject for processes like VP-
deletion, VP-pronominalization and VP-fronting. A few relevant examples are given
in (5)-(8), taken from Baker (1997).
2As we will see below, this includes in a sense event arguments too, or at least, the mereological
relation between events when there is more than one event in a sentence.
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(5) John [V P hit the table] and Bill did [V P (so)] too.
(6) John said he would hit he table, and [V P hit the table] I guess he did.
(7) *[XP John hit] the table and [XP (so)] did the chair.
(8) *John said he would hit the table, [XP John hit] I guess did it.
Clearly, these data need a different account if the object does not bear a special
relationship to the verb. I assume that the verb will move through the functional
heads F and Voice, which means that the verb will still be close to both the object
and subject. However, more importantly, the verb will always have to move on its
own, even in cases of VP-fronting, as discussed in chapter 5. This means that an
analysis of VP-fronting has to ensure that the verb has to appear before anything
else in such cases. A feature ensuring that the verb is highest in the left periphery
would ban a case like (8) and allow (6). We also need a rule that says that the
object and the verb can be deleted, but not the subject and the verb. This can be
formulated by using features on the relevant heads that I will now introduce.
The next assumption is that Agents are introduced by Voice0, cf. Kratzer
(1996), Alexiadou et al. (2006). I am using this label, though it should be clarified
that the label does not really matter; see Chomsky (1995c), Harley (1995), Folli
and Harley (2007), Pylkkänen (2008), Ramchand (2008), Sailor and Ahn (2010) for
discussion.3
Themes are also introduced by functional heads. Here I am just going to label
3I assume that Agents and Experiences have a somewhat different syntax, and that this in part
accounts for the different interpretations. See Landau (2010) for much recent discussion that can
be applied to the present theory.
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the relevant head F0, for lack of a better name. Below I will elaborate on how one
can provide mapping principles based on the nature of the functional head.
The verb is generally merged prior to all functional projections as in Borer
(2005a,b), Bowers (2010). This has to be the case in order to make sure that
the verb is spelled out in a separate conjunct, though there is an alternative, as
mentioned in chapter 5.6. Note that Travis (2010) argues that this is too simplistic.
I will not discuss Travis’ arguments here, but they can easily be accommodated into
the present framework. The important part that cannot be given up is that the verb
is spelled-out independently of all the thematic arguments.4
Based on these assumptions, let us look at a standard transitive sentence such
as (9).
(9) The students read the books.
This sentence typically has the structure in (10). I am following Borer (2005a,b)
and Bowers (2010) in assuming that the VP is below all arguments.5
4Pylkkänen (2008: 84) suggests that all causative constructions involve a Cause head, which
combines with noncausative predicates and introduces a causing event to their semantics. I won’t
be specifically dealing with causatives here, but in those cases, her proposal can easily be adopted.
5For expository convenience, I am using a VP here. It could also be a root and a v categorizer,





the books F VP
read
I am now going to discuss how this structure gets built derivationally and we will see
that in the syntax, a structure like (10) will never exist as a representational object.
Rather, the structure will correspond to chunks that are generated and spelled out.
Here is the derivation for the sentence in (9).




The next step in the derivation is for the books to merge with FP. The constraint
in (3) bans two phrases from being merged so such a merger cannot take place.
In order for merge to happen, Spell-Out applies. Spell-Out prunes the structure
such that the complement of F is spelled out, i.e., the VP. Because of the relational
character of Bare Phrase Structure (Muysken 1982, Chomsky 1995c), F is now a
head and can merge with the phrase the books (see below for much more discussion
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of this). That is, Spell-Out results in pruned structures where nothing is left in F’s
original complement after Spell-Out. (12) shows the structure after Spell-out and
merger of the Theme. Note that I assume that F and FP are completely identical. I
am just using different labels for expository purposes. This implies that one cannot
say that F and FP have different adicities, contrary to many semantic theories.
(12) FP
books F




Then we again face the situation that I described above. The students needs to
merge with Voice, but this cannot happen due to the by now familiar constraint (3).
In order to remedy this, the complement of Voice in (13) needs to be spelled out,
that is, FP needs to be spelled out. After Spell Out, the students can then merge
with Voice, as shown in (14).
(14) VoiceP
the students Voice
The VoiceP in (14) can now be merged with further heads, but as soon as a new
phrase is supposed to be merged, Spell-Out will be triggered again. Let us for
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concreteness move the subject to the canonical subject position, which in English I
take to be SpecTP.6 First T merges with VoiceP, creating a TP, as shown in (15).







It is necessary for the adjunction to T to create a Spell-Out domain in order for
a conjunct to be created at logical form. There is also independent phonological
evidence that the subject needs to be in its own domain, see Samuels (2011) for
discussion.
An immediate consequence of the current system is that in sentences like (17),
just like the nominal phrase the food, the PP on the table cannot be the complement
of the verb.8
6Below I will elaborate on this movement operation, but to foreshadow, I will argue that move-
ment is adjunction in this framework.
7On this approach, every phrase will be merged adjacent to a head (Narita (2009, 2011), cf.
also Kayne (2010).)
8Thanks to Mark Baker (p.c.) for raising this issue.
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(17) She put the food on the table.
The reason is that the PP will then be spelled out together with the verb, which will
not yield the PP as a separate conjunct in logical form. For the latter to happen,
on the table has to be a sister of a functional projection that is merged above the
verb.9 That is, the structure has to be as follows (I am not showing the Spell-Out




on the table GP
G VP
See Bowers (2010) for extensive empirical arguments that the latter analysis is the
most viable one, which requires the verb to move in order to obtain the correct linear
order (see already Koizumi (1995) for arguments that this is indeed the case).10
A further consequence is that complement clauses such as (19) need a different
syntactic analysis than what is commonly assumed.
(19) John thinks that Mary left.
9I will say more later about what it means to be an adjunct.
10See also Adger (In press) for a new theory of PPs whose syntax is abstractly similar to the
one here.
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Here, the complement clause is not a complement of the verb, but rather introduced
by F.
I will now discuss the mapping principles between syntax and semantics and
also what the semantic composition principles are.
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4.3 Mapping syntax to semantics
The goal of this section is to show how the syntax I have just outlined provides
a relatively transparent mapping onto logical forms. The core idea is that an ap-
plication of Spell-Out corresponds to a conjunct at logical form. I will argue that
this is the most transparent mapping if one assumes that conjunction is the basic
composition principle. Below I will argue that a mapping that assumes that each
Merge corresponds to conjunction won’t give us the correct logical forms. That is,
there will have to be constraints on what can serve as a possible mapping, and these
constraints will in part be guided by what the logical forms are.
In section 4.3.1 I will present my proposal and in section 4.3.2 I will discuss
a couple of alternatives. In sections 4.3.3-4.3.5 I will discuss the composition of
conjunctivist logical forms.
4.3.1 A transparent mapping
In order to see how a typical derivation would run, let us consider a slightly shorter
version of Schein (1993)’s sentence.
(21) Three video games taught every quarterback.
Below are the three steps of the derivation. I have used the derivations we have seen
already and just added the mapping to logical form. The arrows signal what the






This is the first step of the derivation. The verb somehow becomes a phrase and
merges with the F head.11 As discussed in chapter 1, one can either say that the
event variable belongs to the verb in the lexicon, or that it is acquired through the
merger of a root with a categorizer.
The next step is to merge the Theme every quarterback with the FP. When
the Theme is to be merged into the structure, the complement of the F head has to
be spelled out. This complement is the VP, and it is in a box in the syntactic tree.
This box corresponds to the logical form given in (23). When the Theme is merged,
the derivation continues as follows, with merger of the Voice head.







(25) =⇒ [every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e](Theme(e’, y))
The FP will be interpreted as in (25). Here the quantifier outscopes the mereological
relation. There are two ways in which the mereological relation can enter the struc-
ture. The first option is to put it into the QP. In order to obtain the correct scope
relation, the general structure of the QP would have to look roughly as follows.
(26)
every
quarterback ∃e’ : e’ ≤ e
There are many complicated issues surrounding the internal architecture of QPs,
so I will not go into their structure here. I simply want to note that this is an
alternative. Another alternative is to stipulate syncategorematicity and say that
the QP is interpreted as ‘[every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e]’. Both these proposals leave
every quarterback as a constituent and treat every as taking a covert event quantifier
argument. Again, I just want to note the alternatives and not choose between them
here.
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As far as the event variable on the thematic relation is concerned, I assume
that thematic predicates are born with an event variable. That is, that is part of
how they are understood when we understand their meaning (for example, we need
to know how we understand the Agent predicate). For the Theme relation in this
derivation, we need an e’ as opposed to the ordinary e. I assume that when F merges
with a QP that contains an e’ that is closed, then this is the event variable that
is part of the thematic predicate. This is a way of saying that the merging itself
introduces and closes the relevant variable.
Returning to the main derivation, when the Agent is to be merged, the com-
plement of Voice has to be spelled out. This complement corresponds to the box
in the tree structure, and it has the logical denotation in (25). The derivation can






(28) =⇒ [∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)](Agent(e, x)
The T head is merged, and the next Spell-Out domain is the domain that is boxed
in the tree structure. This domain arises when the subject moves to merge with
T. The Agent predicate contains an e variable, since there is no information that
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indicates that any other event variable is required, cf. the discussion of the Theme
above.
I assume that the Spell-Out domains are added to a stack, so that at the
end of the derivation, these domains are all conjoined by the semantic composition
principle Conjunction. This gives us the following:
(29) [∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)](Agent(e, x)
∧ [every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e](Theme(e’, y) ∧ teach(e)
At the end, existential closure is added, and we end up with the following logical
form:
(30) ∃e([∃X: 3(X) ∧ ∀x(Xx → Gx)](Agent(e, x)
∧ [every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e](Theme(e’, y) ∧ teach(e))
We need these two steps - conjunction and existential closure, since in some cases,
existential closure takes place on only a subset of the conjuncts. This is the case
when we have a strong quantifier in subject position as in a sentence like (31).
(31) Every student ate pizza.
Here there can either be one eating event or there can be many eating events. This
can be captured by letting the strong quantifier every student scope either inside or
outside of the event quantifier. The same happens with strong quantifiers in object
position. An example is given in (32) from Taylor (1985: 17), where there is a strong
quantifier in the object position.
(32) Henry gracefully ate all the crisps.
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As Taylor points out, this sentence is ambiguous. We can list the two meanings as
follows.
(33) Each and every crisp was gracefully eaten by Henry.
(34) Henry’s crisp-eating style had overall grace.
An event-based framework can make sense of this ambiguity since (33) corresponds
to predicating gracefulness of each of Henry’s individual crisp-eatings, and (34) cor-
responds to predicating gracefulness of an event formed by summing the individual
crisp-eatings to obtain a further crisp-eating of Henry’s (Taylor 1985: 17). The
logical forms that Taylor (1985: 17-18) gives are the following.
(35) (∀y)(Crisp(y) → (∃e)(Eat(Henry, y uniquely, e) & Graceful(e)))
(36) (∃e)((∀y)(Crisp(y) → Eat(Henry, y, e) & Graceful(e))
These logical forms demonstrate the way in which the existential event quantifier
can interact with the strong quantifier.
For strong quantifiers in both object and subject position, we thus observe
an ambiguity with respect to the event quantifier. This appears to correspond to
when the existential quantifier is inserted: either after conjunction has happened,
or before conjunction has finished conjoining all the predicates. This is essentially
a way of saying that insertion of existential closure is free. I will get back to that
below and some predictions that the current system makes.
We see that the mapping relies on a given syntax plus translations of the
syntactic terminals into a favored logical language. I am here assuming the logical
notation provided in the works I am citing. It is of course an independent empirical
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question how exactly we should render the denotation of every and other lexical
items.
I want to emphasize that the order of the functional projections and the Spell-
Out domains need to be as described above.12 There are various ways one could
implement this, but it seems like it is necessary to assume a universal sequence of
functional projections (Cinque 1999, Starke 2004). It does not work to say that the
sequence can be freely generated and independent principles filter out the wrong se-
quences. We want to understand why these meanings are not attested, so the absence
of a meaning cannot be a filter at the conceptual-intentional interface. Therefore
I am going to assume that the hierarchy is universal, leaving aside the question of
why that order is universal as opposed to some other order.
4.3.2 Alternative mappings
In this subsection I will discuss two alternative mappings. The first one I will
consider is one that makes the Spell-Out domains smaller, and the second one is a
mapping that involves ‘lexical’ rules rather than Spell-Out.
The first alternative that I will consider is one which holds that each applica-
12Semantically we would get the same results if the Agent was first merged at the bottom of
the tree, which is expected since the thematic role in no way depends on the verb. Sigurðsson
(2006) argues that this is indeed the case for reasons having to do with Case and the binding
theory; see also Bowers (2010). However, there are syntactic arguments that this is not plausible,
so intervention effects would block the subject from moving across the object in a standard subject-
raising configuration. That is, independent syntactic principles will filter out those sequences that
are not good.
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tion of Merge corresponds to a conjunct. Based on the syntactic structure above,
nothing would really go wrong with such a principle. However, it would create prob-
lems for the Theme QP every quarterback. If every merge corresponds to a conjunct,
it predicts that the quantifier and its restriction should be in different conjuncts.
That is, instead of (37) as the denotation of the QP, we may instead get (39) if the
syntactic structure is as in (26) above, repeated here for expository convenience.
(37) [every y: Qy] [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e]
(38)
every
quarterback ∃e’ : e’ ≤ e
(39) [every] & [y: Qy] & [∃e’ : e’ ≤ e]
I say may because what happens here very much depends on specific assumptions
about the structure. But with this rough structure depicted here, each of the three
elements should be in separate conjuncts. And even if one jettisons the mereolog-
ical relation from the syntactic structure, there is still a conjunct separating every
and quarterback. With such additional conjuncts, one is lead to expect that one
can delete them and get an entailment relation that is preserved. However, every
quarterback does not entail every in the sense that Jones buttered the toast quickly
entails that Jones buttered the toast, so this does not work.
Another possibility is to say that each phrase constitutes its own interpre-
tational domain. By interpretational domain I only mean that the phrase gets a
specific interpretation, but that there is no Spell-Out in the sense that I have pro-
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posed above. Put differently, what we are considering is how conjunctive logical
forms can be generated without the specific syntax that I have proposed. The fol-
lowing discussion still presupposes that the main semantic composition principle is
conjunction and that each interpretational domain is added to a stack that then
gets existentially closed, as discussed above.
For purposes of this discussion, I assume that we have a conventional syntax
without Spell-Out pruning the structure. I also assume that each argument is intro-
duced by a functional projection. If that is the case, it is possible to invoke mapping
rules such as the following (Baker 1997):
(40) SpecVoiceP → Agent(e, DP)
(41) SpecFP → Theme(e, DP)
However, in chapter 2 we saw that Bare Phrase Structure comes with multiple
specifiers, in which case it will be hard to know which specifier to look at, say, if
wh-movement happens by adding specifiers to the Voice head, as in the following
example.









As this tree shows, it is hard to know which specifier of Voice (40) is supposed to
pick out, since the grammar arguably does not keep track of the first and second
specifier. That is to say, the grammar does not count, so it is impossible to say that
the first specifier and the first specifier only gets mapped onto a relevant thematic
predicate. Either the mapping rules are wrong, or the syntax needs to somehow
change so that the mapping rules can be utilized.13 Let us consider each of these
options in turn.
If the mapping rules are wrong, we need to come up with different mapping
rules. It may be possible to say that interpretation happens prior to movement, so
that when what moves, the thematic predicates have already been determined by
principles such as (40)-(41). One could say that the thematic part of the sentence
constitutes a phase, whereas the rest of the sentence constitutes a different phase.
13This argument would not go through were one to deny the existence of multiple specifiers and
claim that there is a stipulation that bans such phrasal configurations.
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If that is the case, it would entail that we have a two-stage model of interpretation,
where first the thematic part of the sentence is interpreted and then the rest of the
sentence. This would effectively amount to encoding the duality of semantics thesis
stated in Chomsky (2004). This thesis holds that thematic relations are interpreted
one way and scopal/discourse relations are interpreted differently. In an abstract
way, this relates to the distinction between Force and Content stemming from Frege;
see Lohndal and Pietroski (2011) for more discussion.
An alternative is to invoke an extra level where the syntactic representation
has been adjusted. One way to do this is to translate the tree in (43) into a tree
where the intermediate wh-element is eliminated. This would be reminiscent of
Montague (1974a)’s analysis tree.







Given this tree, it is possible to use the principles in (40)-(41).14 But I see no
14Interrogatives present their own problems, but it is a common assumption that it is the head
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other way of getting from (43) to the tree that will be required for interpretation.
Furthermore, it is not clear to me how this would translate into, say, languages with
multiple subjects where these subjects are all specifiers of the same head. Note,
though, that the alternative I have just outlined entails that specifiers are necessary
as objects that the grammar operates on.
Yet another approach would be to involve a type-driven lambda approach,
where the conjuncts are determinants of the denotation of the syntactic elements.
Such an approach would be able to yield thematic separation without problems (see
Champollion (2010c) for a concrete example), though it does not hold that con-
junction is the main semantic principle. Furthermore, Schein (1993) and Pietroski
(2005a) have argued at great length that a conjunctivist approach is superior to ap-
proaches that are type-driven and where the main principle is functional application
(see also Partee (2006) for raising the question why semantics is type-driven). See
section 4.3.4 for some more discussion.
4.3.3 Conjunction
I have already adopted the hypothesis that conjunction is the main composition
principle, cf. Schein (2003, In press), Pietroski (2005a, Forthcoming). I have tacitly
assumed that there is only one ‘&’ for logical forms, though I have not been explicit
about which one. I will now discuss this issue.
and the tail of a ‘wh-chain’ that matter for interpretation.
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Schein (In press) shows in very detailed ways that one & is a sustainable view
despite appearances to the contrary. A common concern is whether we are dealing
with the same kind of conjunction in the following two examples.
(46) John reads a book and Mary reads a book.
(47) John and Mary read a book.
Schein defends the view that both these conjunctions are sentential connectives in
logical forms. He points out that an event-based semantics makes such an analysis
possible. Consider the following contrast, taken from Schein (In press).
(48) At Acropolis Pizza, the sauce and the cheese are a perfect marriage of two
rivals.
(49) *At Acropolis Pizza, the sauce is a perfect marriage of two rivals, and the
cheese is a perfect marriage of two rivals.
We can maintain a sentential connective if the connective connects clauses about
the cheese’s and sauce’s participation in the perfect marriage event. Here is the
paraphrase that Schein provides.
(50) For some event e, ((Participates(e,s) and Participates(e,c)) & be a perfect
marriage(e))
(51) The sauce participates and the cheese participates & its a perfect marriage.
This is sufficient to illustrate the point. I take & to be a connective that connects
predicates, both verbal predicates and thematic predicates. To the extent that one
wants to distinguish between these predicates, I assume that there are no constraints
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on & that prevent this. If one can argue that all these predicates are sentential in
some way or other, then I can also follow Schein. However, it is rather unclear what
exactly makes a predicate a sentential predicate (a truth value or something else?).
It may be that there are more conjuncts than Spell-Out domains, which is
possible, though these conjuncts will then have to be introduced at logical form. To
take one such example, if instead of ‘buying(e)’ we have ‘buy(e) & past(e)’, then
it will not be the case that ‘past(e)’ is transferred on its own. The reason is that
by assumption past(e) is a head, and heads do not constitute separate Spell-Out
domains, as we have seen at the beginning of this chapter. If there are cases where
a head introduces a separate conjunct, this cannot happen the way other conjuncts
are introduced through Spell-Out. Instead it might happen through lexical rules
that decompose a lexical item at logical form. My view is that these decomposition
rules should not exist, as it undermines the transparency thesis.15 My point here is
simply that it is theoretically possible to invoke such rules, not that it is desirable.
4.3.4 Interpretation of arguments
In addition to conjunction, it may seem that it is necessary to have a composi-
tion operation that integrates the thematic arguments into the thematic predicates,
cf. already Carlson (1984). That is, somehow ‘Theme(e, _)’ has to become e.g.,
‘Theme(e, John)’. Pietroski (2005a) essentially appeals to a type-shifting opera-
15In the case just discussed, one could e.g., claim that the past morpheme is a phrase rather
than a head. This makes sense since past(e) is shorthand for something more relational: speech
time is related to other times and so on and so forth.
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tion to achieve this. I will suggest a different solution, one where there is a more
restrictive composition principle than type-shifting.
However, let us first look at the theory that Higginbotham (1985) outlines.
Following Stowell (1981), he assumes that each word that assigns thematic roles to
arguments has a thematic grid. This thematic grid provides information about the
number and nature of these arguments. For example, the verb see has the following
thematic grid (Higginbotham 1985: 555):
(52) see, +V -N, 〈1,2,E〉
Let us see how Higginbotham (1985: 555-556) captures the way in which arguments
are interpreted based on such thematic grids. The example sentence he uses is the
following.
(53) John saw Mary.
Higginbotham assumes that the values of a predicate F, the things x such that
v(x,F), are those of which it is true (Higginbotham 1985: 555). The values of (52)
are the ordered triple 〈a,b,e〉, and the values are the the values of the point p of the
phrase marker that has (52) as its label. If we let s range over finite sequences of
things, we get the following statement for the values of p:
(54) v(s,p) ↔(∃x)(∃y)(∃e)(s = 〈x,y,e〉 & see(x,y,e))
With this at hand, we can consider the argument Mary. Mary is the label of a sister
point q, and we get the values of q as follows:
(55) v(x,q) ↔ x = Mary
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The value of the VP is the following, as Higginbotham assumes that the subject
originates externally to the VP.
(56) v(〈x,e〉,VP) ↔ (∃y) v(〈x,y,e〉,V) & v(y,q)
This then gives us:
(57) v(〈x,e〉,VP) ↔ see(x,Mary,e)
And finally, after inserting John, we get a truth value:
(58) S is true ↔ (∃e) see(John,Mary,e)
For Higginbotham, the assignment of thematic roles corresponds to the semantic
closure of the point S in (58).
This alternative is not compatible with full thematic separation. For that
reason, we need a different alternative. There are various options that come to
mind. Here I will briefly consider two of them, before I present my own.
The first proposal is to assume a constrained version of Functional Application.
We need a version of Functional Application that does not assume adicity changes,
apart from maybe two to one for the thematic concepts. Kratzer (1996) shows us
how this can be done, and the derivations would roughly look like in (59)-(64). I
only show how the arguments would be integrated into the thematic predicates and
provide the final logical form. A full derivation would have to provide more details,







(64) ∃e[Agent(Mary)(e) & Theme(Pat)(e) & love(e)]
See also Champollion (2010c) for a worked-out solution that assumes that each
argument is introduced by a functional projection.
I will now present my own proposal. I suggest that there is a separate com-
position principle but that it is a mapping principle from syntax to logical form. I
will call the relevant operation Thematic Integration.16 The principle is defined as
in (65).
(65) Thematic Integration
H DP →Spell-Out→ R(e, DP).
The principle takes a syntactic structure consisting of a head and a complement and
provides a mapping into logical form. The principle relies on a given set of heads H
and a given set of thematic predicates R:
(66) H = {Voice, F, App, . . . }
(67) R = {Agent, Theme, Experiencer, . . . }
Here I take no position on the exact nature of the sets that H and R contain.
These sets are important in order to constrain the power of Thematic Integration.
Furthermore, in chapter 5 I argue that Baker (1988, 1997)’s Uniformity of Theta
16Bayer (1996) calls the same principle ‘argument indexing’.
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Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) is very much related to this mapping principle.
However, it is also possible to make use of more general labels like External and
Internal, cf. Williams (1981a), if that turns out to be sufficient.
I would like to stress the necessity of something like Thematic Integration.
One may think that an alternative is to put ‘Agent’ and ‘Theme’ in the Syntax and
then just conjoin the sister of the argument with the argument. However, this has
been argued to be implausible, as the following quote makes clear.
(68) We find it significant that no language we know of has lexical items synony-
mous with the (metalanguage) expressions “Theme,” “Agent,” “Benefactive,”
and so on. One can say that there was a boiling of the water by John; but
“of” ’ and “by” do not mean what “Theme” and “Agent” mean. This is of
interest. Languages have words for tense, force indicators, all sort of arcane
quantifications and many others. Yet they do not lexically represent what
seems to be a central part of their vocabulary. [. . . ] We think this sort
of fact reveals a simple truth. Θ-roles are not part of the object-language
(Uriagereka and Pietroski 2002: 278).
If this is correct, it seems difficult to dispense with Thematic Integration since the
latter is just a mapping relation that relates syntactic objects to a given object
language. Thematic Integration is a syntactic mapping principle, and it translates
syntactic arguments into thematic relations in the meta-language. This would also
exclude a covert preposition that indicates some flexible proto-thematic relation of
the sort that Dowty (1989) has argued for. If this preposition never shows up overtly,
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it is effectively a way of encoding a semantic relation in the syntax.
4.3.5 Existential Closure
The last part that figures in the logical forms is Existential Closure. Researchers have
debated whether you can insert an Existential Closure anywhere in a sentence (see
e.g., Reinhart (1997)) or whether there are constraints on such insertion (see e.g.,
Heim (1982), Bowers (2010), and see Bayer (1996) for much discussion of existential
closure in general). I will now show that we can implement a constraint on existential
closure that appears to be quite compatible with Reinhart’s view.
We have seen above that existential closure can happen either after all con-
juncts have been conjoined, or before if there is a strong quantifier in subject posi-
tion. If insertion of Existential Closure is completely free, then that predicts that
it can apply to only the verb. That is, one could get a logical form of the following
sort.
(69) ∃e[kick(e)] & Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, balls)
The question is then how the event variables for the thematic predicates are closed.
We can solve this question by letting Existential Closure apply to each spelled-out
conjunct. The logical form will then end up looking like this:
(70) ∃e[kick(e)] & ∃e[Agent(e, John)] & ∃e[Theme(e, balls)]
Here each conjunct is existentially closed. Since the proposal in this chapter is that
each conjunct corresponds to an application of Spell-Out, this is easy to implement.17
17This way of looking at things may also have consequences for the debate concerning subsen-
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Whether this view can be maintained or not depends on whether the closure
of an event variable has to survive its Spell-Out domain. I do not know about any
evidence that necessitates this, but the prediction is clear: Such cases should not
exist if the present proposal is correct.
4.4 Some syntactic aspects of the proposal
In this section I will clarify some of the syntactic assumptions that I left unspecified
when going through the derivations earlier in this chapter. This includes why Spell-
Out happens the way it does and how pruning works.
The rationale behind when Spell-Out applies is that structures of the kind
given in (71) are bad, namely cases where two phrases Merge. Above I gave a
constraint that blocks structures like (71).
(71)
XP YP
Uriagereka (1999) notes that structures of this sort create complications, and Moro
(2000) develops this at great length (see already Speas (1990: 48)). Moro argues that
such structures are unstable in narrow syntax and that one of the XPs needs to move
in order to create a structure that is licit for purposes of linearization: ‘. . .movement
can be thought of as a way to rescue the structure at PF in case a point of symmetry
has been generated [. . . ] To put it more generally, movement turns out to be a
consequence of the necessity of organizing words into a linear order’ (Moro 2000: 3).
Recently Chomsky (2008, 2010) has made a similar argument and Alexiadou and
tentialism, cf. Merchant (2001, 2004), Stainton (2006).
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Anagnostopoulou (2001, 2007), Richards (2010b) have also argued that structures
akin to (71) are problematic in various ways.18 In particular, Chomsky (2010)
suggests that the need for movement is related to labeling and that structures like
(71) cannot be properly labeled.19
Notice that all of these proposals treat the badness of (71) as a representational
problem that somehow can be remedied. Moro assumes that it can be fixed by
moving one of the XPs and that somehow the original trace/copy does not create
18For example, Richards (2010b: 14-15) argues that the data in (i) follow from a distinctness
condition where two phrases cannot be close to each other within Richards’ definition of a phase.
(i) *Into the room kicked John the ball.
The problem with his analysis is that data such as (i) are fine in V2 languages like Norwegian.
However, nothing in the relevant part of the syntax is different, on any account that I know of,
between English and Norwegian. And according to Richards, the problem lies in the base structure,
as a man and a ball will be in the same domain and thus the two phrases will cause a linearization
crash. Unless a blunt stipulation is made, I do not see how Richards’ analysis can deal with the
contrast between English and Norwegian.
19Moro (2008) elaborates on this, following Chomsky (2008)’s suggestion that labels are derived
computationally through inspecting the search space of a head. Moro argues that two phrases
cannot be merged because the configuration would crash. The reason for this crash is that the
search space for any head H that merges with the two phrases will be ambiguous. Moro (2008:
2) presents the following solution: ‘On the other hand, if either XP or YP is targeted by H and
then raised (yielding, for example: {YP, {H, {XP, YP}}}), the derivation can proceed, because
the computational mechanism has overcome the problem of labelling: YP is no longer available for
introspection to H [. . . ] and the label can be properly assigned’. As Sigurðsson (To appear) notes,
a problem with this solution is that it is countercylic: It requires you to go back in the derivation
in order to assign the label.
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problems. It is very unclear how this at all can be implemented from the point of
view of the copy theory of movement. All occurrences of a copy are identical, so
how can one occurrence not matter for the purposes of a constraint? Chomsky’s
proposal, as far as I can tell, suffers from a similar problem. Even if a structure
can be correctly labeled after movement, why does not the new structure, the site
of the remerge, create the same violation that the movement was supposed to fix?
See Chomsky (In press) for some discussion of a novel view on intervention that is
claimed to bypass this problem.
For these reasons, I am instead proposing that the constraint that bans (71)
has to be derivational and that it is a universal ban. Structures that look like
(71) simply cannot be generated through Set Merge. The Spell-Out system I have
developed above effectively bans a merger of the kind in (71), which is related to
what Uriagereka (1999) and Narita (2009, 2011) argue for subjects and adjuncts.
The reason is that you can never put two syntactic objects that can only be phrases
together: In those cases, one of the phrases needs to be reduced to a bare head. So
whenever you have a structure like (71), Spell-Out needs to apply to the complement
of the head that is on the clausal spine.20 At this point, there is a difference between
both Uriagereka (1999) and Narita (2009, 2011). The former argues that specifiers
(and adjuncts) can be spelled out separately, whereas the latter argues that there
20In order to make sure that this happens, you can define Spell-Out in terms of the main
workspace, assuming that there is a main workspace for the clausal spine and that phrases that
want to merge with the main workspace are constructed in a separate workspace, cf. Uriagereka
(1999).
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is optionality as to whether Spell-Out applies to specifiers or complements. In
the present system, there is no optionality: Spell-Out always has to target the
complement of the head that constitutes the spine of the relevant tree that is being
built.
A similar logic has been employed by Epstein (2009). He refers to Epstein
(2007) who noted a problem with the resulting structure after a phase-head com-
plement has been spelled out. The problem is that we are left with a non-term. If
narrow syntax only operates on terms, this is a problem, since the resulting structure




This structure clearly shows that the object after Spell-Out retains the bar level,
which does not appear to be necessary. Epstein (2009) therefore argues that the
phase edge is transformed into a head-complement relation. He notes that this gives
us an additional consequence: all theta marking configurations can be reduced to
head-complement relations, instead of head-complement and the configuration in
(72). In chapter 5, I will endorse this conclusion, though in a slightly different way.
If Epstein is right, we have a reason for why the constraint in (71) should hold:
It provides a unified relation for assignment of thematic roles, but in a different
way than previous proposals. A further motivation behind the constraint is that
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if we adopt the derivational version of the constraint, we are able to eliminate the
difference between complements and specifiers. As I have tried to show above, that
has a major consequence, namely it gives a transparent mapping from the syntax
onto Neo-Davidsonian logical forms. Previous research has not been able to do
that with the same empirical adequacy, viz. accounting for the data in chapter
3. Needless to say, this payoff does not explain the constraint, but it does provide
motivation for the constraint.
Note that complement reduction is entirely in line with Chomsky’s approach
to phases, though my approach requires a more flexible and different definition of
what a phase is, if a phase is the relevant notion. In what follows, I will not talk
about phases, but rather stick to Spell-Out. If my suggestions concerning Spell-Out
are on the right track, then we may want to revise what a phase is. Clearly, the
concept will be more variable and relational (cf. den Dikken (2006, 2007), Gallego
(2010)) than on Chomsky’s approach. I leave this issue for future work.
Before moving on, it will be useful to make some of the technical aspects
clearer. If one assumes that a Maximal Projection is a projection that is not domi-
nated by anything, it seems like the very first Merge will consist of two phrases being
merged. The lexical items are taken from the numeration, and at that point neither
is dominated by anything. Thus they are maximal projections on such a definition.
How can one claim that two maximal projections cannot be merged? That seems
to effectively ban any derivation from getting off the ground.
A way to resolve the problem is to argue that the problem is only apparent.
Chomsky (1995c: 245) argues that ‘we understand a terminal element LI to be an
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item selected from the numeration, with no parts (other than features) relevant to
CHL. A category Xmin is a terminal element, with no categorial parts. We restrict
the term head to terminal elements’. Chomsky provides the following definitions:
(73) maximal projection:
A maximal projection is a syntactic object that does not project any further.
(74) minimal projection:
A minimal projection is a lexical item selected from the numeration.
This means ‘[. . . ] that an item can be both an X0 and an XP’ (Chomsky 1995c:
249). Chomsky mentions clitics as examples of the latter. Given this, there is in fact
no problem related to claiming that two phrases cannot be merged. First Merge can
either be between two heads or a head and a phrase. Given that each element has an
ambiguous structure, a constraint banning the merger of two phrases can be taken
to be a constraint on Merge such that this result will never be generated. That is,
X-XP and X-Y structures are generated, but if there is a derivational constraint
preventing the generation of XP-XP, such a structure won’t be created.
Thus it is possible to implement the ban on merging two phrases without
running into a paradox such that no derivation can ever get started.
Another issue concerns what happens when a tree structure is pruned, cf. the
discussion of Epstein’s work above. There are two alternatives, as far as I can tell.
Let us first look at it from a graph theoretic perspective, using set-theory. Consider




(76) {X, {X, Y}}
The next step is to merge a ZP. Since this cannot be done due to the constraint in
(71), the complement of X undergoes Spell-Out. After Spell-Out, we are just left
with (77).
(77) {X, {X}}
However, there is no need for X to project when there is no complement. Let us
state this more explicitly, building on Epstein (2009)’s insights.
(78) Non-redundancy condition on pruning (NCOP):
Remove the label when there is no reason to project the label.
When there is a complement, there will always be a reason to project the label. This
of course assumes that we need labels, see Collins (2002), Seely (2006), Hornstein
(2009) for discussion and different views. Assuming labels and the NCOP, (77) is
therefore equivalent to (79).
(79) X





(81) {XP, {X, ZP}}
The set-theoretic notion shows more clearly what happens when a structure is
pruned. However, we need to make a stipulation concerning the behavior of la-
bels in order to get the result we want.
The other alternative is a purely set-theoretic perspective. One can then argue
that what pruning does is eliminate one of the sets in (76). That is, pruning reduces
(82) to (83) by deleting the entire set {X, Y} and only retaining the label. The label
then becomes a term, assuming that labels are copies of terms.
(82) {X, {X, Y}}
(83) X
This would mean that it’s not just Y that gets spelled out, but an occurrence of
X as well. What remains after Spell-Out is just X, and this is a bare head that
can merge with the phrase ZP. In this case, there is no need for a non-redundancy
condition on pruning.
I am not going to choose between these two alternatives here, but I want to
point out that it makes a difference whether one considers pruning from a graph-
theoretic or a set-theoretic perspective (see Kupin (1978) for an earlier and somewhat
similar argument).
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter argues that it is possible to provide a syntax where each Spell-Out
domain corresponds to a conjunct at logical form. By assuming that two maximal
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projections can never Merge, and that one of them has to be reduced to a bare head
via Spell-Out, the dynamics of Spell-Out will be exactly as required for each transfer
to the interfaces to correspond to a conjunct. Furthermore I have discussed the basic
semantic principles that ensure that the logical forms are construed correctly. I have
also provided detailed examples of how the derivations work, and elaborated on the
details of the syntactic theory. In particular I have discussed why there should be a
constraint barring two maximal projections from being merged, and how Spell-Out
prunes the syntactic representation.
Towards the end of the chapter I explored a few syntactic consequences of the




The EPP, Movement, and Serial Verbs
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I developed a new theory of Spell-Out and I addressed a few
consequences that this theory has. The goal of the present chapter is to continue to
address consequences of the proposal. I will particularly focus on the EPP as that
continues to be a very important issue in the theory of syntax. It may also seem
even more important for a theory that claims that there is no distinction between
specifiers and complements. In this chapter, I will argue that there is a way to recast
the EPP in the theory I have been arguing for in this dissertation.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses linearization in
English and section 5.3 suggests how the present theory can be extended to account
for the EPP in English. The chapter proceeds to discuss movement in section 5.4
and how movement can happen when the domains of Spell-Out are as outlined in
chapter 4. Section 5.5 deals with Condition on Extraction Domains facts and briefly
considers agreement as well. Serial verbs are the topic of section 5.6, and in the last
section I discuss the nature of UTAH within the present theory.
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5.2 Linearizing elements in English
The attentive reader will notice an implication of the present system that on the
face of it is rather unfortunate. If if head-complement relations are the locus of
linearization, and specifiers are defined the same way as complements, then the
current system predicts that English should be a VSO language. Let us see why
this is the case. I assume that the verb moves from V0 through F0 and then to
Voice0, following Larson (1988, Forthcoming) and Chomsky (1995c), among others.
Let us look at a concrete example, namely the sentence in (1).
(1) John saw Mary.







I assume that Merge creates an unordered set, so these structures represent un-
ordered sets. If we have a linearization algorithm where each unordered set is
mapped onto an ordered set with a specified linear order (Epstein et al. 1998,
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Richards 2004, Lohndal and Samuels 2010), then we get the following linear state-
ments:1
(5) see
(6) see > Mary
(7) see > John
If we only pronounce the highest copy, and if we assume that John precedes Mary
by virtue of being hierarchically higher, then we get the linear order see John Mary,
that is, VSO. Although McCawley (1970) argues that English underlyingly is VSO
because that simplifies the number of cycles one needs and because it is also in line
with how the Polish notation of predicate logic conceives of the relationship between
the predicate and its arguments, these reasons are no longer valid: I have explic-
itly argued that verbs do not have arguments, in which case the second argument
McCawley makes evaporates. Similarly, our theories of the cycle are quite differ-
ent today as the overall architecture of the grammar has changed rather a lot (see
Freidin (1999), Lasnik (2006) and Freidin and Lasnik (2011) for useful discussion).
On my approach, the underlying order only consists of unordered sets, but with the
linearization statements English needs, without further assumptions, English comes
out as VSO.
Kayne (1994) argues that there is no difference between adjuncts and specifiers.
Inspired by this claim, I will argue that movement is adjunction and that adjunction
1Here I assume that when there is just one lexical item, the algorithm just returns that item.
An alternative is to say that there is no linearization statement for such cases.
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amounts to Pair Merge, following Chomsky (2004).2 Since Pair Merge involves an
ordered set, as opposed to an unordered set (regular Merge), we can impose that
the ordered set corresponds to a linear left to right ordering. If the subject moves
and adjoins to T, a statement specific to English will state that the subject precedes
the head it has been adjoined to, thus ensuring that the subject precedes the finite
verb in English. Essentially this proposal amounts to saying that the subject moves
because there is a requirement in English that the subject position be filled. This
requirement is the EPP. 3
The relevant part of the structure for a sentence like (8) will look as in (9).
(8) John eats a cake.
(9) TP
<John T>
Here the <> indicates an ordered set, i.e., <John, T>, which is the result of Pair
Merge of John to T. I assume that each adjunct needs to be ordered in a specific
way (stated at the PF interface), cf. the fact that many adjuncts follow what
2The claim that adjuncts are on a different ‘plane’ was in a way anticipated by Koizumi (1995:
144, fn. 4): ‘[. . . ] either adjuncts may be introduced into a phrase marker non-cyclically or they are
projected on a different plane of a three dimensional phrase structure so that they are invisible for
the purpose of locality conditions’. See also Åfarli (1995) and Rubin (2003) for critical discussion.
3Various researchers have argued that the EPP follows from language-specific conditions on
linear order, cf. Bever (2009), Kučerovà (2009), Sigurðsson (2010). This was already suggested by
Chomsky to Fukui, namely that ’there is a rule of PF which fronts the subject to the specifier of
IP position [...]’ (Fukui 1986: 61).
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they modify. These ordering statements are language-specific and belong to the PF
interface. For the T head in English, the adjunct precedes the head.
The present approach predicts that there should be VSO languages where all
arguments stay in situ. McCloskey (1997) and Roberts (2005) discuss Irish and
Welsh and conclude that in these languages, the subject does not stay in situ. How-
ever, according to Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (2001), in languages like Greek,
Romanian and Spanish, the arguments stay in situ. Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou






































‘Petros solved the problem correctly.’
As they point out, these languages are V-to-I-raising languages (see their paper for
references). They argue that these subjects are VP-internal by looking at participle
and adverb placement facts in periphrastic constructions (see also Alexiadou (1997)
and Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998)). A relevant example is provided in




















‘If Janis has already read the book carefully . . . ’
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These data are exactly as predicted on my approach. They fall out automatically
if these languages have the head-complement setting with verb movement: the verb
moves above the object and the subject, yielding the VSO order I illustrated above.
It is worth noting that this is the case for any account where the subject starts out
low and the verb moves to a higher functional head.
As for SOV languages like Japanese, more needs to be said. Since they have
the complement-head setting, the language will come out as SVO if the highest verb
is pronounced. This means that either the lowest copy of the verb is pronounced
or the object moves (see Kayne (1994) for the latter). I will not perform a detailed
study of OV-languages here, but these are the two options that the present approach
gives, and the movement of the object alternative is certainly in line with a common
analysis in the literature.
The next section discusses the EPP in great detail, and I propose a slight
modification of Chomsky and Lasnik’s proposal that the EPP is the requirement
that a functional head need a specifier. Specifically I argue that the EPP should
be stated as a requirement that a functional head has a nominal sister. This order
can be fulfilled either by moving an element lower down in the tree structure, or
by inserting an expletive as a last resort. First, I will start by reviewing some
background on the EPP, and then go on to discuss how my theory can account for
the EPP.
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5.3 The nature of the EPP
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature of the EPP. In fact, prior to
Chomsky inventing the name, Perlmutter (1971: 100) noted that ‘Any sentence
other than an imperative in which there is an S that does not contain a subject
in surface structure is ungrammatical’. Chomsky (1981)’s discussion focuses on
examples such as (14)-(15).
(14) It seems that John is here.
(15) *Seems that John is here.
It is important that there is an expletive subject here that cannot bear a semantic
relationship to the verb, since lack of such a semantic relationship could account for
the contrast between (16) and (17).
(16) Mary baked a cake.
(17) *Baked a cake.
The object cannot move from one Case position to another, which is presumably
what excludes (17).
Originally, the EPP was called Principle P by Chomsky (1981) and it said that
the principle ‘is the structural requirement that certain configurations . . .must have
subjects . . . ’ (Chomsky 1981: 27). Chomsky particularly focused on English and
noted that the subject is obligatory. The name EPP, though, comes from Chomsky
(1982). Recall that the Projection Principle ‘states informally that the θ-marking
properties or each lexical item must be represented categorically at each syntactic
163
level (Chomsky 1982: 8). The Extended Projection Principle goes beyond that, as
Chomsky notes in this lengthy quote:
(18) It might be thought that [the fact that clauses require subjects] follows from
the Projection Principle, . . . but this is not quite correct. While subcate-
gorized complements are obligatory for heads, the θ-marked subject is not,
as we can see from passives or nominals . . . Furthermore, nonarguments can
occupy the subject position, as in it is clear that S, I expect [it to be clear
that S]; in fact, the subject position must be filled by a pleonastic element in
structures lacking a θ-marked subject. It seems, then, that the requirement
that the clause have a subject is independent of the Projection Principle . . . I
will henceforth refer to the Projection Principle along with the requirement
that clauses have subjects as the Extended Projection Principle (Chomsky
1982: 9-10).
However, the terminological convention ever since has been that the EPP only de-
notes the ‘extended’ part of the EPP. Despite this, there are at least three versions
of the EPP, corresponding to how the theory has developed (cf. Roberts (2005: 5)).
The first version was that all clauses need to have a subject position, as we have just
seen. The second version, in Chomsky (1995c), is that a DP has a strong feature
that is checked in a specific position, namely the canonical, obligatorily filled subject
position of English. Lastly, Chomsky (2000a, 2001) argues that the EPP should be
conceived of as a parametrized requirement that a functional head has a specifier.4
4See also Lasnik (2003) and Cable (2010) who argue that EPP is optional.
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Below I will discuss this issue and conclude, following much work by Howard Lasnik,
that the third formulation is the correct one. Most of the discussion will center on
English since English seems to be the language that most clearly provides evidence
for something like the EPP.
Before moving on, it is worth to pause to note an unclarity regarding the EPP,
first noted by McCloskey (1997: 242).
(19) With the advent of the Internal Subject Hypothesis, it becomes crucially
unclear what position this principle [the EPP] referred to. Is it properly
construed so as to require that the internal subject position always be struc-
turally realized? Or is the requirement that there be a structural subject
to be construed rather as a property of functional projections, as suggested
in Chomsky (1993)? If there are many inflectional projections between C
and V, which one of them, if any, is privileged by the Extended Projection
Principle?
I will not have more to say about this issue here, but with the advent of the carto-
graphic approach (Pollock 1989, Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999), with a series of projec-
tions in the TP area, this problem is very acute, to say the least. But at least for
English, the problem is how to ensure that what is traditionally known as SpecTP
is filled.
In section 5.2, I suggested that subjects move to the subject position in English
because otherwise my theory would yield the wrong linear order (effectively VSO).
The question is why there is this movement. The EPP would provide an answer,
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though there are many proposals in the literature that reduce the EPP to Case and
other independently motivated principles (cf. Williams (1980), Rothstein (1983),
Fukui and Speas (1986), Heycock (1991), McCloskey (1997), Castillo et al. (1999,
2009), Martin (1999), Boeckx (2000), Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (2001, 2007),
Bošković (2002), Epstein and Seely (2006), Landau (2007), Bever (2009), Kučerovà
(2009), Richards (2010a), Sigurðsson (2010)). I think important data discussed by
Lasnik (2001a,b, 2003) (see also Nevins (2004) for relevant discussion) show that it is
very difficult to reduce the EPP entirely. Therefore I will assume an EPP constraint,
and I will show that this constraint can actually be stated as the requirement that a
functional head require a nominal sister. Let us briefly consider somewhat abstractly
what this means.
For me, a specifier is the sister of a head; see chapter 4 for discussion. Lasnik
(2003: 20) defines the EPP as ‘the requirement that certain functional heads have a
specifier’. Since I define specifiers the way I do, I can reformulate this requirement
as the requirement that certain functional heads need a sister. Lasnik does not say
that this specifier has to be nominal-like, but it appears to be implicit.5 The latter
is important, because otherwise one might think that it suffices to merge T and
VoiceP as in (20).




Voice . . .
However VoiceP is clearly not nominal, but rather verbal. Instead, VoiceP needs to




The configuration in (21) is what actually fulfills the EPP requirement that the
functional head T needs a nominal specifier. Thus I slightly modify the theory in
Chomsky (2000a, 2001) and especially the one in Lasnik’s work. In the rest of this
section, I will illustrate this, and as I do that, also present Lasnik’s motivation for
why we still need an EPP requirement.
Section 5.3.1 discusses Lasnik’s arguments for the need for an EPP princi-
ple. Section 5.3.2 extends the account I’m advocating to expletives and pro-drop
languages.
5.3.1 Lasnik’s arguments for the EPP
Lasnik (2003) gives a comprehensive discussion of the EPP and why some previous
attempts to reduce the EPP to other independently motivated mechanisms do not
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work. Fukui and Speas (1986) already suggest that EPP effects follow from a re-
quirement that a Case assigner must assign Case; see also Bošković (2002), Epstein
and Seely (2006) and Hornstein (2009). This extends to Exceptional Case Marking
(ECM) configurations too, Fukui and Speas argue, and derives the contrast between
(22) and (23), since the verb believe assigns accusative Case.
(22) Mary believes [it to seem that John is here].
(23) *Mary believes [to seem that John is here].
Lasnik argues, however, that there are examples where neither θ-theory nor Case
theory demands a subject, but still a subject seems to be required. He gives the
following examples that are based on discussion in Bošković (1997) of BELIEVE
verbs, that is, verbs that assign a subject theta role, do not check accusative Case
and take an infinitival complement.
(24) *the belief [ to seem [Peter is ill ]]
(25) *John has conjectured [ to seem [Peter is ill]]
Since nouns need not have a Case feature, a subject in the infinitival clause does
not seem to be required in (24). This is confirmed by the data in (26).
(26) *the belief [it to seem [Peter is ill]]
Lasnik argues that (26) violates the Case Filter, which means that Case is not
licensed in the subject position of the infinitival clause. Therefore, the only obvious
explanation for (24) has to rely on the EPP. Lasnik argues that one could perhaps
argue that belief cannot take an infinitival complement of the non-control type. This
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is descriptively true, Lasnik (2003: 4) says, but he argues that ‘in the absence of a
better account of the fact, it seems most principled to rely on the combination of
the Case Filter and the EPP’.6
As for (25), the explanation he gives is the same. The presence of a pleonastic
subject does not improve the sentence and indicates that conjecture does not have
a Case feature that it can discharge. This is shown in (27).
(27) *John has conjectured [it to seem [Peter is ill]]
However, it is not clear that these are the only accounts, as Lasnik concedes.
Epstein and Seely (2006) offer a different view for both belief and conjecture cases.
For belief, they essentially take over Martin (1999)’s analysis, which in turn invokes
Myer’s generalization. The latter can be stated as follows:
(28) ‘. . . if zero derivation is a kind of inflection, we predict that no zero-derived
word could appear inside a derivational suffix, i.e. no such suffix could be
added to a zero-derived word (Myers 1984: 62).
6Epstein and Seely (2006: 102-103) challenge the descriptive generalization by presenting the
following data.
(i) My preference for it to be likely that my horse will win is clear.
(ii) My desire for it to be obvious that he is smart pleased them.
If the for-phrase is a complement, the examples violate the descriptive generalization that nouns
never take non-finite complements of the non-control type. However, in these cases we are plausibly
dealing with CPs rather than TPs, and the C head may check the case of it. But then even the
stipulation would not suffice.
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The analysis Martin gives runs as follows: a nominal like belief is derived from its
verbal root, and this root takes a full CP complement with a null complementizer.
This complementizer is an affix (Pesetsky 1991), and this affix incorporates into the
verb believe. The [believe + null affix C] is the input to the nominalizing operation,
but due to Myer’s generalization, the zero-derived element cannot host a derivational
suffix. Assuming that Myer’s generalization holds, this story accounts for the data,
though it leaves unexplained why Myer’s generalization should hold.
For conjecture, Epstein and Seely build on Ormazabal (1995) (see also Pesetsky
(1991), Martin (1999), Bošković and Lasnik (2003)). Ormazabal argues that ECM
infinitival complements have a CP with a null complementizer (see also Kayne (1984)
and Pesetsky (1991)). This null complementizer is subject to Lasnik (1981)’s Stray
Affix Filter, which means that the null complementizer needs to attach to a host.
On the assumption that conjecture is a noun, (27) is accounted for by saying that the
null complementizer cannot find an appropriate verbal host. Epstein et al. (2005),
Epstein and Seely (2006) explicitly make this claim in relation to the present data.
Lasnik (2003) presents several arguments in favor of the EPP, most of which
rely on movement through infinitival clauses. Since several of them are similar in
character, I will only discuss a few of them here. The reason for this is also that the
discussion will apply equally to the other examples Lasnik discusses.
Lasnik and Saito (1991), based on Postal (1974), present arguments that there
is overt raising in ECM infinitives. Specifically, they argue that the ECM subject
has raised overtly to SpecAgrO. The following tree structure illustrates this (taken












tBob to be guilty
Lasnik and Saito provide a variety of evidence in favor of raising of the ECM subject.
In particular, they focus on the contrast between infinitival and finite complements,
as illustrated in the examples in (30)-(32) (Lasnik 2003: 7-8).
(30) a. The DA proved [two men to have been at the scene of the crime] during
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each other’s trials.
b. ?*The DA proved [that two men were at the scene of the crime] during
each other’s trials.
(31) a. The DA proved [no suspecti to have been at the scene of the crime]
during hisi trial.
b. ?*The DA proved [that no suspecti was at the scene of the crime] during
hisi trial.
(32) a. The DA proved [noone to have been at the scene] during any of the
trials.
b. ?*The DA proved [that noone was quilty] during any of the trials.
One might think that this does not provide an argument for the EPP, since the ECM
subjects are in SpecAgrOP and not in SpecTP. However, there are many other cases
where ECM subjects stay in situ, so the cases that show further raising are after all
illustrative. Let us consider a further argument to this effect.
Based on work by Kayne (1985) and Johnson (1991), Lasnik (2003: 8) discusses
examples like (33)-(34).7
(33) Mary made John out to be a fool.
(34) Mary made out John to be a fool.
Lasnik argues that in (33), John has overtly raised into the matrix clause (to the
specifier of AgrO). In (34), which shows that the raising is optional for many speak-
7It should be pointed out that not all speakers think that (34) is good, and the following
argument is based on those who do.
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ers, John stays in the embedded sentence. We can assume Lasnik’s analysis of these
cases, by positing EPP features on the relevant functional heads. In (34), John has
moved to become a sister of the embedded T, and in (33), it has raised to become
the sister of AgrO.
Now, these two A-positions potentially allow scopal ambiguities. Chomsky
(1995c), following an observation by Zubizarreta (1982), discusses the interplay of
quantifiers and negation based on the following data:
(35) (it seems that) everyone isn’t there yet
(36) Everyone seems [t not to be there yet]
According to Chomsky, negation can have wide scope over the quantifier in the first
sentence but not in the second. He argues that ‘[. . . ] reconstruction in the A-chain
does not take place, so it appears’ (Chomsky 1995c: 327). Lasnik (2003: 9) phrases
the generalization as follows: ‘[. . . ] a universal quantifier in subject position of a
clause can be interpreted inside the scope of clausal negation in that clause, but
cannot be ‘reconstructed’ to that position if it has A-moved away’.
As we would predict, if we consider ECM complements where it is clear that
the subject has moved, scopal reconstruction is not possible. Lasnik (2003: 10)
provides the example in (37).
(37) The mathematician made every even number out not to be the sum of two
primes.
In this case, the only reading is one which is pragmatically very implausible: the
mathematician was engaged in the futile activity of convincing someone that no
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even number is the sum of two primes. The more plausible reading would have been
a case where the mathematician was trying to convince someone that Goldbach’s
conjecture is false. So even pragmatic pressure does not make the reading available,
which is consistent with Chomsky’s claim. If we change the word order, narrow
scope is available:
(38) The mathematician made out every even number not to be the sum of two
primes.
Here the subject must be in the lower clause, which entails that it can be interpreted
in the scope of negation. Thus we have a very strong argument for the EPP, since
the surface position and the interpretive position diverge. As Lasnik points out, if
Chomsky is correct, it cannot be the case that every even number has raised, followed
by out raising even higher. Rather, every even number has to be the specifier of the
embedded T.
Another argument for the EPP comes from binding theory. Consider the
example in (39) (Lasnik 2003: 12).
(39) John appears to Mary [ to seem to himself/*herself [ to be the best candi-
date]]
Lasnik argues that absent the EPP, there would be no reason for John to move
through SpecTP of the intermediate TP.8 If such movement does not take place,
himself should not be a licit anaphor, and by fairly standard assumptions, herself
8Epstein and Seely (2006) argue adamantly that successive A-movement does not really exist.
If they are right, Lasnik’s data need to receive a different analysis.
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should be possible. Again, Lasnik’s analysis works: The intermediate T has an EPP
requirement which triggers movement, which will ensure that John will move across
himself on its way to its final landing site. A partial derivation for (39) would look
as follows, where A and B are functional heads.9
(40) [FP F be ] (Spell out be, merge the best candidate)
(41) [FP F the best candidate ] (Merge T, Spell out FP, merge John)
(42) [TP T [V oiceP John Voice ]] (Copy John, spell out VoiceP, merge with T)
(43) [TP John T ] (Merge A)
(44) [AP A [TP John T ]] (Copy John, merge to himself, spell out TP)
(45) [AP to himself A ] (Merge B)
(46) [BP B [AP to himself A ]] (Merge seems, spell out AP)
(47) [BP seems B ] (Merge Voice)
(48) [V oiceP Voice [BP seems B ]] (Spell out BP, merge John)
(49) [V oiceP Voice John ]
The derivation shows the applications of Spell-Out and how John moves though
the second infinitival clause (more on how movement works in section 5.4). The
parentheses indicate the next operation that is going to happen. An element that
is being moved has to be copied and put in a separate workspace (see section 5.4
for discussion). Then the complement of a head can be spelled out and the moved
9The verb seems is introduced by functional structure, which corresponds to the categorizer of
the root. See section 5.6 for further discussion.
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element can remerge with that head. This is what is meant by ‘copy John, spell out
VoiceP, merge with T’ above.
The reader will notice that John and himself are not in the same Spell-Out
domain during the derivation. There are two ways to address this apparent problem.
One is to adopt the Agree theory of binding, where features of reflexive agrees with a
functional head that then agrees with its antecedent (Reuland 2001, 2011). On this
view, himself agrees with F, which is to say that the phi-features of the reflexive are
transmitted to F. The next step is that F agrees in phi-features with Voice. Voice
introduces the Agent, and at that point, Voice can agree with John. If the phi-
features of the reflexive match, then we have a licit antecedent-reflexive relationship.
So himself works, whereas herself would not work. Furthermore, John will be the
only licit antecedent since it matches the features of the reflexive and it is merged
before Mary.
Another view is that binding essentially is movement (Hornstein 2007). On
this view, the antecedent starts out in a constituent together with self, and then
the antecedent moves to its final landing site. In order to make this work for (39),
one would have to allow John to undergo sideward movement (Nunes 2004) so that
it can merge with self. This is because John starts out below himself. In order to
become a licit antecedent, John needs to merge with self at some point during the
derivation. Sideward movement would provide the adequate relationship.
Both theories would be adequate for present purposes, so I leave it to the
reader to choose between them.
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A similar example concerns Condition B of the binding theory. Lasnik (2003:
13) gives the example in (50).
(50) *Johni is believed [ to seem to himi [ to be a genius ]]
Here the obviation appears due to movement through the intermediate SpecTP,
assuming that the binding domain is the infinitival sentence. My account of this
example would be entirely parallel to the account I just gave of (39).
A caveat is in order before moving on. Drummond and Hornstein (2011)
argue that these data do not tell us much. They argue that the main problem with
examples such as (39) and (50) concerns the status of (51).
(51) John appears to Maryk to seem to herk to be intelligent.
Drummond and Hornstein argue that the example in (51) should be perfect given
the unacceptability of (50) - pronouns should be licit where reflexives are banned.
But they claim that the example ‘is not particularly good’ and that this makes it
hard to interpret the data in (39) and (50).10 That may be true, but we would also
want to test (51) and make sure that this sentence is not bad for, say, pragmatic
reasons. The following sentence is also just as curious as (51).
(52) It appears to Maryk to seem to herk that John is intelligent.
However, there does not seem to be much of a pragmatic difference between these
examples. If that is the case, then Drummond and Hornstein’s claim stands.
The last argument I will discuss involves ellipsis and repair configurations.
Lasnik (2001a) argues against Chomsky (1995c)’s clam that the EPP reduces to a
10The example is fine though without the coreference.
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strong feature of a functional head. Instead Lasnik argues that the EPP is not a
matter of feature checking, which is similar to the claim in Chomsky (1982, 2000a).
In order to consider the argument, it is necessary to provide some background dis-
cussion. Lasnik considers pseudogapping as illustrated in (53).
(53) You might not believe me but you will Bob.
He follows Lasnik (1995) in arguing that pseudogapping is derived by overt ‘object
shift’ (to SpecAgrOP, following Koizumi (1995)) followed by deletion of the residual
VP. The main verb has not raised, and the question is why such raising otherwise
needs to take place, as the following contrast shows.
(54) *You will Bob believe.
(55) You will believe Bob.
Lasnik argues that one needs to postulate a strong feature that forces the raising of
V in these non-elliptical cases. Based on Ochi (1999), who argues that it is just the
matching feature of an item that is attracted, the lower V becomes phonologically
defective after attraction of the lower ‘V’. A crash at PF can be avoided if the entire
V is raised (pied-piping) or a category containing the lower V is deleted.11 Deletion
means that any kind of defect will not cause any problems on the PHON side.
Lasnik also discusses a parallel example involving matrix sluicing where he
follows the standard assumption that sluicing is wh-movement followed by IP ellipsis.
(56) Speaker A: Mary will see someone.
11This assumes that pseudogapping is derived through VP-deletion.
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(57) Speaker B: Who Mary will see?
If there is no ellipsis, raising of the finite auxiliary is required.
(58) *Who Mary will see?
The reasoning is parallel to the pseudogapping case: If the interrogative C contains
a strong feature, then the matching feature of I must raise overtly to check it. It
will then be phonologically defective and either pied-piping or ellipsis is necessary .
The next argument is the important one from the present point of view. Chom-
sky (1995c) argues that the EPP is instantiated as a strong feature on I, perhaps a
D-feature, as Chomsky argues. Then, consider the following example.
(59) Mary said she can’t swim, even though she (really) can swim.
When this strong EPP feature attracts the matching feature of she, we get the
sentence in (60), if pied-piping obtains.
(60) Mary said she can’t swim, even though she (really) can swim.
However, analogous to the pseudogapping and sluicing cases above, we should also
be able to raise just the relevant features of she if the phonologically defective she
can be deleted. The problem is that such deletion is impossible, as (61) shows.
(61) *Mary said she can’t swim, even though (really) can she swim.
Lasnik (2001a: 360) then argues that ‘The only obvious way to exclude [(61)] is to
demand that the subject raises. And the most straightforward way to guarantee that
is to formulate the EPP so that it demands that the functional head of the clause
have a specifier’. This argument of course rests on the existence of feature movement
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and feature strength (see Lasnik (1999) for more discussion of these issues), but
insofar as that part of the argument holds up, then the argument in favor of a
structural notion of the EPP that does not reduce to features seems convincing.
In this section, I have discussed a number of Lasnik’s arguments that there
has to be an EPP requirement in English. I have shown how I can basically follow
Lasnik in arguing that the EPP is a structural requirement that T has a nominal
specifier/sister. In the next section, I will discuss how expletives and pro-drop
languages fit into the picture.
5.3.2 Expletives and pro-drop languages
This concludes my discussion of Lasnik’s arguments against reducing the EPP to
other principles. There are still a couple of issues I need to deal with before I can
conclude this section. One issue involves sentences like (62) and (63).
(62) It seems that Mary came.
(63) There is a woman here.
As for (62), I argue that it is inserted as a language-specific last resort operation
(cf. Marantz (1991)) if there is no available nominal to merge with T. It has to be
a nominal, since inserting an adverb is not sufficient (64).
(64) *Yesterday was raining.
(65) Yesterday there was rain.
This way of looking at it expletives may lead to a problem for locative inversion, if
locative inversion involves movement to SpecTP.
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(66) Down the hill rolled John t.
However, it is not clear that into the room is in SpecTP, even though Collins (1997)
argues that it is. Collins assumes that the subject is in SpecVP and that the finite
verb moves to T. If this is true, it would be the only case in English where a main
verb moves that far. Collins explicitly argues that we need to widen the EPP so
that it also drives the movement in (66). On the present approach, this could also
be done, if it really turns out that locative inversion involves movement to SpecTP.
That would mean that T has a requirement that it merges with either a nominal or
a PP. Again, we need to exclude verbal elements like VoiceP, and other adverbs as
in (64). I hope to return to the problem of locative inversion in future work.
Returning to (63), I will follow Bowers (2002), Richards and Biberauer (2005),
Deal (2009) and Alexiadou and Schäfer (2010) and argue that there is actually
inserted in the argument domain and that it moves to SpecTP. This is similar to
other suggestions by Hornstein and Witkos (2003), Kayne (2008) and Hornstein
(2009); see also the references cited in Richards and Biberauer (2005) for earlier
proposals in the same spirit. I will not delve into the mechanics here because they
do not really matter. Suffice it to say that if there moves to SpecTP, then this
movement will satisfy the EPP requirement on T, just like any ordinary movement
of the subject does.
A note on V2 languages like German and Norwegian is necessary at this point.















‘Today it’s nice outside.’
Norwegian does not have a distinction between it and there (see Hestvik (1986),
Åfarli (1992) for an analysis of some relevant differences between English and Nor-
wegian). However, I claim that the expletive det should be analyzed like the English
there in that it moves from its base position for purposes of linearization. There do
not seem to be any relevant differences between English and Norwegian that would
speak against such a claim. In Norwegian, the verb also moves at least to T, as can









‘Mary often eats cake.’
Therefore, the child has to assume that both the subject and the verb move in
Norwegian.12
Since we are in the Scandinavian corner, the reader may wonder how I will
analyze transitive expletive constructions of the kind that we find in Icelandic. A













‘Many Christmas trolls probably ate the sausages.’
(Bobaljik and Jonas 1996: 196)
12I set aside whether in sentences such as (67), there is movement of both the verb and the
subject to the left periphery. See Travis (1984), Vikner (1996), Zwart (1997) for much discussion.
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Bobaljik and Jonas argue that the subject in (69) occupies SpecTP.13 They go
through several diagnostics, and show data where subjects in transitive expletive
constructions precede shifted direct objects. Similar examples have been attested
for Dutch, as shown in (70).


















‘. . . that many people bought the book yesterday.’ (Zwart 1992: 489)
Movement of the subject to SpecTP follows from the EPP requirement on T. As
for the expletive, this has to be merged in a higher projection. Bobaljik and Jonas
(1996: 217) put it in SpecAgrSP (cf. Vangsnes (2002)), whereas Christensen (1991),
among others, argue that it is base-generated in SpecCP. Exactly where the position
is does not matter for present purposes as long as it has an EPP feature that triggers
a last-resort insertion of the expletive.14





‘I have telephoned.’ (Haegeman 1994: 453)
There are various ways pro-drop can be analyzed. If there is a silent pro in SpecTP
(Rizzi 1982), then this pro would satisfy the EPP. Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou
(1998) argue that the EPP can be satisfied in two different ways: Either by T
13See Vangsnes (2002) for more discussion and data not discussed by Bobaljik and Jonas.
14I will not deal with impersonal null subjects in Icelandic; see Sigurðsson and Egerland (2009)
for much discussion.
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merging with a phrase or by the verbal morphology on T as long as this has the
requisite nominal feature (Taraldsen 1978). Here I am going to assume the analysis
given in Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (1998). This means that there is no need
for a pro in the grammar of Italian, which Manzini and Savoia (1997) independently
argue against.15
In this section, I have argued that my approach developed in chapter 4 can
account for the EPP in English by following Lasnik’s proposal that the EPP is a
requirement that T needs a nominal specifier. Let us by way of summary consider
the sentence in (72).
(72) Mary loves John.
This sentence will have the following derivation, where the parentheses indicate what
the next step of the derivation will be.
(73) [FP F loves ] (Spell out loves, merge John)
(74) [FP John F ] (Merge Voice)
(75) [V oiceP Voice [FP John F ]] (Spell out FP, merge Mary)
(76) [V oiceP Mary Voice ] (Merge T)
(77) [TP T [V oiceP Mary Voice ]] (Copy Mary, spell out VoiceP, remerge Mary)
(78) [TP Mary T ]
15It is worth noting that Italian is one of the pro-drop languages that does not allow VSO orders,
unlike languages such as Greek, Romanian and Spanish. Being a pro-drop language and having
VSO orders are presumably two independent properties and my theory does not predict that they
should be intimately related. Thanks to Artemis Alexiadou (p.c.) for bringing up this issue.
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This derivation shows that a copy of Mary is made and this copy remerges with the
T head, which fulfills the EPP requirement. In the next I will elaborate more on
how movement has to be understood in the present framework.
5.4 Movement
If Spell-Out is as dynamic as I have suggested, a crucial question is how movement
is possible. A couple of examples are provided in (79)-(81).
(79) What did you eat?
(80) Every quarterback, three video games taught two new plays.
(81) Read the book Mary did.
I will go through how (79) and (81) work in some detail.
In order for movement to take place, a copy has to be made. Since the direct
object or the Theme will be spelled out as soon as an Applicative or an Agent is
merged, it is important that a copy of the object is made upon Spell-Out. This
copy can for example be made due to a feature on the direct object that triggers
movement. This copy can be put in a separate workspace and then be remerged later
in the derivation. Note that this requires a conception of movement that is close to
Nunes (2004), who in turns develops the theory in Chomsky (1995c). For Nunes,
movement is decomposed into four different and more basic operations. These are
given in (82)-(85).16
16Nunes (2001, 2004) and Hornstein and Nunes (2002) present further evidence in favor of this






The Spell-Out system I am advocated forces us to decompose Movement as two
operations, Copy and Merge. Since the original occurrence of what in (79) will be
spelled-out, a copy of what needs to be made. This copy can then be remerged.
I assume that each derivation is a series of steps that constructs a syntactic
object based on lexical items. We can define each stage of a derivation by a lexical
array and a workspace (Collins and Stabler 2011).
(86) A stage (of a derivation) is a pair S = <LA, W>, where LA is a lexical array
and W is a set of syntactic objects. In any such stage S, we will call W the
workspace of S.
The assumption is that several workspaces can be involved in the construction of a
sentence. There is one workspace for the main spine of the sentence and then another
one for storing copies until they can be merged. Invoking multiple workspaces is
not something that is novel with the present theory. Whenever, say, a complex
nominal phrase is merged as a specifier of a projection in a standard theory, this
complex nominal phrase has been constructed in a separate workspace before the
entire phrase is merged to the clausal spine. Thus workspaces are needed, and I
am just saying that a syntactic object can remain in a workspace until it is merged.
Again, this is hardly anything new.
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It is not irrelevant where the copy gets remerged. Considerations of what
the appropriate logical forms are come into play. The example in (80) shows that
topicalization can apply to one of the core sentences we discussed in chapter 3.
The logical form at least needs to have separate conjuncts for the predicate and
the arguments. In order for this to happen, the order of the derivation has to be as
described in chapter 4. The Agent is above the Theme which is above the verb. This
has implications for where the first copy of what can remerge in the example in (79).
It has to be remerged with Voice, after the Agent has to be merged. This means
that the Agent and Voice will Merge and then the Agent has to undergo Spell-Out
before what can be merged with Voice. This complies with standard phase-based
analyses of wh-movement where the wh-constituent moves to the edge of the v-phase,
cf. Chomsky (2000a, 2001).
A derivation for (79) would therefore look as follows:




(88) a. Spell out eat and merge what with F.
b. FP
what F





(90) a. Spell out the complement of Voice, make a copy of what, and merge you.
b. VoiceP
you Voice








(93) a. Make a copy of what, spell out the complement of T, and merge you.
b. TP
you T





(95) a. Spell-out the complement of C and merge what.
b. CP
what C
As this derivation shows, it is occasionally necessary to keep multiple copies in the
workspace. In this case, both what and you have to be in the workspace and the
correct elements have to be merged. If we enrich our lexical items with features,
then it is easy to enforce that, say, T merges with you and not what. However, I
have not done that here in order to keep things cleaner, and because it is not clear
that anything would go wrong where T and what to merge before T and you merge.
This analysis extends to the VP-fronting case in (81). Because the verb and
the Theme will be in separate Spell-Out domains, fond-of will have to move to
the left periphery of the sentence separately from many books. This has actually
been proposed as one possible derivation for VP-fronting by Rimell and Leu (2005).
Rimell and Leu are concerned with scopal ambiguities in English and Swiss German,
and they argue that different readings correspond to different derivations that have
identical surface strings. One is a derivation where both the VP and the Theme
together move to the left periphery the other, and more interesting for our purposes,
is one in which the Theme moves separately to the left periphery and then the rem-
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nant VP moves after the Theme has moved. I am not going to take over the details
of their proposal, but my own proposal modifies their second proposal, namely that
the verb and the Theme move separately to the left periphery.
Below I give a possible derivation for the sentence in (81).




(97) a. Make a copy of read, spell out read, and merge the book with F.
b. FP
the book F





















(103) a. Spell-out the complement of C and merge the book.
b. CP
the book C




Note that I skipped intermediate movement through the Voice edge, but that can of
course be accommodated if there is empirical evidence that it happens. Crucially,
for the linear order to come out correctly, it is important in which order the book
and read are merged. This can be ensured by adopting a richer left periphery where
different heads have features for different constituents, say, for a verb and a DP.
There is another example that it is relevant to discuss, as it involves what ap-
pears to be pied-piping of an entire relative clause. Consider the following example:
(105) The man who smokes killed Mary.
Assuming the theory of relative clauses in Bianchi (1999), who extends the proposal
in Kayne (1994), the standard structure for this sentence is provided in (2). G











In order to analyze this sentence in the following system, we need to distinguish
between two workspaces: One workspace for the main spine of the clause and one
workspace for the relative clause. This is required since the relative clause is a
complex DP. Note that this is not different from standard theories: They all assume
that the relative clause is constructed before it is merged with main clause.17
For the main spine of the tree, we have the following derivation. I will shortly
discuss why only the man is merged into this structure.
(107) [FP F killed ] (Spell-out killed, merge Mary)
(108) [FP Mary F ] (Merge Voice and FP)
(109) [V oiceP Voice [FP F VP ]] (Spell-Out FP, merge the man)
(110) [V oiceP [the man] Voice ] (Merge T)
(111) [TP T [V oiceP [the man] Voice ] (Copy the man, spell out VoiceP, remerge)
(112) [TP [the man] T ]
The parentheses indicate the next operation, and I abstract away from the C pro-
jection.
The relative clause has the following derivation:
(113) [FP F smokes ] (Merge Voice and FP)
(114) [V oiceP Voice [FP F smokes ]] (Spell-Out FP, merge man who)
(115) [V oiceP [man who] Voice ] (Merge T)
17Observe that Late Merge theories do not work because you cannot Merge the entire relative
clause into the main spine. This raises questions of how to deal with the Freidin-Lebeaux effects
discussed in Chomsky (1995c).
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(116) [TP T [V oiceP [man who] Voice ] (Copy man who, spell out VoiceP, remerge)
(117) [TP [man who] T ] (Merge G)
(118) [GP G [TP [man who] T ]] (Copy man who, spell out TP, remerge)
(119) [GP [man who] G ] (Merge C)
(120) [CP C [GP [man who] G ]] (Copy man, spell out GP, remerge)
(121) [CP man C ] (Merge the)
(122) [DP the [CP man C ]]
Again, the parentheses indicate the next operation that will happen. The final
structure here is what is being merged into the main spine in (109) above. That
is, we now see why only the man is merged into the structure, and not the entire
relative clause.
However, this appears to yield a problem for linearization. The main spine
just gives us the man killed Mary, and not The man who smokes killed Mary. If it is
correct that this is a problem of linearization, then we essentially need a statement
that who follows man. If who follows man, and who precedes smokes, then man will
also precede smokes by transitivity. Furthermore, C in the relative clause precedes
who, and man precedes C. In the main clause the man precedes killed Mary. Thus it
does not matter that we are dealing with two workspaces here - the linearization will
come out correctly. Needless to say, this depends on a theory of linearization and
copy realization, e.g., where the highest copy is typically pronounced Nunes (2004).
Attempts at developing theories of linearization can be found in Idsardi and Raimy
(In press) and Lohndal and Samuels (2010).
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One thing that it is important to mention is that movement requires multiple
copies. I follow Hornstein (1995a) in assuming that only one copy is relevant at
the CI interface. We also need a more complex theory of the PF interface that
will ensure that the topmost copies are pronounced, generally speaking. See Nunes
(2004) for important discussion.
There is one more consequence that I would like to bring out.18 The theory
that I am advocating entails that multidominance representations cannot exist. Let
us consider why.
Chomsky (2004) argues that there is only Merge and that it there are two
versions: External Merge and Internal Merge (see, among others, Epstein et al.
(1998), Starke (2001)). Others argue that there are still differences between the two
types of Merge and that they do not reduce to a common source (Brody 2006, van
Gelderen 2008). A third element in this debate is whether there are more than just
External and Internal Merge. Citko (2005: 476) argues that there is:
(123) ‘The existence of External Merge and Internal Merge predicts the existence
of a third type, combining the properties of both. This third type, which
I will refer to as Parallel Merge, is like External Merge in that it involves
two distinct rooted objects (α and β), but it is like Internal Merge in that
it combines the two by taking a subpart of one of them [. . . ]’.
Parallel Merge is also known as multidominance, and a typical multidominance
structure looks as follows:







Various scholars have given arguments that multidominance exists and that it can be
fruitfully applied to different empirical phenomena. A couple of examples are across-
the-board wh-questions (Citko 2005) and right node raising (see already McCawley
(1982)).
(126) I wonder what Gretel recommended and Hansel read.











In discussing right node raising, Larson (2011, In press) argues that neither a
multidominance approach, a deletion account or a movement account can account
for all the data. To give an example, the multidominance approach does not make
different predictions for the following two sentences (modeled on Kayne (1994: 67)):
(128) a. Ivan bought, but Ivy didn’t read, any books.
b. *Ivan didn’t buy, but Ivy read, any books.
In the tree above, the same relation holds between the conjunct with the negation
and the shared object and the conjunct without the negation and the shared object.
A general problem for multidominance approaches is that they do not fit in
nicely with phase-based derivations. A representation such as (127b) cannot be
construed in a phase-based derivation. The reason is that the shared object the
book will be spelled out in one conjunct before the other conjunct is merged. The
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same reasoning holds for long-distance wh-questions, where the original landing cite
and the intermediate landing site in the embedded SpecCP will both be spelled out
when copy is merged in the matrix SpecCP.
(129) What did John tell Mary that Bill bought?
In standard phase theory, you only get multidominance representations phase-internally.
The approach to Spell-Out I have developed above excludes multidominance repre-
sentations entirely. Larson (2011) has shown that this may be a desirable outcome.
See his paper for an alternative analysis of right node raising that would be com-
patible with the present theory of Spell-Out.
In the next section, I will go on to say something about how locality fits into
the current model.
5.5 Some Notes on Locality and Agreement
The present theory has several other consequences. It goes beyond the limit of
this thesis to explore all of them, but here I will discuss a couple of rather striking
consequences. One consequence of a specifier-less theory is that one cannot say that
specifiers are islands for extraction as in Huang (1982)’s Condition on Extraction
Domains. Another consequence is that the domain of application for Agree is smaller
than on most other approaches. I will start out by discussing locality and then turn
rather briefly to agreement.
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5.5.1 Locality
On a specifier-less approach, there is an obvious question that arises concerning
locality.19 There is a well-known asymmetry between complements and left branches
like specifiers. The latter does not allow sub-extraction whereas the former does.
(130)-(131) give examples of sub-extraction in English and (132) shows that sub-
extraction from a direct object is perfectly OK. For completeness, (133) shows that
you can also move the entire object to the left periphery.20
(130) *[CP [Which Marx brother]i did [TP she say [CP [IP [a biography of ti] is
going to be published/will appear this year]]]]?
(131) *[CP [Which Marx brother]i did [IP she say [CP that [IP [a biographer of ti]
interviewed her/worked for her]]]]? (Merchant 2001: 185)
(132) Whati did Mary take [a picture of ti]
(133) Whati did John eat ti?
On the assumption that indirect objects are specifiers too (see Larson (1988) and
research following him), we expect them to not allow sub-extraction. This is indeed
the case, which Culicover and Wexler (1973: 26) already noted. (135) gives a relevant
example.
(134) I send a friend of Peter a book.
19I will not have anything to say about adjuncts here, since the presence or absence of specifiers
does not relate specifically to that issue, though see Kayne (1994).
20As for to movement of subjects in English, this is complicated by the existence of that-trace
effects. See Lohndal (2009, 2011b) for comprehensive discussion and references.
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(135) *Whoi did you send [a friend of ti] a book? (Lohndal 2011b: 189)
These data have been used to motivate an account of these extraction effects that
rely on the difference between specifiers and complements. This has been imple-
mented in various ways throughout the years and was first stated by Huang (1982)
in his Condition on Extraction Domains (see also Kayne (1984), Chomsky (1986a),
Lasnik and Saito (1992), Manzini (1992), Takahashi (1994), Müller (1998), Ochi
(1999) for different accounts). More recently, Uriagereka (1999) and Nunes and
Uriagereka (2000) have developed an account where the Spell-Out system is con-
strued such that specifiers are always spelled out separately from the clausal spine.
If that is the case, the ban on extraction from subjects follows.
Since there is no way to create a distinction between specifier and complements
within my approach, it would be a bad result if these locality data really necessitate
such a distinction. Interestingly, there are data that show that the data above
provide a simplified picture. Starke (2001: 36) gives an example from French (136)
































‘Which movie do you think that the first part of would create a scandal?’





























‘The first part of this film caused a big scandal last year.’
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In a quite comprehensive cross-linguistic study, Stepanov (2007) presents a range
of cases where extraction from subjects is reported to be good. A couple of ex-






































‘Which actress does John think that a picture of _ turned up?’ (Stepanov
2007: 90).
Spanish is also a language where you can extract out of a subject, but crucially if




















































‘Which speakers does it seem to you that the proposals by will impress me?’
Even in English, sub-extraction from a post-verbal DP is possible. The contrast
between (142) and (143) is taken from Merchant (2001: 187).
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(142) [CP [Which candidate]i were [IP there [posters of ti] all over the town]]?
(143) *[CP [Which candidate]i were [IP [posters of ti] all over the town]]?
Note that the approach by Uriagereka (1999) and Nunes and Uriagereka (2000)
does not make different predictions for extraction out of preverbal and postverbal
subjects. A left-branch specifier is a left-branch specifier regardless and consequently
sub-extraction should always be ruled out. The above data are therefore problematic
for accounts that claim that specifiers are always immune to sub-extraction.21
Based on the data just discussed and other data, new accounts have been de-
veloped of CED effects, e.g., Stepanov (2007), Boeckx (2008), Hunter (2010), Jurka
(2010), Lohndal (2011b), Müller (2010). These accounts do not rely on differences
between specifiers and complements as units that the grammatical operations refer
to.22 To the extent that this is a successful approach, it solves the problem that the
present approach at first glance faces, namely that locality considerations seem to
force us to let grammatical operations refer to specifiers. The latter is not necessary
if the data require a different account, which the recent literature argues is the case.
Therefore I conclude that locality issues per se do not constitute a problem for an
approach that does not have specifiers. This is not to say that there are not other
problems and issues that the current framework has to deal with, involving e.g.,
ellipsis and subjacency effects, but I will not discuss these here.
21See Uriagereka (2011) for a reply to this criticism and for a discussion of how to remedy this
in his Multiple Spell-Out framework.
22For Jurka, there is a specifier effect, but also a movement effect.
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5.5.2 Agreement
Given the relatively small Spell-Out domains that I am advocating, the present sys-
tem will have quite strong restrictions on how feature dependencies can be created.
In particular, feature dependencies will have to be shorter than typically assumed
in standard Agree approaches (see Chomsky (2000a) and much literature following
this paper). T can still agree with the subject since both are in the same domain,
but T will not be able to agree with the object directly, as has been argued to be
the case in dative-nominative constructions in Icelandic, cf. e.g., Richards (2004).
However, what is possible, is for transitive Agree to happen. That is, what looks like
long-distance agreement can happen in intermediate steps so that in a configuration
x > z > y, x and y agree by virtue of y agreeing with z and x agreeing with z. If
we consider a typical derivation, we will see how this works. Look at the sentence
in (144).
(144) John likes himself.
This sentence will have the following derivation:
(145) [FP F likes ] (Spell out likes, merge himself)
(146) [FP himself F ] (Merge Voice)
(147) [V oiceP Voice [FP himself F ]] (Spell out FP, merge John)
(148) [V oiceP John Voice ] (Merge T)
(149) [TP T [V oiceP John Voice ]] (Copy John, spell out VoiceP, remerge John)
(150) [TP John T ]
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The reader will notice that John and himself are not in the same Spell-Out domain
during the derivation. This may pose a problem for binding theory, if binding
theory requires there to be, say, a c-command relation between the reflexive and its
antecedent. However, the problem is only apparent. If one adopts the Agree theory
of binding, where the reflexive agrees with a functional head that then agrees with
its antecedent (Reuland 2001, 2011), there is no problem. On this view, himself
agrees with F, F agrees with Voice, and Voice agrees with John. That is one way
of implementing agreement in a step-wise fashion. Another view is that binding
essentially is movement (Hornstein 2007) and that John and self start out as
sisters, assuming that self is a head. The antecedent then moves to its surface
position, which on my theory would work exactly as sketched above. I am not going
to choose between these two theories of binding, but I hope it is clear that both of
them can be implemented with the present theory of syntax.
Given that Spell-Out domains are relatively small, everything that looks like
a long-distance agreement effect will in effect have to be deal with in the syntax as a
result of many intermediate Agree relations. This sits well with arguments advanced
by Koopman (2006) and Hornstein (2009) who argue that there is no such thing as
long-distance agreement in the syntax and that all agreement configurations are
strictly local. Whenever we see something that looks like long-distance agreement,
Hornstein argues that movement has to be involved. Hornstein’s view would also be
straightforwardly compatible with the present theory. As Boeckx (2009) discusses,
it is actually rather hard to find a genuine case of long-distance agreement. If that is
true, then it would be a virtue to have a theory that does not allow for long-distance
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agreement.
I want to point out that the present view dovetails quite nicely with late inser-
tion frameworks such as Distributed Morphology (DM) (Halle and Marantz 1993)
(see also McCawley (1968)). In DM, morphological realizations are dealt with in a
post-syntactic component, i.e., PHON on the present view. Some researchers even
argue that all agreement should be confined to this post-syntactic system (Bobaljik
2008), or even to semantics (Dowty and Jacobson 1989), but there are arguments
that at least certain agreement dependencies are syntactic, cf. Svenonius (2007),
Adger and Svenonius (2011).
In the next section, I will go on to discuss serial verbs.
5.6 Serial verbs
In this section I will show how serial verbs lend further support to the claim that
each Spell-Out domain corresponds to a conjunct at logical form. The goal will be
to argue for a particular syntactic representation, and then show how that repre-
sentation maps onto logical forms.
Serial verbs are challenging for syntactic theory because serial verb construc-
tions typically have one tense node but two or more verbs.23 These verbs do not
seem to be coordinated or subordinated. Two examples are provided in (151) and
(152) from Edo and Nupe, taken from Baker and Stewart (2002: 2).24
23This section builds substantially on Alexiadou and Lohndal (2011).























‘Musa cooked a yam and sold it.’
Importantly, these structures contain two transitive verbs and the second verb has
no overt object. Instead, the object of the first verb is understood to be the object
of the second verb. Baker and Stewart (2002) argue convincingly that this second
verb instead has a pro; see their paper for justification.25
Baker and Stewart (1999) and Stewart (2001) argue that the two verbs can be
coheads of the same VP, which entails a doubly headed analysis of serial verb struc-
tures. However, Baker and Stewart (2002) argue against this analysis on empirical
grounds. If a double-headed VP is the correct structure, we expect the two verbs to
behave alike. Baker and Stewart found at least one instance where this is not the
case. They show that in Nupe, verbs can be doubled for focus reasons. However,























‘Musa cooked the yam and DID sell it.’
Therefore, Baker and Stewart (2002) suggest that one of the vPs is adjoined
25See Jeong (2007) for an analysis involving sideward movement of the object of the second verb
so that it also becomes the object of the first verb.
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Baker and Stewart present a couple of arguments for why adjunction is needed
here. This rests on a comparison between consequential serial verb constructions


























‘Musa there the knife onto the table.’
The difference between consequential and resultative serial verb constructions is that
in the latter case, the second verb is an unaccusative verb. Whereas consequential
serial verb constructions describe composite events where there are two distinct
subevents, resultative serial verb constructions describe a single event where the
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second verb characterizes a state that the object comes to be in as a result of the
action denoted by the first verb (Baker and Stewart 2002: 3). Now, Baker and
Stewart argue that in resultative serial verb constructions, the second verb can
undergo complex predicate formation with the first verb. This is required in order
for the second verb to be close enough to the object such that it can discharge
its thematic role to the object. Concretely, for (157) they assume the syntactic
structure in (158) and that the lower verb moves from its base position and adjoins















Crucially, this relies on the idea that head movement applies such that it feeds theta
role assignment, building on an idea by Saito (2000). Baker and Stewart point out
that we see V-V-incorporation overtly in resultative constructions in Igbo, which is
a Nigerian language that is related to Edo and Nupe, but does not have serial verb









‘Obi pushed Eze down.’









‘Ada cooked and ate the yams.’
To account for this, they invoke the idea that transitive verbs have more structure
than unaccusative verbs. They argue that V can incorporate, but that transitive
verbs have a v layer above V. Baker and Stewart claim that v is not a theta role
assigner: ‘V assigns Theme, and (active) Voice assigns Agent, but v assigns no
theta-role; it only adds a semantic sense of causation and licenses accusative case
on the object’ (Baker and Stewart 2002: 34). They propose the condition in (161),
which makes this clear.
(161) X and Y form a complex predicate only if there is some Z that X and Y both
theta-mark.
Since there is this difference between consequential and resultative serial verb
constructions, Baker and Stewart argue that a consequential serial verb construction
‘does not have the same need to be the complement of V1 as VP does’ (Baker and
Stewart 2002: 37). Therefore they make the common assumption in (162).
(162) X can be the complement of Y if and only if X and Y enter into a thematic
relationship.
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This leads the authors to conclude that the second vP in a consequential serial verb
construction has to be an adjunct, as in the representation in (155). They add two
empirical pieces to support this claim.
Unlike in resultative serial verb constructions, in a consequential serial verb
construction the second verb phrase can follow a goal PP or a resultative AP that is




























‘Ozo threw the pot into the trash so that it broke.’
They also point out that VP-final adverbs and PP adjuncts can come before the
second verb in Edo, contrary to resultative serial verb constructions. This contrast



























‘Ozo pushed the pot quickly/in the the house down.’
Baker and Stewart conclude that these data show that the second verb phrase is not
the complement of the first verb phrase. Rather, it has to be some kind of adjunct.
However, this argument is not watertight. If the second verb phrase is an
adjunct, then it should be possible to leave it out. If that happens, we are no longer
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dealing with a serial verb construction. Furthermore, if there are differences in the
syntactic structure for transitive and unaccusative verbs, then this might be related
to the attachment site for adjuncts. A feasible analysis seems to be to say that
adjuncts can adjoin to v but not to V, in which case the contrast between (163) and
(164) and (165) and (166) would follow.
Alexiadou and Lohndal (2011) discuss these facts from the point of view of
Distributed Morphology, and they argue that the correct syntactic structure looks
















The structure in (167) has one unusual property, namely the way the second root
is introduced. The root is in the specifier of a categorizing head, and not the
complement of a categorizer, as is the case for the first root.
Alexiadou and Lohndal defend this structure in different ways, but I will not
go through their arguments here. Instead I would like to argue that the present
theory gives us a nice way of deriving the logical form for serial verb constructions.
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Pietroski (2005a: 210-217) argues that serial verbs offer an additional argument
for full thematic separation and that the correct logical form is one in which each
argument and each predicate are interpreted as monadic predicates. Let us consider
this in more detail.
An important fact here is the contrast between (168) and (169) (Pietroski
2005a: 210). This is a contrast between a serial verb construction from Edo and a
























‘Ozo will cook the food and then eat it.’
In (168), there is one big event with multiple stages. In (169), there are two events,
where one events precedes the other. I have tried to incorporate this difference into
the idiomatic translations. So we want a logical form that brings out this difference.
Building on a note by Baker and Stewart (2002) that the right eventish semantics
will ensure that goat is the Theme of both hit and see in (151), Pietroski provides a
semantics that achieves this. The logical form for (151), repeated here for expository












‘Ozo will kill the goat and sell it.’
(171) ∃e[Agent(e’, Ozo) & hit(e) & Theme(e, goat) & sell(e) & Theme(e, pro)]
This logical form presupposes complex processes like hitting the goat in order to sell
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it and doing so. This process begins with a cooking, its Theme is the food, it ends
with an eating, and its Theme is the value of pro (Pietroski 2005a: 213). Thus
there is one ongoing event where the Agent is related to the same process as the
Theme(s). Based on the thematic predicates and the fact that there is only one
kind of event variable in the logical form, one can assume that speakers can make a
quick inference that we are dealing with an ongoing event. That is, as long as both
verbs have the same event variable (e), they will be understood as part of the same
event. If there are two event variables, as seems to be the case when there is an
overt second object as in (169), then there are two different events.
I have set aside several details here, but if (171) is roughly the correct logical
form for serial verbs, then the syntactic structure in (167) is exactly what is required.
Each of the specifiers in that tree will constitute a separate Spell-Out domain, and
will thus correspond to a conjunct at logical form.26
With this in hand, here is the derivation for the serial verb construction in
(170). Note that I am assuming roots and categorizers here, since I do not see how
else the verb will be introduced into the structure. I am also using English words
in the derivation for the sake of exposition.





26Note that this also makes it possible to say that the second root in (167) is actually not really
a specifier, and one can maintain that all roots are complements of a categorizer.
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(173) a. Spell out vP, merge pro.
b. FP
pro F















(177) a. Spell out vP, merge goat.
b. FP
goat F





(179) a. Spell out FP, merge Ozo.
b. VoiceP
Ozo Voice
I won’t continue the derivation, but this shows how it works. As the reader will be
able to verify, each Spell-Out domain will, as before, correspond to a conjunct at
logical form. I take serial verbs to provide further support in favor of the theory
since we do not need any additional mechanisms to analyze such structures.
In the next section, I will discuss the relationship between Thematic Integra-
tion and the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH).
5.7 Thematic Integration and UTAH
In chapter 4, I argued for a semantic composition principle that I called Thematic
Integration. I repeat the definition of the principle in (180).
(180) Thematic Integration
H DP →Spell-Out→ R(e, DP).
The goal of this section is to argue that this principle is important if one wants to
account for a principle like UTAH in the grammar (Baker 1988, 1997).
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As discussed in chapter 4, the principle in (180) crucially relies on certain
heads that I abstractly call y. It seems that a list of possible heads y may be needed
in order to prevent overgeneration of the sort ‘C(e, whP)’ where there is a wh-phase
at the left edge of the sentence. As an example, if the Agent is introduced as a sister
to a Voice head, then (180) returns ‘Agent(e, XP)’. This means that there has to be
a rule that connects Voice and Agent. I will argue that Baker (1988, 1997)’s UTAH
does this. The hypothesis is given in (181).
(181) The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH)
Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identi-
cal structural relationships between those items at the level of D-structure.
(Baker 1988: 46)
Among others, the hypothesis is intended to account for the contrast in (182)-(183),
i.e. to account for why there seem to be no verbs where the Theme of the event is
expressed as the subject.
(182) John hit/built/found/pushed/bought/cleaned/broke/described the table.
(183) *The table plit/puilt/vound/fushed/pought/bleaned/proke/tescribed.
(Baker 1997: 76)
Clearly there is a poverty of stimulus issue here: No child ever has access to such
data as in (183), but nevertheless, no child acquires such a grammar. Instead the
child will recognize that such structures are illicit despite no input telling them that
they are bad.
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Interestingly, Baker (1997: 120-121) states the following linking principles that
give content to UTAH.27
(184) An agent is the specifier of the higher VP of a Larsonian structure.
(185) A theme is the specifier of the lower VP.
(186) A goal, path or location is the complement of the lower VP.
These principles cannot immediately be adopted in the present work, and they also,
for natural reasons, do not incorporate the rich work on the syntax of argument
structure that has been going on in recent years (Borer 2005a,b, Alexiadou et al.
2006, Pylkkänen 2008, Ramchand 2008). Nevertheless, similar rules can be formu-
lated within the present approach. Since I assume that all arguments are sisters of
dedicated functional projections, the rules would have to take the form sketched in
(187)-(190), with an independent assumption about where in the tree these heads
27These rules can be stated in different ways. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995) suggest the
rules in (i) and (ii).
(i) Immediate Cause Linking Rule
The argument of a verb that denotes the immediate cause of the eventuality described by
that verb is its external argument (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995: 135).
(ii) Directed Change Linking Rule
The argument of a verb that corresponds to the entity undergoing the directed change
described by that verb is its direct internal argument (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995:
136).
See also Larson (1988) for discussion.
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sit.28
(187) An agent is the sister of a Voice head.
(188) A theme is the sister of a F head.
(189) A benefactive is the the sister of an Appl head
(190) A goal, path or location is the sister of a G head.
I have used Voice as a label since the literature agrees that the Agent is related
to the Voice head (Kratzer 1996, Stechow 1996, Alexiadou et al. 2006, Pylkkänen
2008, Ramchand 2008, Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou 2010) (see also Chomsky
(1995c), Harley (1995). As for the other labels, I have used Appl for applicatives.
There may be more than one applicative head (McGinnis 2001, Cuervo 2003, Jeong
2006, Pylkkänen 2008), and these various heads may require a different semantics
such that the principle in (190) probably needs to be split into several rules. Since
my goal is not to give an in depth study of applicatives and their semantics, I will
not provide further discussion of that issue here. The main goal is rather to clarify
the logic.
As for objects, I have just used an F projection. Marantz (2005), Alexiadou
et al. (2006) argue that (change-of-state) verbs are syntactically decomposed into a
Voice, a v and a root component as in (191) (see also Kratzer (2005)).
(191) [Voice [v [Root ]]]
28This is similar to Epstein (2009) who argues that thematic assignments happen in a head-non-
head relationship (what Epstein calls theta marking).
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The v head introduces an event (cf. the process head in Ramchand (2008)). Fur-
thermore, Alexiadou et al. (2006), Alexiadou and Anagnostopoulou (2010) argue
that causative semantics emerge via the combination of v and a resultant state (a
root or a small clause), cf. Embick (2004), Ramchand (2008), Schäfer (2008). This
does not make v a plausible head for the theme to merge with. Therefore I am just
going to suggest that there is a functional head F that merges with the theme; see
Marantz (2005) for some further thoughts on what its semantics may be.
The rules in (187)-(190) would also derive thematic uniqueness, namely the
fact that no verbs seem to be able to assign the same thematic role to two or more
of its arguments Carlson (1984: 271).29 The reason is that the mapping principle
makes reference to the functional heads, and since each argument is related to one
functional head, thematic uniqueness would follow. It would also make thematic
uniqueness a principle of grammar and not a principle of eventualities as Carlson
(1984: 273) argues. Furthermore, this way of looking at Thematic Integration does
not necessitate that interpretation is ‘delayed’ in the sense argued by Hunter (2010:
71-72). Hunter argues that in order for an argument to be interpreted as either an
external or an internal argument, interpretation needs to take place in a configura-
tion where both arguments are present. This is not necessary once (180) is assumed
instead of the type-shifting operation Hunter assumes.
29This assumes that identical heads cannot iterate, which is related to the question of how the
order of heads is ensured. See Cinque and Rizzi (2008), Shlonsky (2010) and van Gelderen (To
appear) for discussion.
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One may object to my use of specific thematic roles and not the more general
labels External and Internal (cf. Williams (1981a), Pietroski (2005a), Hunter (2010)
on the latter). For Williams, the external argument is a distinguished element that
is singled out by underlining. Kratzer (1996: 131) claims that the notion of an
external argument has no theoretical significance once arguments are severed from
the verb. The reason is that, strictly speaking, the agent argument is no longer an
argument of the verb. On my approach, the same can be said about the Theme
argument. Kratzer also remarks that what we call the external argument of the
verb is really the internal argument of Agent. Thus, even for Kratzer, all arguments
are therefore internal, which is something that also holds of the view I am arguing
in favor of. Belletti and Rizzi (1988) also argue that an internal/external distinction
is not sufficient to capture Italian psychological predicates and Grimshaw (1990)
argues that any given argument is ‘more external’ or ‘less external’ than another.
There is another related reason why I do not think it is profitable to use
External and Internal. The reason is UTAH. If Baker’s work is on the right track,
then we need quite specific mapping principles between the syntax and SEM. As
Baker (1997) argues, UTAH can be seen as part of the theory of the syntax-semantics
interface. The following quote endorses exactly the same view as the one I am
defending in this thesis.
(192) If [the] kind of lexical decomposition approach begun by Hale and Keyser
and brought into the syntax by Chomsky and others is correct, then the
UTAH essentially disappears as a separate condition of grammar. The basic
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function of the original UTAH was to regulate where the various arguments of
a predicate are expressed. This is a nontrivial task if predicates have multiple
arguments of the same type, because one must keep track of which NP is
associated with which argument position. If, however, syntactic structure
is built from the lexical decomposition of a verb, such that each predicate
in the decomposition takes a single NP argument, then UTAH becomes
trivial. All that remains is a simple convention that an argument must
be in a local configuration with its argument-taker; the rest follows from
compositional semantics. We have then reduced the UTAH to a matter of
“virtual conceptual necessity” (Baker 1997: 125-126).
What Baker refers to as lexical decomposition (explicitly as in the work of Hale and
Keyser (1993, 2002); though see also Dowty (1979) and Levin and Rappaport Hovav
(1995)) of the verb is equivalent to the functional heads I am employing here. Given
this, it seems difficult to use entirely general labels, as they do not seem to capture
the relevant generalizations.
Lastly, notice that even if I argue that these mapping rules are necessary, this
does not mean that I am putting ‘Agent’ and ‘Theme’ into the syntax, as I pointed
out in chapter 4. Rather, the mapping rules give translations from the syntax and
into the semantics. This may seem like a notational trick, but it is actually a
significant difference because it keeps the syntax independent of the semantics. If
we had put Agent and Theme into the syntax, then the syntax would in part be
semantically driven, which is not a view I would like to endorse. Therefore I will
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maintain that my approach is distinct from an approach that puts Agent and Theme
as heads in the syntax.
5.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have argued that the theory presented in chapter 4 offers an avenue
to account for the EPP in English. This is based on the claim that the EPP follows
from conditions on linearization. I have also integrated my approach to the EPP in a
larger theory of EPP-phenomena involving other Germanic and Romance languages.
I then discussed how movement works on the present approach, and continues to deal
with the fact that the present theory cannot derive CED effects in traditional ways,
and I briefly suggested a way that one can do that. I also noted that the domain
of application for an operation like Agree is smaller on the present approach than
on most other approaches. I did not explore the cross-linguistic implications of this
claim, but noted that theories like Distributed Morphology relegate most of these
agreement facts to the PF component. Then I turned to serial verb constructions
and argued that my theory of Spell-Out derives their logical forms straightforwardly.
Lastly I discussed if the present approach can tell us something about UTAH and I





This chapter is more concerned with some fundamental issues than the previous
chapters. In particular, I want to discuss the issue of transparency. Concretely, what
does it mean for a mapping to be transparent? In order to begin to address this
question, it is necessary to consider the nature of the syntax-semantics interface.
This interface can be more or less transparent, and various mapping alternatives
have been presented in the literature.
Consider Higginbotham (1985)’s proposal. He provides rules that he calls
‘basic principles of interpretation’ (Higginbotham 1985: 590). These include four
principles involving the Theta Criterion and its implementation, rules for quantifiers
and quantifier scope, and lastly rules for antecedence and disjoint reference. Such
principles of interpretation relies on a very specific syntax, as Higginbotham makes
very clear, but there is no one to one correspondence between syntactic and semantic
rules. As such the mapping is not as transparent as it could be, but it is transparent,
say, for quantifier scope since the scopal relations depend on the syntactic structure
at LF.
In the next section I will discuss Jacobson (2002)’s perspectives on the syntax-
semantics interface. Jacobson frames this as an issue of compositionality, but one
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can just as well view it as an issue of transparency and the nature of the mapping
from one grammatical component to another component. Her discussion will be
useful to see both the kind of mapping proposals that have been offered and to
contrast them.
The chapter has the following outline. Section 6.2 discusses four different
views of compositionality and compares them. It is argued that a system where
each syntactic rule has a corresponding semantic rule cannot be sustained. Section
6.3 offers a few remarks on compositionality and discusses compositionality from
the point of view of a conjunctive semantics. Section 6.4 elaborates on the basic
semantic operations and briefly discusses whether they are specific to the human
Faculty of Language. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Four different views of compositionality
As I pointed out, there is a close relation between the syntax-semantics interface
and compositionality. In what follows I will present Jacobson (2002)’s discussion
of compositionality. The discussion is particularly relevant for how to think about
the syntax-semantics interface, and it will form the background for my discussion
of semantic composition operations below.
Jacobson (2002) discusses four views of compositionality. Her main goal is
to defend the idea of direct compositionality, which is the idea that syntax and
semantics work closely together when generating structures. She particularly argues
against what has been the traditional view within Chomskyan generative syntax
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since May (1977) (see also Chomsky (1976)), namely that there is a syntactic level
of representation called Logical Form (LF) which serves as the input to ‘semantics’.
It is important to note, as she points out, what the specific nature of the objection
is (emphasis mine):
(1) ‘The objection to LF is not that it necessitates an additional ‘level’ - for a
level is nothing more than a by-product of the rule system, and so it is the
nature of the rule system which is (or should be) of primary interest. But
indeed this view does entail a more complex rule system; the claim that there
is a level of LF (distinct from surface structures) necessitates an additional
set of rules mapping between surface structures and LF’ (Jacobson 2002:
602).1
Both based on considerations of theoretical parsimony and from a more minimalist
perspective, we want to reduce the theoretical machinery as much as possible, i.e.,
we want the rule system to be as simple and elegant as possible, provided that it
still yields descriptive adequacy. LF was invented exactly for the latter reason, and
if one wants to argue against it, one has to show how the same phenomena can be
analyzed without it.
Jacobson also argues that the choice is not between LF and an architecture
with a straightforward one-to-one mapping between syntax and semantics. There are
other ways that one can maintain a notion of more or less direct compositionality
while admitting differences between the syntactic and semantic composition, and
1This is only an argument if SS exists, though Jacobson seems to have actual surface structures
in mind, and not SS in the sense of GB theory.
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Jacobson argues that all of these are superior to the LF analysis: ‘Moreover, even if
there is good evidence for a level of LF distinct from surface structure, there remain
various ways to conceive of the organization of the grammar, and what I am calling
the ‘modern’ solution is surely one of the more complex ways that has ever been
dreamed up’ (Jacobson 2002: 602). In the following subsections, we will see how she
makes that argument, though it should be noted that the surface structure Jacobson
is talking about is not the notion that we have had since the Extended Standard
Theory. Rather, it is just the linear string. As we have learned from the history
of generative grammar, is not obvious what surface structure is, and we certainly
cannot assume that it is obvious what it is.
The following discussion will center around sentences of the form in (2).
(2) Some man read every book.
Such ambiguous sentences, with a (universal) quantifier in object position, have been
the subject of intense study for decades, and they also motivated the LF approach in
May (1977). The sentence in (2) allows two possible readings: there is a particular
man who read every book, or that every book was read by some man or other.
We will use the sentence in (2) to briefly illustrate how each approach handles the
ambiguity.
6.2.1 (A) Strong Direct Compositionality
This view is the strongest view that one can take concerning how syntax and se-
mantics are related. Each syntactic rule has a corresponding semantic rule that
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gives you the meaning of the relevant constituent as a function of its parts. This is
typically known as the rule-to-rule principle and it originated with Montague (1970)
(see also Bach (1976)). Szabó (2000: 484) articulates it this way:
(3) Compositionality is often formulated as the so-called rule-to-rule principle:
Complex expressions can be assigned meaning by assigning meaning to the
basic expressions and by giving a semantic parallel to the syntactic con-
struction steps. The idea behind the rule-to-rule principle is that for each
syntactic rule that specifies a way of combining certain sorts of expressions
into a complex expression, there is a corresponding semantic rule which spec-
ifies a function that assigns to the meanings of the constituents the meaning
of the complex expression we get when we apply the syntactic rule to them.
Jacobson assumes that the syntactic rules are of a context-free phrase struc-
ture type, which means according to her that the grammar does not have to keep
track of structure - it merely concatenates strings (Jacobson 2002: 603). This view
of compositionality requires one to use type-shifting rules fairly frequently. As Ja-
cobson notes, this may not be too different from a theory that opens up the door for
silent elements, since a silent lexical item that applies to the expression with which
it combines is more or less equivalent to a type-shifting operation.
As for cases like (2) above, Jacobson discusses two alternatives. One involves
‘Cooper storage’ (Cooper 1975), which keeps the syntax simple by the relevant
standards but enriches the semantics. Another view is to use type-shifting rules.
A typical solution is to say that verbs like read are listed in the lexicon with the
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type < e,< e, t >>, but that there is a type-shifting rule that allows an argument
to lift to an << e, t >, t > type.2 If you first lift the subject and then lift the
object, then you get a wide-scope reading of the object. As we can see, on this
approach, there is no ‘mismatch’ between the syntax and the semantics, though the
semantic operations are very powerful since there are few if any limitations on what
type-shifting can do.
6.2.2 (B) Weak(er) Direct Compositionality
What Jacobson calls ‘weak(er) direct compositionality’ is different from a strong
direct compositionality in two ways. First, the combinatory syntactic rules are
not all equivalent to a context-free phrase structure grammar. Instead they may
perform some other operations. Second, syntactic rules may build structure and
not just unstructured strings. Since this allows for the construction of trees, we are
close to what Montague did and what was subsequently done in the mid and late
1970s. For Montague, linguistic expressions are first translated into a language of
intensional logic, and only expressions of that language receive interpretation. This
means that it is not the case that each of the syntactic operations is associated with
a unique semantic operation, since there is this intermediate level. However, this can
easily be changed such that you do not need the intermediate level, so Jacobson’s
point that Montague grammar is weakly directly compositional still stands.
The way to deal with cases like (2) also came from Montague, namely from
2An alternative would be to say that transitive verbs map pairs of generalized quantifiers to
truth values.
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his ‘Quantifying-In’ rule. Jacobson (2002: 605-606) shows how this can be done
formally, but these details are not important for present purposes. Suffice it to
say that a quantifier in these cases binds a variable and that the linear order of
quantifiers will determine the scope.
6.2.3 (C) Deep Compositionality
This is the model in Generative Semantics. In this theory, Deep Structure equals
Logical Form, though generative semanticists did not care much about specifying in-
terpretations the way semanticists usually do. However, as Jacobson says (Jacobson
2002: 606), this is easy enough to achieve. One can say that each tree is specified
as well-formed by the syntactic rules and, at the same time, each tree is given a
model-theoretic interpretation by the semantic parts of the rules. It is important
to note the following property of deep compositionality: ‘A key difference between
this and Strong Direct Compositionality is that this view contains an additional
set of transformational rules which map the Logical Forms to surface structures’
(Jacobson 2002: 606).
As for data such as (2), the treatment of these is quite different from what
we have seen so far. There is a level where the quantifiers are represented: They
are in their raised position corresponding to their interpretation, rather than in
their surface position that corresponds to where they are pronounced. Quantifier
Lowering takes care of the discrepancy, which means that whenever a quantifier
appears in object position, this appearance is due to Quantifier Lowering. The
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ambiguity follows from the initial height of the quantified NPs, since this is where
they are assigned an interpretation.
6.2.4 (D) Surface to LF
The last view Jacobson discusses is what has come the most prominent view within
Chomskyan generative grammar, namely ‘[. . . ] the view that there is a level of LF
which receives a model-theoretic interpretation and which is derived from surface
structures by some set of rules’ (Jacobson 2002: 607). Jacobson correctly points
out that there are two possible versions of this view. The first one is that the com-
positional syntactic rules directly give surface structure and these are then mapped
into LFs. The second one is the more familiar one, where the surface structures
are derived from an underlying structure. An argument in favor of this architec-
ture that is often put forward is that the overt and covert transformations are very
similar, though, crucially, there can be differences between the two types of trans-
formations. I will return to this point below when I consider empirical arguments
for the existence of such differences.
When it comes to dealing with quantifier ambiguities as in (2), the analysis is
pretty much like a reversed version of the analysis in Generative Semantics. That
is, the quantified material is located roughly in situ at surface structure (except
for movement to subject position for EPP reasons), and then at LF there will be
movements to generate the correct scope relations. The syntactic component works
independently of the interpretational component in the sense that a syntactic surface
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structure representation is generated, then a syntactic LF representation, and then
the interpretational rules work on the latter representation.
6.2.5 Comparison and discussion
Jacobson (2002) stresses that there is a substantial difference between the first three
approaches to compositionality (A-C) and the last one (D): ‘A, B, and C all have in
common the fact that the syntax ‘builds’ in conjunction with the model-theoretic
interpretation, and this is discarded in D’ (Jacobson 2002: 609). One could view
this as problematic for aesthetic reasons, as Jacobson also does: a system where syn-
tax and semantics run in tandem – in the sense that semantic composition tracks
syntactic composition, as if expressions had their meanings intrinsically – is more
elegant than a system where they do not. However, what Jacobson fails to mention
is that you could formulate a rule that gives a semantic value to the syntactic trans-
formation. The semantic value could be vacuous, though it would still constitute
a semantic value. If so, then the correlation between syntactic and semantic rules
would be reinstated. However, Jacobson has two other objections that this solution
does not answer: ‘The first [objection] is that under the conception in D there is no
explanation as to why these systems work on such similar objects, and the second
(related) problem is that D requires a duplication of information not required in
A-C’ (Jacobson 2002: 609). I find the first objection particularly important.3 If
the syntactic and semantic rules are roughly the same, namely concatenative with
3The second objection does not seem convincing. Approaches A and B surely duplicate infor-
mation by having predicates with an infinite hierarchy of types via lifting.
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something added to get you hierarchy and thematic closure, as suggested in Horn-
stein and Pietroski (2009), then we really need strong empirical evidence to bolster
the claim that a level of LF is necessary. Otherwise the natural conclusion should
be that syntax and semantics dovetail rather closely.
Jacobson elaborates on the latter objection concerning duplication of informa-
tion in the following way:
(4) ‘Moreover, there is a clear cost to the move of divorcing the syntactic com-
binatory rules from the semantic rules. The point is easiest to illustrate by
a comparison of theory C to theory D, since these are otherwise most alike.
Both theories contain an additional set of rules effecting a mapping between
surface structure and LF; they disagree on the direction of the mapping.
Crucially, in theory D, the semantic combinatory rules (or their equivalents),
and this means that the syntactic side of things must be stated twice: once
as output of the syntax, and once as input to the semantics’ (Jacobson 2002:
610).
Of course, there is a way to show that we in fact need duplication. Jacobson clearly
states how such an argument would have to run:
(5) ‘The claim that these rules operate on different objects could also be sub-
stantiated if one could show that the semantic rules took as their input a
much larger or more general set of local trees than the syntactic rules give
as output. If one could really make such a case, then divorcing the output of
the syntax from the input to the semantics would be exactly the right move,
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but to my knowledge, there have been no serious arguments to this effect’
(Jacobson 2002: 611).
In the last sentence, I think Jacobson ignores in particular one argument advanced
by Huang (1982) which seriously challenges her claims.
Huang (1982) discussed a striking set of data from Chinese wh-movement and
compared them to English. Consider the contrast between (6) and (7) (from (Huang
et al. 2009: 266)).















‘What do you like the person who bought t?’
(6) shows a standard case of a Subjacency violation. Since (7) is good, one may be
lead to think that Subjacency does not apply in Chinese. However, that conclusion
is not warranted. Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988: 107) present the following data.
(8) Who [t believes [the claim [that [Mary read what]]]]
(9) ?*What [do you believe [the claim [that [Mary read t]]]]
Under the assumption that all wh-phrases need to move to Comp at LF, () requires
the same exception from Subjacency that Chinese requires. Rather, what seems
to be going on is that there is a difference between syntactic movement and LF
movement.
Further support for this view comes from the fact that even though arguments


















‘Why do you like [the person who bought the books t]?’
Huang (1982) argued in favor of the following: complements can move freely at LF,
non-complements cannot. A non-complement is constrained by the Empty Category
Principle (ECP).
The following example in (11) shows that adjuncts can move in Chinese with-
out incurring an ECP violation because the trace is antecedent-governed, assuming
the LF-representation in (11), using English words for ease of exposition.
(11) [Why1]1 Mary thinks [t1 [John [left] t1]]
This derivation assumes contra Aoun et al. (1981) that comp-to-comp movement at
LF is possible.
Jacobson (2002) does not discuss these facts much. Here is what she has to
say about them:
(12) ‘It has also become popular to talk of the difference between wh-movement
constructions (English) and quantifier scopes (or the difference between wh-
movement in English and in Chinese – see Huang, 1982) as reducing to a
difference between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ movement. But - aside from the fact
that this makes for a pleasant rhyme - it doesn’t seem to be any more illumi-
nating than saying that the difference is between appending to the front and
substituting in (as in the classical Montague treatments) or between moving
up and moving down (as in classical Generative Semantics)’ (Jacobson 2002:
615-616).
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I think the above discussion has shown that the data show more than Jacobson
takes them to show. Therefore I think there is still a good case to be made for di-
vorcing syntactic and semantic operations. There are too many syntactic operations
that do not have a corresponding semantic effect, e.g., movement, although move-
ment per se is not incompatible with one kind of direct compositionality, as Barker
and Jacobson (2007) emphasize. If we consider both Huang’s argument and scope
interactions, then we have very powerful arguments that there are interactions here
that exclude otherwise puzzling absences of ambiguities. Taken together with the
evidence provided by Huang, it is clear that there is no one-to-one correspondence
between syntactic and semantic rules.
If this is correct, we have to ask what the constraints are on the mapping.
That such constraints exist has been clear since May (1977)’s influential work, and
has been developed by Huang and others. Montague (1974b)’s approach is too lib-
eral, in that there are not enough constraints on the mapping principles. Jacobson’s
own favorite approach is constrained, but as we have seen, there are empirical prob-
lems with it. This thesis has suggested strict mapping principles, where there are
limitations on the size of the syntactic domains that are transferred to logical form.
The other constraints will be syntactic in nature, cf. May (1977) and Hornstein
(1995a,b) for illustrative examples.
The theory in this dissertation supports this latter conclusion. The Spell-Out
domains are divorced from the purely syntactic operations, and hence there is no
one-to-one correspondence between the syntactic rules and the ‘semantic’ rules. The
latter have been argued to include conjunction, thematic integration and existential
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closure. However, the reader may be curious to know how these operations fit into
a compositional theory. I will therefore say a bit more about this before I return to
some discussion of the nature of these operations.
6.3 A few remarks on compositionality
We have seen how discussion of the interface between syntax and semantics pro-
vides us with some perspectives on transparency. The mapping can be less or more
transparent. This will in turn have consequences for how compositionality works.
Bayer (1996) argues that the neo-Davidsonian approach comes in two flavors:
One flavor is a lexical flavor, where the denotation of the verb contains slots for
thematic predicates (Bayer 19964):
(13) chase = λyλxλe[chase’(e) ∧ θSU ,chase′(x)(e) ∧ θDO ,chase′(y)(e)]
Bayer calls this approach the lexical strategy. The other flavor is what Bayer calls
the compositional approach. On this approach, the meaning of a verb is a set of
events.
(14) chase = λe[chase’(e)]
As Bayer points out, on this approach, thematic roles are linked to the verbal mean-
ings with the events that correspond to the meaning of the verb. The approach I
am pursuing is clearly of this second type.
Several researchers have objected to me that compositionality necessarily in-
volves lambdas. If the computation is not type-driven by way of lambdas, the
computation is not compositional. There are several things that are wrong with
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this claim.
First, lambdas just stand for functions. As Collins (2011: 43) puts it, ‘The
original function and its λ-abstraction are equivalent as so interpreted, as the ab-
straction simply names the function that interprets the original predicate (open
sentence) as defined in M[odel], where any occurrence of a variable is replaced by
what the function f takes as its argument’. So lambdas per se should not be re-
quired given that this is all they do. And as Champollion (2010b,c) has shown, one
can generate the same interpretation as above by way of a type-driven computation
where functional heads introduce arguments. This should not come as a surprise: a
powerful tool such as the lambda-calculus can clearly do the same as a less powerful
tool.
Second, it is important to be clear on what compositionality amounts to. Here
is a standard definition: ‘Compositionality is a property that a language may have
and may lack, namely the property that the meaning of any complex expression is
determined by the meanings of its parts and the way they are put together’ (Pagin
and Westerståhl 2010a: 250). There are several issues to bring out here: One is that
compositionality is not a given - it could very well be that natural language is not
compositional, as e.g., Fodor (2001) claims.4 Another is that we need a definition
of what meaning is - how are meanings composed should be an important question.
As Szabó (2000) has made very clear, there are many different flavors of com-
positionality. For our purposes, we care about how an abstract notion of composi-
4See Pagin and Westerståhl (2010b) for a discussion of common objections to compositionality.
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tionality is realized in natural cases, i.e., in cases involving natural language data.
One answer could be Functional Application. Another answer could be Conjunc-
tion. For both these alternatives, it is important that the mapping be systematic.
Thus we might worry more about systematicity rather than compositionality when
it comes to natural language.5 The rules that relate the parts to the whole have to
be systematic. As Hornstein (1995b: 386) argues, ‘That this systematicity is not as
strictly compositional as it might be does not imply that it fails to account for the
productive capacity displayed by native speakers’. This argument gets even stronger
if it is the case that language is not really compositional, because even if language
isn’t compositional, it surely is systematic. My approach involves a mapping that is
both systematic and compositional: for each Spell-Out domain, there is a conjunct.
And each conjunct is related to the whole sentential logical form, which is closed by
an existential quantifier.
The real questions involve the nature of the basic operations that the system-
atic mapping invokes. These basic operations can have different complexities. One
can imagine a syntax that is as rich and as complex as possible and that any kind
of semantic composition operations are allowed. That will provide an enormously
powerful theory, which coupled with the availability of silent structure, pretty much
can do whatever one wants it to do. This means that it will be hard to justify why
only a few of these options are exploited in natural language. Furthermore, it will
make it very hard to come up with a transparent mapping from syntax to semantics.
5See also Blutner et al. (2004) for an empirical argument that systematicity is superior to
compositionality.
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Consider a question related to this, which relates to the necessity for constraints on
the semantic side.
Why are there only some semantic types? There is no known theory of how to
restrict or explain the type typology that we find. Even the motivation for why we
have the basic types 〈e〉 and 〈t〉 is not very clear, as Partee (2006) points out. She
concedes that it is in part because of tradition and in part because it has worked
so well. As she also points out, whereas the model-theoretic domain corresponding
to type 〈e〉 has been fairly uncontroversial, there has been more disagreement when
it comes to type 〈t〉. Partee lists the following suggestions: truth-values, sets of
assignment function, functions from possible worlds to truth-values and propositions
taken as primitives. In a sense, Montague had a third basic type, namely possible
worlds, and there have also been proposals to add more basic types: situations or
eventualities and sometimes times. As Partee points out: ‘Arguments for or against
various choices have usually been arguments from elegance of resulting analyses, not
arguments claiming conceptual necessity’. If we want a transparent mapping, we
want to reduce the power of the semantic operations, and reduce the discrepancy
between syntactic composition and semantic composition. Questioning the necessity
for a type typology might be relevant from this perspective.
The second possibility is that syntax is simpler but that the semantics as
complex as one likes. From the point of transparency, it is not trivial how one maps
a simple syntax onto a complex semantics. Semantics seem to require hierarchical
and binary trees, and also quite a bit of movement-like relations. How will a syntax
that is very simple (e.g., non-hierarchical) provide the right input to the semantics?
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Clearly, there will have to be a lot of generative power on the semantics side in order
to remedy such missing syntactic structure. Put differently, semantics will have to
do things that a more complex syntax could have done.
One can of course turn the previous picture on its head, which gives us the
third possibility, namely a complex syntax and a simple semantics. In principle,
a complex syntax allows for as much silent structure as one wants, which again
constitutes a case where it is hard to properly constrain the theory.6 In many
ways, this view corresponds to the view that generative semanticists held (see Lakoff
(1972), McCawley (1973), cf. also Harman (1972)), although they rarely spelled out
the semantic interpretations, as discussed above. A complexity discrepancy is crying
out for ‘adjustment’ rules, it seems, and they in turn require explanation. And as
before, discrepancies don’t yield transparency.
Lastly, the fourth option is to make both syntax and semantics as simple as
possible. Based on what I have said so far, this clearly comes out as the ideal alter-
native. If one can make both syntax and semantics simple, this makes it somewhat
easier to give principled explanations for why these operations exist and how they
may have come into existence evolutionarily speaking.7 Put differently, we need to
attribute less to Universal Grammar, which is preferable for the reasons just given
(cf. Chomsky (2005), Richards (2008), Hornstein (2009), Boeckx (2011)).
6It should be noted that it is hard to tell apart semantic operators that are stipulated to exist
only in the semantics from those that are present as silent operators in the syntax.
7Crucially the syntax cannot be too simple, as in Quine (1960) and Davidson (1967), where
there is really no notion of a hierarchical syntax.
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Interestingly, if both syntax and semantics are simple, then arguably the map-
ping from syntax to semantics will be simple too, maybe close to Montague’s “rule-
to-rule” hypothesis where a syntactic rule corresponds to a semantic rule (see also
Epstein et al. (1998), Barker and Jacobson (2007)), as we discussed above. Com-
plex semantic operations will not be needed to remedy the simplicity of syntax if
it can be argued that the semantic operations themselves are simple. A major goal
of the present thesis is to argue that one can get a transparent mapping from syn-
tax to semantics by simplifying both components appropriately (see also Hornstein
(1984) for a somewhat similar claim). So by independently simplifying syntax and
semantics, the mapping between them also gets simplified. There will of course be a
limit to how much simplification one can do, and I have no advocated a rule-by-rule
hypothesis in this dissertation.
I have argued for a simple syntax and semantics, but it has suggested mapping
principles that are non-trivial. These mapping principles appear at first glance to
be more complex than a point-by-point mapping, since they require a delay in some
cases in order to generate the appropriate Spell-Out domain. Despite this, I have
tried to make the case that eliminating specifiers and verbal adicity makes it possible
to develop a more restricted theory of the syntax, the semantics and the syntax-
semantics interface.
I will now return to the basic operations I have posited and discuss their nature
in some more detail.
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6.4 Basic operations
In chapter 4 I discussed the three basic semantic operations that I assume. For ease




It is important to emphasize the relative simplicity of these operations. They are
all fairly general operations, and one can even ask if they are language-specific op-
erations. Conjunction is a very general rule, which just chains two things together
without changing any of their properties. Existential Closure is a very general prop-
erty of logic and presumably even other non-human species make use of. Evidence
for this may be that they have thoughts or instincts that refer to specific objects,
e.g., in the case of identifying a prey. As for Thematic Integration, this is not really
a semantic operation on my approach. It has a semantic effect, but it is clearly a
syntactic rule related to how Spell-Out works.
It should be noted that conjunction encompasses a very general principle that
can easily be adopted by Neo-Montagovians. A priori, it would be desirable to
have just one compositional operation, be it conjunction or functional application.
Montague’s algebraic conception of semantics require that the syntactic operation
of concatenation corresponds to a single semantic operation. This has typically
been taken to be functional application. Conjunctivism allows Neo-Montagovians
to treat instances of predicate modification as another instance of a general oper-
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ation of concatenation, which could be driven by lambda functions if so desired.
Pietroski (2005a) has argued that this is not desirable on either theoretical or em-
pirical grounds, but my point here is simply to point at the similarity across meta-
theoretical frameworks. For any theorist, it should be desirable to stipulate as few
operations as possible.8
One question that arises is what this separate faculty might be. Several re-
searchers have made the case for a faculty of logic. Chomsky (1988: 99) argues:
(18) The logical notions are embedded in our deepest nature, in the very form
of our language and thought, which is presumably why we can understand
some kinds of logical systems quite readily whereas others are inaccessible
to us without considerable effort [. . . ] if at all.
A similar point has been made by Luria (1973: 141):
(19) To the biologist it makes eminent sense to think that, as for language struc-
ture, so also for logical structures, there exist in the brain network some
patterns of connections that are genetically determined and have been se-
lected by evolution as effective instruments for dealing with the events of
life.
For further arguments to this effect, see Crain and Pietroski (2001), Pietroski and
Crain (2005) and especially Crain and Khlentzos (2010) for acquisition experiments
that argue in favor of innate knowledge of logic. In the future, it would be interesting
8In addition to these operations, quantification over sequence variants may be required for
purposes of quantification and relative clauses, cf. Larson and Segal (1995), Pietroski (2011).
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to explore these issues further.9
9Nowhere in this thesis have truth and reference played a significant role. This is not just
because I have not been specific about this issue, but because I do not think that these notions
should play a significant role in an I-language approach. This aligns well with the Chomskyan
approach. Several researchers have presented many arguments in favor of a purely internalistic
approach that does not make use of reference and truth, cf. Chomsky (1977, 1995b, 2000b),
Horwich (1997, 1998), McGilvray (1998), Pietroski (2005b, Forthcoming), Patterson (2009). In a
forthcoming book, McGilvray outlines this view in more detail:
(i) I mentioned before that one can introduce a technical term, call it ‘referM’ or something of
that order (with indices for contextual variables or not), to indicate a relationship that is
stipulated to stand between a word and a thing. This can be a useful tool in doing formal
semantics and model theory. In such a case, however, the aim is not to somehow capture
what is going on when a person on an occasion actually refers to something, but rather
the aim is to create a mental model in which a term stands in the specified relationship
to a specified thing or things, perhaps in some (also stipulated) possible world. This can
be useful in trying to make sense of inference and entailment, among other things - or at
least, it has proven so. But it must be kept in mind that in stipulating such a relationship
and the ‘things’ that terms referM to, the things and circumstances in the model and the
model as a whole are all mental inventions and are inside the head; they are not things ‘out
there’. In effect, then, introducing mental models of this sort is an exercise in syntax. It
can be justified, but not as a way of capturing reference and truth (appropriateness, etc)
as these notions arise in the use of language (McGilvray In press: chapter 4).
There is a lot of work to be done in order to develop this view in great detail, and I hope to return
to that in future work.
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6.5 Conclusions
This chapter has argued that we need to divorce syntactic composition from semantic
composition and that a conjunctivist semantics is compositional in many ways. I
also argued that rather than worrying about compositionality when it comes to the
Faculty of Language, we should rather worry about systematicity and what the
right systematic composition rules are. The chapter also elaborates on the basic





The goal of this dissertation has been to unify two reductionist hypothesis: that
syntax does not distinguish between specifiers and complements, and that verbs do
not take thematic arguments. I have argued that these two hypotheses actually
bear on each other and that we get a better theory if we pursue both of them. The
hypothesis that each application of Spell-Out corresponds to a conjunct at logical
form has been put forth, which transparently maps syntactic structures onto logical
forms. Extensive discussion has been provided of the problematic nature of both
specifiers and of verbs taking thematic arguments. Several syntactic consequences
of the proposal have been outlined and discussed, and I have emphasized the need
for reanalyzing many facts involving areas such as movement, linearization, serial
verbs, extraction and so on and so forth. Lastly the thesis offers a specific view of
compositionality and basic semantic operations from a conjunctivist perspective.
If the arguments in the present thesis are on the right track, there are several
areas of semantic and syntactic theory that would have to be reanalyzed in order
to fit into the theory that I have put forward. Examples that come to mind are:
nominal phrases, polysynthesis, crossover effects etc. Whether the theory can be
sustained is in part a question of how successful these reanalyses turn out to be. I
have dealt with the most obvious challenges that come to mind in chapters 4 and 5,
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but needless to say, there are many other empirical nuts and bolts that will have to
be dealt with. One domain that I have not discussed here for reasons of space, is the
syntax and semantics of interrogatives, though see Lohndal and Pietroski (2011) for
comprehensive discussion within the present framework. Clearly others remain, and
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